Defendant corporation’s voluntary disclosure of a computer hard drive by a consent search which it permitted the government to copy was a waiver of attorney-client privilege in the hard drive. United States v. General Maritime Management (Portugal) L.D.A., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55163 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 2008).

Trial court’s finding that officer’s fleeting view of an air freshener hanging on the rear view mirror was not an obstruction was factually entitled to deference. The stop was unjustified, and the trial court’s suppression order is affirmed. People v. Johnson, 384 Ill. App. 3d 409, 893 N.E.2d 275 (4th Dist. 2008).*

During traffic stop, officer told defendant “Okay. Then we’re done,” and walked away from the side of the car. Ten seconds later he asked if he could ask some more questions, and defendant assented. Defendant told the officer she had drugs in her purse and consented to a search. Kunselman v. State, 2008 WY 85, 188 P.3d 567 (2008). (Comment: Once again, a court concludes the defendant understood that a stop had ended and did not restart when the officer asked questions. What person really understands they are free to drive off?)

Hospital security guard commissioned to arrest under Ohio law was a state actor. His arrest of the defendant for trespass in a hospital lobby was valid. State v. Hughes, 2008 Ohio 3966, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3384 (1st Dist. August 8, 2008).*

Even if the initial entry into defendant’s apartment was invalid, the search warrant was valid as based on an independent source of previously obtained information. Defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s finding was premised on the initial entry and not the independent source issue. State v. Diaz, 109 Conn. App. 519, 952 A.2d 124 (2008).*

“[A] request for consent to search does not constitute interrogation.” State v. Rippe, 119 Haw. 15, 193 P.3d 1215 (2008).*

Officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for obstructing an officer when he directed her to show her concealed hands as he was retreating from another person he was afraid would assault him. State v. Niebauer, 2008 Ohio 3988, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3388 (11th Dist. July 25, 2008).*

The government did not exceed the scope of a search warrant for defendant’s computer for child pornography by looking at files that were not obviously child porn by their names. “As an initial matter, Defendant’s brief contains no citation to any legal authority whatsoever. Accordingly, it is not clear what legal grounds Defendant has for his motion or his theory concerning the Government’s search and seizure of his computers and storage devices.” United States v. Ogden, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93489 (W.D. Tenn. November 18, 2008).*

Defendant’s consent was not free, and the remainder of the search flowing from it was barred under Wong Sun. United States v. Singleton, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93134 (W.D. N.Y. November 12, 2008).*

Defendant’s swerving was reason enough for a stop that the defendant might have been falling asleep while driving. United States v. Triska, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D. Kan. 2008).*

The mentally ill retain Fourth Amendment rights. The fact they are not permitted to possess firearms does not give the police the authority to make warrantless entries to confiscate them. Moreover, that does not even give grounds for a search warrant under Penal Code § 1524. People v. Sweig, 167 Cal. App. 4th 1145, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (3d Dist. 2008):

In this case, a search warrant could not have been obtained despite the legislative mandate (§ 8102) that law enforcement shall confiscate and retain custody of any firearm or other deadly weapon that is owned, possessed, or under the control of a person detained for mental health treatment and evaluation because the person is suffering from a mental disorder causing the person to be gravely disabled or dangerous to himself, herself, or others (§ 5150).

(4) When a mentally disordered person is detained outside of his or her residence pursuant to section 5150, law enforcement cannot get a search warrant to confiscate a firearm or other deadly weapon inside the residence because, as the People acknowledge on appeal, the situation specified in section 8102, without more, does not fall within the limited grounds set forth in Penal Code section 1524 for the issuance of search warrants.

