CA7: Defendant driving into the security perimeter of a heavily armed nighttime search could be stopped

Defendant could be stopped when he was entering the security perimeter of a search just as a nighttime search was about to occur. Officers approached him with guns drawn and saw drugs in plain view. United States v. Jennings, 544 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2008):

It is a logical extension of the rule of Summers and the reasoning in Bohannon and Baker to hold here that it was reasonable for the officers to briefly detain Jennings after he entered the security perimeter surrounding the apartment where the narcotics search was underway. Although Jennings never stepped onto the property being searched, he entered the officers’ security perimeter just as a SWAT team armed with high-powered rifles entered the apartment from the rear. His arrival took the officers by surprise, and given the elevated risk of violence during a search for narcotics, they were reasonably concerned for their own and for Jennings’s safety, as well as for any activity that might compromise the search. Had it become necessary for the officers to apprehend anyone trying to escape through the front door of the apartment, Jennings and his passenger would have been in their path. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to “exercise unquestioned command of the situation” by detaining Jennings long enough to ensure that he was unarmed and uninvolved in criminal activity. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03.

The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement strikes a balance between an individual’s interest in being left alone and the public’s interest in community safety, crime control, and the safety of law enforcement officers engaged in the work of protecting the public and investigating crime. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331; United States v. Burton, 441 F.3d 509, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2006). Here, the officers’ interest in maintaining control inside their security perimeter until the SWAT team secured the targeted apartment for the search far outweighed Jennings’s interest in being left alone for the few moments that he was detained. Seconds passed between the moment the officers blocked in the Cadillac and the moment they saw the bag of crack in plain view through Jennings’s window, giving them probable cause for arrest. In light of the limited nature of the intrusion and the officers’ compelling need to maintain control within the security perimeter, Jennings’s detention was reasonable. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332; Burton, 441 F.3d at 511-12. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Jennings’s motion to suppress the crack.

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