VA: Exclusionary rule applies in probation revocation proceedings

Exclusionary rule applies in probation revocation proceedings because of defendant’s allegation that the officer acted in bad faith. Logan v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 533, 666 S.E.2d 346 (2008):

We conclude that the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Scott is misplaced based upon three relevant distinctions between Scott and the present case. First, Scott involved a parolee, rather than a probationer, 524 U.S. at 360, and parolees “have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment,” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006). Second, the parolee in Scott had explicitly consented to a search of the house and his person as a condition of parole. 524 U.S. at 360. Third, a parole revocation hearing is an administrative proceeding, and “[a]pplication of the exclusionary rule would … alter the traditionally flexible, administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings.” Id. at 364. Therefore, we reaffirm our holding in Anderson and rule that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the exclusionary rule never applies in probation revocation proceedings and in failing to consider Logan’s bad-faith argument.

Defendant’s twice going over the white line was probable cause for a stop, and that led to defendant’s arrest for DUI. State v. Mays, 2008 Ohio 4539, 119 Ohio St. 3d 406, 894 N.E.2d 1204 (2008).*

Officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s car for cruising through the parking lot of a high school football stadium without stopping when it was apparent that the driver was not coming to attend the football game and officers expected a fight to occur. Esposito v. State, 293 Ga. App. 573, 667 S.E.2d 425 (2008).*