Plaintiff’s complaint that search for a body that involved digging up property after an alert by a cadaver dog survived summary judgment on the reasonableness of the conduct of the digging. Spangler v. Wenninger, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86369 (S.D. Ohio September 3, 2008).*

Location of search was a drug processing house, not a residence, so defendant had no standing as a guest. State v. McCoy, 2008 Ohio 4947, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4150 (9th Dist. September 29, 2008):

[*P10] It is obvious from the evidence that the house at 1114 W. 18th Street was a place for storing and trafficking drugs, and not a traditional place of residence. When asked to describe the inside of the house in question, one of the arresting police officers stated: “It appeared to be a place where they were bringing in marijuana, cocaine, [and] they were repackaging it for distribution.” The nature of the house had been so converted by the lessee that it had lost its character as a residential dwelling and with it the heightened protection inherent in such property. Furthermore, McCoy presented no testimony or evidence outside of his own assertions that showed he actually had the permission required to receive protection as an “overnight guest”. See Gulley at P25 (“Although social guests enjoy Fourth Amendment protection in certain instances, privacy does not attach per se upon a person’s blanket assertion that [he is] a guest in another’s home.”).

Consenter who signed a consent form in Spanish had apparent authority to consent to search whole premises. United States v. Aragon-Ruiz, 551 F. Supp. 2d 904 (D. Minn. 2008).*

Actual renter of rental car was not present, but an authorized driver was the passenger, and he could consent to a search of the car. State v. Morgan, 2008 Ohio 4948, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4154 (9th Dist. September 29, 2008).*

GSR testing after arrest requires no warrant. It is no different than fingerprinting. People v. Allen, 376 Ill. App. 3d 511, 875 N.E.2d 1221, 314 Ill. Dec. 934 (1st Dist. 2007).

Motion to suppress was summarily denied because the record supported the finding that defendant’s stop was not unreasonably extended and he consented. United States v. Villalovos, 249 Fed. Appx. 339 (5th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).

Being transferred from one jail to another involves no new seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Goldhaber v. Higgins, 576 F. Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2007).*

Officers were looking for a stolen air compressor, and they came upon defendant’s truck parked in front of his house visible from the road, and they suspected the air compressor was there. They approached in this public area, and saw stolen tools from that vantage point in an open shed. It was valid plain view. Tryon v. State, 2007 Ark. LEXIS 515 (September 27, 2007).*

Defendant could show no more than the informant was a mere tipster and not involved in the drug transaction as he contended. Therefore, the informant would not be disclosed. Cauley v. State, 287 Ga. App. 701,
652 S.E.2d 586 (2007).*

There was an objective basis for defendant’s traffic stop. State v. Burnette, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 770 (September 28, 2007).*

Trial court erred in suppressing stop of defendant’s vehicle on victims’ report of a robbery. State v. Green, 992 So. 2d 82 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008):

Here, it appears that the robbery occurred mere minutes before Officer Ferguson stopped Green’s vehicle. The State asserts in its brief in opposition to Green’s motion to suppress that Green’s vehicle was stopped approximately 1.3 miles from the laundromat where the robberies occurred. The 1 dispatches identified the vehicle as a gray or dark gray car with two to four black males in the vehicle. Apparently the source of the dispatches was the victims’ descriptions of the robbers to police. Officer Ferguson stopped the vehicle approximately six minutes after the BOLO was issued.

The place to be searched was described by its look and its address, so the warrant clearly satisfied particularity. The good faith exception would save it, too. United States v. Gutierrez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27260 (N.D. Okla. April 1, 2008).* (Comment: The way this is described in the opinion, this was not even a close call. This must have been an argument made to satisfy the client.)

Federal § 1983 claims that could have been brought in a previous state action and weren’t were precluded in federal action. Zaklama v. Leanza, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27195 (D. N.J. March 31, 2008).*

Child pornography search warrant for defendant’s premises failed to show probable cause under Second Circuit precedent.

Absent any allegation that Falso accessed the cpfreedom.com website, and with little or no weight attaching to his prior conviction, the question remains whether other allegations in the affidavit, considered as a whole, support a finding of probable cause. Generalized allegations about: (1) the propensity of collectors of child pornography to intentionally maintain illegal images; (2) law enforcement’s ability to retrieve such images from a computer; and (3) the ability to view child pornography on the cpfreedom.com website, fail to establish the requisite nexus of illegal activity to Falso. Although Falso might hoard images of child pornography if he viewed and downloaded them, there is no allegation in the affidavit that he was in a position, or was otherwise inclined, to do so.

. . .

