Prosecutor’s comment in opening statement about defendant’s refusal of consent violated the Fourth Amendment, but it was harmless. Fratcher v. State, 37 So. 3d 365 (Fla. App. 4th DCA 2010):

In this appeal, Fratcher complains of the following comment the prosecutor made during her opening statement:

The police get there. Fratcher opens the door and they place him under arrest. He immediately–the officer, you hear Detective McNally … say, can I search your truck. No, you can’t search my truck.

We believe that, under Gomez [v. State, 572 So. 2d 952, 953 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)], the trial judge abused his discretion in overruling Fratcher’s objection to this comment. While the prosecutor did not make the comment in a closing argument–so that it was not tinged with the argumentative character that made the Kearney comments so harmful–it was made as part of a narrative retelling of the facts, as was the impermissible comment in Gomez. Against this case’s constitutional backdrop, the prosecutor’s comment ran afoul of the strong prohibition against comment on a defendant’s exercise of his Fourth Amendment rights that the fifth district announced in Gomez and we followed in Kearney. Nonetheless, we find the error to be harmless. See Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1999).

Contrary to Fratcher’s argument, however, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.”Improper prosecutorial comments give rise to error justifying mistrial when they are so prejudicial that they vitiate the entire trial. In determining whether reversal is warranted …, the court must determine whether the effect of the comment was to prejudice the jury and impair the fairness of the proceeding.” Mannarino v. State, 869 So. 2d 650, 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (citations omitted) (some internal punctuation marks omitted) (in context of comments made by prosecutor during closing argument). Here, the trial court ruled that the comment did not vitiate the entire trial. We agree. The prosecutor made the comment during opening statement in a non-argumentative manner and did not focus on the fact that Fratcher refused consent to a search. After the judge admonished the prosecutor not to mention it again, the prosecutor did not.

[An issue that remains unstated is a double jeopardy bar mistrial: If a mistrial were granted, the defendant would be able to assert a double jeopardy bar, and the loser of that issue would appeal, seriously prolonging the trial. If the comment is not outrageously flagrant and clearly designed to prejudice the accused, the trial court likely is better off to deny the mistrial for the time being and hold it under abeyance and admonish the prosecutor. If it recurs, mistrial; if not, the jury may cure the issue by acquitting. At least the court can view the issue in the context of the whole trial and rule on it in a motion for new trial on harmless error.]

A magistrate keeping his copies of issued search warrants in a brief case and not a file cabinet satisfies state rule 41 requiring search warrant papers separate. The purpose of the rule is to prevent alteration, and that suffices. State v. Waters, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 732 (August 21, 2009):

The issue on appeal is whether storing copies of search warrants in a briefcase amounts to “keep[ing] one copy as part of his … official records.” The Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require a magistrate to keep copies of search warrants in any specific manner. Rather, as this Court has discussed in the past, the purpose of this Rule is to “protect[] against any post-issuance alteration of the original warrant” and to “give[] the judge control to insure that the warrant is executed and returned to the magistrate in a timely manner.” State v. Brewer, 989 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing State v. Gambrel, 783 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)). In our view, a briefcase is adequate to store a magistrate’s copy of a search warrant. We agree with the trial court’s finding, and we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Police received an anonymous complaint about a possible DUI and had specific information about the vehicle. The vehicle was seen parked where the caller said it would be a few minutes away from where the vehicle left. The anonymous tipster was corroborated by the detail that proved to be correct. State v. Jones, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 731 (August 21, 2009), appeal denied 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 336 (Tenn., Mar. 1, 2010).*

A minor appearing intoxicated is not PC to believe he is in possession of alcohol, so his search was invalid. State v. J.D.L.C., 293 S.W.3d 85 (Mo. App. 2009).*

Officer had PC to stop defendant who drove from a parking lot without seatbelt on. State v. Paige, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 725 (August 31, 2009).*

Overtinted windows PC for stop. United States v. Valentine, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78555 (E.D. Pa. September 1, 2009):

The question before the Court is not whether the Civic’s windows violated the window tint statute, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1)–indeed, the government presented no evidence on that issue. Instead, the question is whether “an objective review of the facts shows that [Officer Ganksy] possessed specific, articulable facts that [defendant] was violating [the Pennsylvania window tint statute] at the time of the stop.” Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 398.

