E.D.Ky.: If police reasonably believe someone not answering, knock and talk can go from front door to another door; finding overdose victim justified entry

Where the police attempt a knock and talk and it’s apparent to them that somebody is home but not coming to the door, it is not unreasonable to go to another door to attempt an answer. Thus, the curtilage may be invaded to that limited extent. The court notes that SCOTUS left this open in a qualified immunity case in November: Carroll v. Carman. The warrantless entry was based on exigency. “While Manning might be ungrateful that law enforcement intervened during his drug overdose, he is incorrect in asserting that they were unjustified in entering his home.” United States v. Manning, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22202 (E.D.Ky. February 23, 2015), R&R 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182358 (E.D. Ky. November 6, 2014):

… Manning does not argue that the officers’ initial approach to his front door was improper but, challenges whether the “knock and talk” doctrine further justified their decision to walk around the house to see if anyone was trying to escape or if there was another entrance where the officers could attempt to make contact.

As the Magistrate Judge explained, “where knocking at the front door is unsuccessful in spite of indications that someone is in or around the house, an officer may take reasonable steps to speak with the person being sought out even where such steps require an intrusion into the curtilage.” Hardesty v. Hamburg Twp., 461 F.3d 646, 654 (6th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). Manning contends that the officers acted unreasonably in remaining on his curtilage after nobody answered at the front door. The question presented is twofold. First, were there sufficient indications that a person was in the residence? Second, did the officers take “reasonable steps” aimed at contacting the persons inside or was the officers’ continued presence on Manning’s property unreasonable? See Hardesty, 461 F.3d at 654.

First, there is no question that officers had ample indication that someone was in the house. Steve Peace told them that Manning was home [Hearing at 37:24-37:40] and this was later confirmed by Deputy Jackson who heard movement inside the house [Id. at 40:36-40:42]. Manning does not contest this point.

Second, the Court must consider whether it was reasonable for the Officers to approach the back of the home to make contact. In an effort to show that the Officers’ actions were not reasonably calculated at making contact with the persons inside the house, Manning notes that the evidence failed to show (1) that there were walkways accessible to the public that led to the rear of the house, (2) that there was a porch or steps at the rear door, or (3) that the area surrounding the trailer was sufficiently public to justify the police officers’ exploration. [R. 859 at 2.] These factors sometimes aid Courts in determining whether police actions were reasonable. See Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 349, 190 L. Ed. 2d 311 (2014) (discussing knock and talk exception but not deciding a bright line rule). These factors are not, however, necessarily determinative of whether an officer’s actions were reasonable.

For example, in Hardesty there were no pathways leading from the front yard to the back deck. See Hardesty, 461 F.3d at 649. Furthermore, the fact that there was no back porch or deck cannot render the Officers’ decision to walk to the back of the house unreasonable. How would the officers know if there was a back deck with a door until they walked around the house to look? Finally, Manning argues that the area surrounding the trailer was “insufficiently public” to justify their decision to walk around back, noting that the area behind the trailer was grown up. This is confirmed by the testimony of Trooper Moses. Moses Testimony at 2:24:31-2:24:44. Of course, Moses would not have known that the area around the back door was grown up unless he walked around the house to figure this out.

In his objection, Manning cites to a very recent Supreme Court decision, Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 349, 190 L. Ed. 2d 311 (2014), to demonstrate how unsettled the law surrounding this subject is. In Carroll, the Supreme Court considered cases from many different circuits that discuss the scope of the “knock and talk” technique but, rather than provide the Court with a bright line rule, the Supreme Court chose to save the question for another day. If anything may be taken from Carroll regarding the scope of the “knock and talk” doctrine, it is that the question of whether “a police officer may conduct a ‘knock and talk’ at any entrance that is open to visitors rather than only the front door” remains unanswered. Id. at 352.

Under the controlling law of this Circuit and the circumstances presented in this case, the knock and talk exception justified the Officer’s decision to walk around the house. The Officers had sufficient indication that persons were in the house and, after knocking on the front door was unsuccessful, took reasonable steps to contact the persons inside the house by approaching the back door.