In the end, the district court’s finding of probable cause in Falso’s case required it to make at least two significant additional inferential leaps not required in Martin and like cases. First, in Falso’s case there is no allegation that he in fact gained access to the cpfreedom.com website, much less that he was a member or subscriber of any child-pornography site. Second, there are no allegations to support an inference that the sole or principal purpose of the cpfreedom.com website was the viewing and sharing of child pornography, much less that images of child pornography were downloadable from the site. Thus, it is only after making the inferences that (1) Falso in fact accessed a website (2) whose principal purpose was the viewing and sharing of child pornography, that the district court could draw the ultimate inference, upheld in Martin, that those who become members of a child-pornography website are likely to collect such images. Putting aside the dangers of Martin’s ultimate inference, see Martin, 426 F.3d at 81-83 (Pooler, J., dissenting); Coreas, 419 F.3d at 156-58, the dangers of coupling it with the inferences drawn in Falso’s case are exponential.

We are not insensitive to “the need for law enforcement to have a certain amount of latitude in conducting criminal investigations.” Martin, 426 F.3d at 76. But, as we explained in Coreas, requiring the government to gather “evidence particularized to the target of the search” before the warrant application is made “will simply focus law enforcement efforts on those who can reasonably be suspected of possessing child pornography.” Id. at 158 (emphasis added). If this proves to be a hindrance, it is one the Fourth Amendment demands.

[A website named C[hild]P[ornography]Freedom? What could that mean?]

However, the good faith exception saved this search warrant (on a 2-1 vote). The showing of probable cause was not lacking that it was not reasonable to rely on it. United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008).

Dissent: “An executing officer can hardly claim good-faith reliance on a warrant issued by a judge who was mis-directed by the officer himself: the same principle explains why, at a magic show, the credulity of the audience does not cause the magician to fear that the lady has been sawn in half.”

Officer’s mistake of law as to applicability of some state vehicle equipment laws to a vehicle registered in another state was not reasonable, so the stop was unjustified. Motion to reconsider granted. United States v. McHugh, 569 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2008).*

Factual dispute whether defendant was holding a bag of marijuana was resolved against him, and it cannot be said to be clearly erroneous. People v. Glenn, 2008 NY Slip Op 6383, 53 A.D.3d 622, 861 N.Y.S.2d 781 (2d Dept. 2008).*

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash left at the curb for collection. People v. Laurent, 194 P.3d 1053 (Colo. App. 2008).*

Object in defendant’s pocket felt during a frisk was not immediately perceived as a weapon, so going in after it was not reasonable. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 564, 667 S.E.2d 410 (2008)*:

The record shows that Bohannon lacked authority to intrude into Brown’s pocket. We recognize that, while patting down the outside of that pocket, Bohannon detected the corner of a hard object. Nothing indicates, however, that the object felt like a gun or other weapon. On the contrary, Bohannon did not know what it was and decided to investigate further based only on the broad assumption that “anything can house a weapon.” Moreover, when questioned at the suppression hearing, Bohannon pointed to no particularized facts that reasonably led him to believe that Brown might have a weapon. Although Bohannon was suspicious that no one knew Brown, he did not believe that Brown had committed a crime and was prepared to let Brown walk away from the scene.

Defendant’s claim that he was subjected to an illegal warrantless arrest without probable cause so his DNA was improperly obtained on his arrest was not presented to the trial court so it is waived. He raised a Sixth Amendment claim against his arrest, not probable cause. State v. Foreman, 2008 Conn. LEXIS 353 (September 16, 2008).*

Exclusionary rule applies in probation revocation proceedings because of defendant’s allegation that the officer acted in bad faith. Logan v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 533, 666 S.E.2d 346 (2008):

We conclude that the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Scott is misplaced based upon three relevant distinctions between Scott and the present case. First, Scott involved a parolee, rather than a probationer, 524 U.S. at 360, and parolees “have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment,” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006). Second, the parolee in Scott had explicitly consented to a search of the house and his person as a condition of parole. 524 U.S. at 360. Third, a parole revocation hearing is an administrative proceeding, and “[a]pplication of the exclusionary rule would … alter the traditionally flexible, administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings.” Id. at 364. Therefore, we reaffirm our holding in Anderson and rule that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the exclusionary rule never applies in probation revocation proceedings and in failing to consider Logan’s bad-faith argument.