. . .

The government has not cited any cases on this issue. However, the Court, through its own research, has found several cases which held that an officer’s testimony concerning his inability to see through a defendant’s vehicle windows was sufficient to establish the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the windows were overly tinted in violation of Pennsylvania law. See United States v. Bellinger, 284 F. App’x 966, 968 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Leal, 235 F. App’x 937, 938-39 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Truley, No. 08-105, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59368, 2009 WL 2029975, *2 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2009); United States v. Lynch, 290 F. Supp. 2d 490, 495 (M.D. Pa. 2003); see also Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 191 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court finds these cases instructive and concludes, notwithstanding the fact that the record is not as developed as in Ushery, that Officer Gansky’s testimony concerning his inability to see through the windows of defendant’s Civic is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion in this case.

[posted 9/6]

State failed to prove existence of a search warrant for this search. The officer testified that he heard there was one, but that sole evidence, which was hearsay, was insufficient to prove the existence of a search warrant. Sosebee v. State, 303 Ga. App. 499, 693 S.E.2d 838 (2010).

This juvenile was moving around in the backseat during a traffic stop, and the officer asked her for the contents of her pockets and then she consented to a search of her cigarette pack. The removal of the cigarette pack was with reasonable suspicion and the search was by consent. In re A. T., 302 Ga. App. 713, 691 S.E.2d 642 (2010).*

911 caller about a shooting gave information that was from personal observation and she described a person fleeing, and the defendant was stopped because he matched the description. The stop was with reasonable suspicion. Commonwealth v. Depina, 456 Mass. 238, 922 N.E.2d 778 (2010).*

In Georgia, when a motion to suppress a search is granted in a criminal case and the state nolle prosses without appealing, that judgment is collateral estoppel to a probation revocation based on the same events, applying the Restatement of Judgments. Thackston v. State, 303 Ga. App. 718, 694 S.E.2d 136 (2010):

The closer question is whether the finality requirement of collateral estoppel was met here, given that the state had the drug charges against Thackston nolle prossed in the criminal case following the grant of the motion to suppress. For the purposes of collateral estoppel, “final judgment” includes “any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982) (hereinafter, “Restatement”). Factors supporting a conclusion that a decision is final for this purpose are “that the parties were fully heard, that the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, that the decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal.” Restatement § 13 cmt. g.

Application of these factors leads us to conclude that the trial court’s decision suppressing the methamphetamine in the criminal case should be considered a final judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel. The parties were fully heard on the motion to suppress in the criminal case. Moreover, it is clear that in granting the motion, the trial court considered the arguments of the parties, expressed its reasons for its decision, and did not consider its decision merely provisional or tentative. Finally, and most notably, the trial court’s grant of the motion to suppress was directly appealable by the state pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4), yet the state declined to file such an appeal, instead seeking entry of a nolle prosequi on the ground that “[t]here does not appear to be any valid ground to … overturn” the suppression order. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s grant of the motion to suppress in the criminal case was “sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.” Restatement § 13.

Twenty year old information about defendant’s efforts as a pedophile to make child pornography was stale. When coupled with the recitation of the officer’s experience that pedophiles keep their materials for many years gets it over the bar. State v. Daniels, 234 Ore. App. 533, 228 P.3d 695 (2010).

Questions about keys that defendant had on his bicycle unreasonably extended the stop and made his consent invalid. State v. Klein, 234 Ore. App. 523, 228 P.3d 714 (2010).*

Officers had probable cause for defendant’s search, so defense counsel would not be ineffective for not moving to suppress. In the interest of T. M., 303 Ga. App. 322, 693 S.E.2d 574 (2010).*

Person who was loaned a truck had a sufficient possessory interest for standing. The stop was found otherwise valid, and the video showed defendant nodding his consent. United States v. Sanchez-Perez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62773 (D. Kan. June 23, 2010):

Here, defendant accurately gave the owner’s name, said the owner was his cousin, and said the owner had loaned him the truck. A computer check revealed that the automobile had not been reported stolen, and the insurance, although expired, was in the name of the person defendant said was his cousin who loaned him the truck. These facts are sufficient to establish a valid possessory interest in the truck, supporting defendant’s challenge to his detention and to the search of the truck.