Defendant’s twice going over the white line was probable cause for a stop, and that led to defendant’s arrest for DUI. State v. Mays, 2008 Ohio 4539, 119 Ohio St. 3d 406, 894 N.E.2d 1204 (2008).*

Officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s car for cruising through the parking lot of a high school football stadium without stopping when it was apparent that the driver was not coming to attend the football game and officers expected a fight to occur. Esposito v. State, 293 Ga. App. 573, 667 S.E.2d 425 (2008).*

Where the entry was authorized and the evidentiary value of drugs in plain view was apparent, seizure was lawful and the trial court erred in suppressing the plain view. People v. Gothard, 185 P.3d 180 (Colo. 2008).*

Police were called to a suspicious vehicle sitting at a gas pump for a half hour. When they arrived they found the defendant asleep with a marijuana pipe on the car console in plain view. It could be seized and was also incident to his arrest. State v. Conway, 992 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2008).*

Suspected prostitute and pimp who rented a hotel room had an expectation of privacy in the hotel room and a computer that they both used. The alleged pimp had standing in a rental car rented by his mother where he had permission to use it. United States v. King, 560 F. Supp. 2d 906 (N.D. Cal. 2008).*

Defendant’s stop was lawfully continued by reasonable suspicion to validate consent. State v. Tindall, 379 S.C. 304, 665 S.E.2d 188 (2008):

1) Tindall was nervous even after receiving the warning; 2) Tindall was driving a rental car that he had not rented; 3) Tindall was driving only one way and then dropping the car off; 4) Tindall planned on driving approximately eighteen hours in one day; and, 5) the cities involved were both “drug hubs.” We find evidence in the record to support a determination that Colegrove had a reasonable suspicion something illegal was occurring. Therefore, the search and seizure did not violate Tindall’s Fourth Amendment rights and the trial court did not err in admitting the cocaine.

Trained narcotics officers had reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in drugs before his flight from them. State v. Dick, 181 Md. App. 693, 957 A.2d 150 (2008):

In our opinion, prior to Dick’s flight and at the time of the stop, the police had reasonable suspicion that he was involved in illegal drug activity. The police officers were specialists in drug enforcement. The area and the specific location under surveillance were known for illegal drug activity and, in fact, two of the officers had previously arrested persons at the gas station for such crimes. Contrast Lemmon, supra, 318 Md. at 380. The location was not a recreational area or meeting place, so that Hoffman’s persistent bicycle riding and apparent wait for someone was out of the ordinary. The quick hand-to-hand transaction in an area more remote than the gas station, although not positively identified as a drug sale, was more than two men talking. Contrast Lemmon, supra, 318 Md. at 379-80. It was recognized by the officers as characteristic of such illegal activity. Although Ward and Stricklin did not see the transaction themselves, they were not acting upon an anonymous tip, but upon eye-witness information received from fellow officers, who also knew the hallmarks of drug activity. Contrast Lemmon, supra, 318 Md. at 379. In addition, there were reasons to make a stop. Ward and Stricklin did not know which of the two suspects was the buyer or seller or whether either displayed signs of using drugs, and a brief delay, while the other officers confronted Hoffman, could have provided vital information. Clearly, the police were acting “in a swiftly developing situation.” United States v. Sharpe, supra, 470 U.S. at 686. Finally, the stop itself was for the briefest of periods.

Further questions of a stopped motorist were valid. Hughes v. State, 293 Ga. App. 404, 667 S.E.2d 163 (2008):

Having de-escalated the traffic stop, police did not need any additional suspicion to ask another unrelated question or to request consent to search. “Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual and request consent to search — as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.” (Punctuation omitted.) Hampton v. State. See Salmeron v. State, supra, 280 Ga. at 736 (1). “[I]f the consent is voluntary, an officer may obtain consent to search a car following the conclusion of a valid traffic stop, without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Sims, supra, 248 Ga. App. at 279. Under the circumstances of this case, in which Hughes had been released from the traffic stop, the officers’ request to ask Hughes a question and their subsequent immediate requests to search Hughes’s vehicle and conduct a pat-down were permissible. See Hampton v. State, supra, 287 Ga. App. at 898-899 (1) (affirming denial of a motion to suppress where police requested and received consent to search “immediately” after returning driver’s license and insurance card).

(See Tracey Maclin, Police Interrogation During Traffic Stops: More Questions Than Answers, 31 Champion 34 (Nov. 2007).)

Court chooses not to believe the defendant’s version. Officers’ testimony was consistent, but defendant lied to the officers going in to this case, and that affects his credibility with the court. United States v. Govan, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97442 (N.D. Ind. December 1, 2008).*

Detention was based on PC and not unreasonably extended. United States v. Dixie, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97567 (N.D. Ind. December 1, 2008):

Asking the Defendant to exit the truck did not turn the reasonable detention into an unreasonable one. In fact, a police officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977). Additionally, the fact that Officer Nicklow’s inquiry about weapons was unrelated to the purpose of the stop does not, by itself, render the detention unreasonable.

Defendant was stopped on a bicycle after he was observed near a computer report to a police car of a crime. He fit the description. After the stop, it was apparent that he was not doing anything wrong, and the suspicion for the stop was dispelled. When defendant dropped his arm to his side, the officer grabbed his arm and put it behind his back because the officer claimed to fear a weapon. Cocaine was found. The seizure was unjustified, and the motion to suppress is granted. United States v. Veltri, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97897 (S.D. W.Va. December 2, 2008).*

Statement in affidavit that vehicle was “Hine’s vehicle” is not a false statement that he owned it because it could mean a way of describing the vehicle. In any event, ownership is immaterial here. United States v. Kelso, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98235 (E.D. Tenn. December 3, 2008).*

Defendant’s reliance on the video and audio of his stop was unavailing here. “The Court disagrees with defendant’s argument that there are discrepancies between the officers’ testimony and the content of the tape which prevent the officers’ testimony from being considered credible. To the contrary, the testimony of the officers is largely consistent with the contents of the video/audiotape.” United States v. McIlwaine, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236 (E.D. Tenn. December 3, 2008).*

The exigencies of the situation justified a warrantless entry to search for a gun and drugs. Included in the exigencies is the seriousness of the crime under investigation. The standard of exigencies for arrest should apply to entries to search, too. United States v. Schaffer, 286 Fed. Appx. 81 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished):

This Court has set forth five factors that district courts are to consider when deciding whether an exigency existed at the time a search commenced:

(1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant; (2) the officers’ reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to police guarding the site; (4) information indicating the possessors of the contraband are aware that police are on their trail; and (5) the ready destructibility of the contraband.

United States v. Mowatt, 513 F.3d 395, 399 (2008) (citation omitted). We have previously held that “arguably, these factors must be supplemented by the gravity of the underlying offense, a factor employed by the Supreme Court in the context of a warrantless arrest.” United States v. Owens, 848 F.2d 462, 470 n.4 (4th Cir. 1988).

It bears noting here that this list is inexhaustive and no single factor is controlling. See United States v. Reed, 935 F.2d 641, 642 (4th Cir. 1991) (“[T]here is no precise formula since emergency circumstances will vary from case to case and the inherent necessities of each situation must be scrutinized.”) Instead, exigencies must be judged in light of all of the relevant actors and from the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the warrantless intrusion.

. . .

Turning to the factors enumerated in Mowatt, inasmuch as it was reasonable for the officers to believe that an armed man was lurking around and may have already returned to his home, the first factor, the urgency factor, favors the Government’s argument concerning exigent circumstances. The second factor, concerning the officers’ reasonable belief that the contraband was about to be removed or destroyed, favors the Government to the extent that this factor is construed to refer to the officers’ reasonable belief that Schaffer might be in the house and he might flee. The third factor regarding the possibility of danger to police guarding the site also favors the Government. It was reasonable for them to enter the house based on the circumstances that they faced to determine if Schaffer was present and armed. Further, the fact that they entered the house with their guns drawn demonstrates their concern for not only their safety but also for Nancy Schaffer.