In a controlled drug delivery, defendant answered the door, and the package was offered. He got a woman who came to the door and said that she lived there and was expecting the package. That was apparent authority to consent to a search of the apartment. United States v. Gonzalez, 609 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2010).*

USMJ’s findings that the officers would have applied for a search warrant other than finding drug ledgers taped to the wall of the defendant’s premises was supported by the evidence. This was on remand, and the government was free to raise the independent source doctrine for the first time on remand. United States v. Castellanos, 608 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2010)*:

Although parties should present alternative arguments whenever sound strategy dictates, the government in this case was not required to anticipate every possible outcome on appeal and formulate a responsive argument for each alternative. “[T]he principle that a party who failed to raise an argument in its initial appeal is held to have waived its right to raise that argument on remand or on a second appeal. … must be limited to issues appropriate to be raised on appeal.” Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 141 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002). “It does not require a party to raise an issue that had not been previously treated or even raised in the district court.” Id. “Issues that arise anew on remand are generally within the scope of the remand.” Husband, 312 F.3d at 251 n.4; ….

Under the facts of this case, the application of the independent source doctrine was an argument arising for the first time on remand. … In Castellanos I, we explicitly directed the district court to engage in further proceedings consistent with our opinion. Implicit in that order was an expectation that the district court would consider arguments raised by both parties as to how the exclusion of the information obtained during the illegal search of the bedroom would impact the validity of the search warrant. The government raised the independent source doctrine at the earliest practicable time, and did not waive the application of the independent source doctrine on remand. The district court did not err in relying upon the independent source doctrine when denying Castellanos’s supplemental motion to suppress.

Gant did not apply to a search for evidence of driving on a suspended license because it was not reasonable to believe that evidence of that offense would be found. Gant, however, is not found to be retroactive to a search occurring before it was decided. People v. Henry, 184 Cal. App. 4th 1313, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 85 (1st Dist. 2010), Modified and rehearing denied by People v. Henry, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 924 (Cal. App. 1st Dist., June 18, 2010):

We see no discernable difference between the application of the good faith exception as in Krull, supra, 480 U.S. 340, when police rely upon a statute later determined to be unconstitutional, and police reliance upon prior decisional law subsequently changed by a decision of the United States Supreme Court. Suppression of the evidence seized by the police in the present case in reasonable reliance upon more than a quarter of a century of case law interpreting Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454 to permit the search, would in no way deter future police misconduct, the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule. Indeed, application of the exclusionary rule in a situation such as this, where the police did not “blunder,” but rather did precisely what the courts told them was acceptable under the Fourth Amendment, would offend basic precepts of the criminal justice system by allowing criminals (including dangerous ex-felons who possess a firearm) to go free because of a major change in decisional law that occurred after their conduct. Such offensive results serve only to undermine public confidence in the judicial system. That being the case, even though Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. 1710 may apply retroactively to defendant’s case, the evidence seized from defendant’s car should nevertheless be admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

Because of Gant‘s substantial departure from what was, by the decision’s own admission, established case law interpreting the search-incident-to-arrest exception in the context of vehicle searches under Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454, this precise issue has now been the subject of several published opinions. Recent decisions on this issue in federal courts were summarized in United States v. Amos (E.D. Tenn., Jan. 5, 2010, No. 3:08-CR-145) ___ F.Supp. ___ [2010 WL 56086], “There is presently a split between the Circuit Courts of Appeals as to whether the good faith exception applies to searches in violation of Gant that were conducted pre-Gant. Compare United States v. McCane [(10th Cir. 2009)] 573 F.3d 1037 (holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to searches which occurred before Gant), with United States v. Gonzalez [(9th Cir. 2009) 578 F.3d 1130 (Gonzalez)] (holding that the good faith exception does not apply to pre-Gant searches). District courts within the Sixth Circuit are also divided as to whether the good faith exception applies. Compare United States v. Lopez (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2009, No. 6:06-120-DCR [2009 WL 3112127] (applying the good-faith exception) with [United States v.] Peoples (W.D. Mich., Oct. 29, 2009, No. 1:09-CR-170) [2009 WL 3586564] (stating that ‘good[-]faith reliance upon case law cannot excuse suppression under the current formulation and application of the good[-]faith doctrine’); see also United States v. Buford (M.D. Tenn. 2009) 623 F.Supp.2d 923, 927 (… the extension of the good[-]faith exception would cause ‘perverse results’ in that case).” From among the collection of cases addressing the issue, we believe those decisions applying the good faith exception are better reasoned.

A live animal in obvious distress, as reported to police, justified a warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment when the officers independently developed reason to believe there was a hurt dog in defendant’s condominium after defendant answered the door. There is a long history in American life of animal welfare. See United States v. Stevens (SCOTUS, April 10, 2010) (“‘the prohibition of animal cruelty itself has a long history in American law, starting with the early settlement of the Colonies.’”). California’s animal welfare statute was passed in 1872. Exigent circumstances justified the entry under the Fourth Amendment, and exigent circumstances are not limited to people in distress. Other states are in accord: People v. Thornton, 286 Ill.App.3d 624, 676 N.E.2d 1024, 222 Ill. Dec. 60 (1997); Suss v. American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 823 F.Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (cat); Tuck v. United States, 477 A.2d 1115 (D.C.App.1984) (rabbits); State v. Bauer, 127 Wis.2d 401, 379 N.W.2d 895 (1985) (horses). People v. Chung, 185 Cal. App. 4th 247, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 253 (2d Dist. 2010), Modified and rehearing denied by People v. Chung, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 1031 (Cal. App. 2d Dist., July 1, 2010):

Exigent circumstances properly may be found when an officer reasonably believes immediate warrantless entry into a residence is required to aid a live animal in distress. Where an officer reasonably believes an animal on the property is in immediate need of aid due to injury or mistreatment, the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment may be invoked to permit warrantless entry to aid the animal. On the record presented, the trial court properly denied Chung’s suppression motion.

Texas declines to adopt the apparent authority rationale that all persons living in somebody else’s house have presumptive exclusive authority over their own bedrooms. If somebody lives in somebody else’s house there must be indicia of exclusion, such as locks on the door or an express agreement. Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010):

Notably, several courts have applied a different test and a different presumption. Mainly, these courts have followed the view that, when two autonomous adults jointly occupy a dwelling and have separate bedrooms, each occupant generally has a higher expectation of privacy in his or her own bedroom. Absent some showing that one occupant has exercised control, retained control, or come to an understanding with other occupants that control will be shared over the others’ bedrooms, these courts start from the presumption that an occupant exercises sole control over his own bedroom and has no joint access to others’ bedrooms. The State can overcome this presumption by presenting facts that would support a finding that the third party who consented to the search of another’s bedroom did, in fact, exercise some control over the bedroom. However, absent any facts to indicate that control over a separate bedroom was shared or somehow retained, or that a third party had joint access to the room, a finding of actual authority cannot be supported. Under this view, even under circumstances in which the consenting third party is related to the person being searched, access and control are the paramount factors.

We refuse to apply such reasoning here. In our view it is more reasonable to conclude, on the particular facts of this case (viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling), that the appellant, lacking any proprietary interest in the house, or even any possessory right other than by the grace of his grandfather, assumed the risk that his grandfather might permit the search of any area of the house that he might reasonably suspect the appellant was using for criminal purposes, even including the appellant’s bedroom–at least in the absence of any agreement between the two that would expressly prohibit the grandfather from making such an intrusion, or some other obvious indicium of exclusion, such as a lock on the door to demonstrate that the grandfather was.