As to the fourth factor, there is no evidence in the record as to whether Mr. Schaffer was aware that the police were on his trail. There is also no evidence in the record as to the fifth factor, that the officers were concerned about the ready destructibility of the contraband. Thus, these two factors favor neither party. Concerning the gravity of the offense, here, the officers were confronted with a situation in which it is unchallenged that the officers had information that Mrs. Schaffer had reported that Mr. Schaffer “had held a gun to her head and threatened to kill her.” (Appellant’s Br. 2) (J.A. 36, 37). Thus, this factor favors the Government.

Comment: Whenever a sliding scale on the gravity of the crime is involved, the court must caution against producing “more slide than scale.” Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 394 (1974).

Officers’ conduct in blocking in plaintiff’s car and grabbing her arm to take away a piece of paper with an officer’s license number on it was a seizure, and there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. The officers were allegedly protecting an undercover officer’s identity in case of retaliation. Childs v. Dekalb, 286 Fed. Appx. 687 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

Even if defendant’s arrest was unlawful, the officers had a valid search warrant. United States v. King, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15333 (11th Cir. July 17, 2008) (unpublished).*

Encounter in the baggage claim area was not shown to be coercive, even though defendant was asked to go to a police office in the airport. Defendant’s “post-9/11” argument that airport security is tougher and more coercive is rejected. United States v. Davis, 286 Fed. Appx. 574 (10th Cir. 2008)* (unpublished) (Comment: An objective review of the facts leads me to conclude, having not seen the record of the hearing, that defendant was coerced into being moved from one place to another.)

Exigent circumstances of a burglary investigation with a kicked in door and a request to look for intruders did not cease when the officer came outside once and then decided to go back in for a further look. United States v. $291,828.00 in United States Currency, 536 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2008):

Braddy’s entire theory of unlawful search rests on the fact that Gent walked outside after the “quick walk” through and then, with a second officer, re-entered the premises to make sure there was no intruder present. Braddy does not dispute that he requested a police officer be sent to his home for this very purpose. However, Braddy seemingly wants this court to adopt a bright line as to how thoroughly officers may look for an intruder under these circumstances. Under Braddy’s arguments, had Gent waited just inside the “kicked in” back door, exigent circumstances would still be in place. Similarly, had Gent heard and/or seen an intruder and walked outside to make sure he had back-up before attempting an arrest, exigent circumstances would no longer exist and he would have had to wait for a warrant to reenter the home. The court cannot draw such a bright line for when exigent circumstances cease to exist.

Given the unique and unusual facts of this case, we find that the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment did not instantaneously cease upon Gent walking outside.

Defendant could be stopped when he was entering the security perimeter of a search just as a nighttime search was about to occur. Officers approached him with guns drawn and saw drugs in plain view. United States v. Jennings, 544 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2008):

It is a logical extension of the rule of Summers and the reasoning in Bohannon and Baker to hold here that it was reasonable for the officers to briefly detain Jennings after he entered the security perimeter surrounding the apartment where the narcotics search was underway. Although Jennings never stepped onto the property being searched, he entered the officers’ security perimeter just as a SWAT team armed with high-powered rifles entered the apartment from the rear. His arrival took the officers by surprise, and given the elevated risk of violence during a search for narcotics, they were reasonably concerned for their own and for Jennings’s safety, as well as for any activity that might compromise the search. Had it become necessary for the officers to apprehend anyone trying to escape through the front door of the apartment, Jennings and his passenger would have been in their path. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to “exercise unquestioned command of the situation” by detaining Jennings long enough to ensure that he was unarmed and uninvolved in criminal activity. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03.

The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement strikes a balance between an individual’s interest in being left alone and the public’s interest in community safety, crime control, and the safety of law enforcement officers engaged in the work of protecting the public and investigating crime. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331; United States v. Burton, 441 F.3d 509, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2006). Here, the officers’ interest in maintaining control inside their security perimeter until the SWAT team secured the targeted apartment for the search far outweighed Jennings’s interest in being left alone for the few moments that he was detained. Seconds passed between the moment the officers blocked in the Cadillac and the moment they saw the bag of crack in plain view through Jennings’s window, giving them probable cause for arrest. In light of the limited nature of the intrusion and the officers’ compelling need to maintain control within the security perimeter, Jennings’s detention was reasonable. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332; Burton, 441 F.3d at 511-12. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Jennings’s motion to suppress the crack.