Defendant’s arrest for theft justified a search incident because that was crime for which evidence could be found. Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d 671 (5th DCA 2009):

Our conclusion on this issue finds ample support in the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia in Thornton. In discussing the “evidence gathering” justification for a search incident to arrest, he observed that a “motorist may be arrested for a wide variety of offenses; in many cases, there is no reasonable basis to believe relevant evidence might be found in the car.” Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia cited Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001) (involving failure to wear seatbelt), and Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 S. Ct. 484, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998) (involving speeding), as examples of these types of cases. It is clear from this discussion that the “nature of the charge” is determinative of whether there exists a reasonable basis to search for evidence, not whether there is some independent evidence that gives rise to a belief that the particular vehicle contains evidence. Id. at 630. As Justice Scalia observed: “[I]t is not illogical to assume that evidence of a crime is most likely to be found where the suspect was apprehended.” Id. Where, as here, the offense of arrest is such that police could “expect to find” fruits and instruments of the crime, the search is justified as an incident to the arrest because it is reasonable to believe that evidence might be found.

While there is a limited expectation of privacy in computer files, defendant took his computer to a repair place, and, in the normal course of repairs, the technician came upon a file labelled “Pedo” and he could open it. Doing so, he was not a government actor under the federal or state constitutions. Brackens v. State, 312 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. App.—Houston (1st Dist.) 2009).*

Arrest of a passenger for an outstanding trespass warrant did not justify a search incident of the car and there was no reason to believe there was any evidence of a crime or a weapon. State v. Afana, 169 Wn. 2d 169 (2010). Lexis overview:

Petitioner argued that the warrantless search of his car incident to the arrest of his passenger violated his constitutional rights. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, but the appellate court reversed. On review, the court reversed the appellate court’s decision. While the warrant for petitioner’s passenger’s arrest gave a deputy a valid basis for arresting her, he had no reason to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of the crime of trespass, for which she was arrested, nor did the deputy have reason to believe that she posed a safety risk because she was already in custody at the time of the search. Just because petitioner, the driver, was unsecured at the time of the search, this did not justify the search. Thus, the deputy had no authority to search petitioner’s vehicle, and the search violated Wash. Const. art. I, § 7. The court rejected the argument that the good faith exception was consistent with the court’s past decisions. The court held that it was incompatible with the nearly categorical exclusionary rule under the constitution.

Robbery victims’ apartment was entered without asking and without consent, and other evidence of crime was seen. There was no exigency to enter because the robbers were gone. Dixon v. State, 36 So. 3d 920 (Fla. App. 4th DCA 2010):

Most importantly, [Officer] Leitman did not testify that he suspected the robbery suspects were in the apartment as soon as he reached the apartment door. He became suspicious only after he entered the apartment without consent, saw evidence of the robbery, and observed Dixon nervous and agitated after disappearing to another room. These observations do not support Leitman’s warrantless entry into the apartment prior to making the observations.

We conclude that the exigency dissipated once Leitman received the initial description of the robbery from the victim who was out of harm’s way, and, thereafter, from his conversation with Dixon and his girlfriend at the apartment door. Accordingly, Leitman’s search of Dixon’s apartment leading to his discovery of evidence of criminal conduct constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. All physical evidence derived from the Leitman’s initial unlawful search, including evidence discovered after the officers acquired a search warrant, should have been suppressed. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Dixon’s motions to suppress, vacate Dixon’s convictions, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

“Although the arrest occurred outside the apartment, the police had reason to believe that an individual posing a danger to the officers was in the apartment. The victim told the police that he had been assaulted and robbed by five men, but only three men emerged from the apartment following the officers’ orders for all of the occupants to exit the apartment. The crimes that the officers were investigating occurred hours earlier and involved robbery and assault at gunpoint. Moreover, the victim told the officers that both appellant and another suspect carried a gun when they answered the front door of the apartment. Neither appellant nor another suspect had a gun when they exited the apartment, and another suspect who was believed to be armed did not emerge from appellant’s apartment.” Maryland v. Buie permits a protective sweep on an arrest outside the home, and this was sufficient. Murphy v. State, 192 Md. App. 504, 995 A.2d 783 (2010).

The search of defendant’s car was justified as an inventory, so Gant did not apply. Thompson v. State, 995 A.2d 1030(Md. App. 2010).*

Defendant called his federal PO drunk from a motel room he was living in and made derogatory remarks about the judges on his case, including the claim that he could “blow a man’s head off at a hundred yards with a rifle.” There was reasonable suspicion for a search of the motel room. United States v. Krug, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52250 (M.D. Tenn. May 26, 2010).*

Officers’ merely standing by as school official told defendant to empty his pockets was not a police search. The school official had reasonable suspicion that defendant was stoned at school. State v. Burdette, 43 Kan. App. 2d 320, 225 P.3d 736 (2010). The court’s introductory paragraph:

This is an appeal by a student convicted of having marijuana in his pockets while he was at school. Two sheriff’s deputies were in the room when an acting principal asked Jordan Kelly Burdette to empty his pockets. In Burdette’s view, this turned a search by school authorities into a law enforcement search. Since law enforcement searches need probable cause and there was no probable cause here, Burdette claims the district court should have suppressed the marijuana produced from his pockets. Because, other than their presence, there was no real involvement of law enforcement officers in asking Burdette to empty his pockets, we hold this search was not a law enforcement search needing probable cause. The record reveals this search was justified from its inception because of Burdette’s abnormal behavior; it was reasonable in scope and not excessively intrusive. We affirm Burdett’s convictions of possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia.

The facts found support the conclusion that defendant committed a traffic violation and that he consented to a search of the car. United States v. Branch, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 3341 (5th Cir. February 19, 2010) (unpublished).*

The facts found support the conclusion that defendant committed a traffic violation and that the officer had reasonable suspicion to patdown the defendant, finding a weapon. United States v. Carter, 366 Fed. Appx. 136 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s vehicle was on the curtilage, despite the fact it was parked in the front and next to the house. A police officer had to enter the see the VIN plate on the vehicle. The open nature of a driveway is its observeability, not that people are expected to enter at will. State v. Olm, 223 Ariz. 429, 224 P.3d 245, 576 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4 (2010):

P14 It is undisputed that the officer could not see the Mustang’s VIN plate from the street, the sidewalk, the concrete walkway leading to the front door, or from the area by the front door. In order to see the VIN plate, the officer had to enter the yard. The state argues that, because the yard was actually used as a driveway, it is a semiprivate area the officer could enter without invitation or justification. See State v. Cobb, 115 Ariz. 484, 489, 566 P.2d 285, 290 (1977) (driveway generally considered “semiprivate” and resident’s privacy expectation for “activities on his driveway will generally depend on the nature of the activities and the degree of visibility from the street”); State v. Dugan, 113 Ariz. 354, 356 n.1, 555 P.2d 108, 110 n.1 (1976) (“[I]n most instances a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to a non-intrusive viewing of items in his driveway.”).

P15 We disagree. The concrete walkway clearly delineated the path guests were expected to take from the street or sidewalk to Olm’s front door. It was not necessary for the officer, or any member of the public, to leave the walkway in order to reach Olm’s front door. And, as we explained above, no reasonable member of the public would believe he or she had permission to enter the yard to peer into the vehicle. The mere fact that Olm parked his private vehicle in his yard, thus arguably converting that area to a semiprivate area, does not compel a different conclusion. Driveways are considered semiprivate areas not because members of the public reasonably could enter them without explicit permission, but because the activities and items in a driveway generally are more readily observable. See Dugan, 113 Ariz. at 356 n.1, 555 P.2d at 110 n.1. Unlike the situation in Cobb, where the officer observed a possibly stolen broach lying in plain view on the ground, 115 Ariz. at 487, 566 P.2d at 288, the officer here first had to leave the walkway, enter the yard, and peer through the vehicle’s windshield to see the VIN plate on the dashboard.

It was not reasonable to conclude that defendant’s wife had apparent authority to enter his locked gun cabinet where defendant had the only key, and she had never been in it. State v. Parrish, 302 Ga. App. 838, 691 S.E.2d 888 (2010).

Based on the trial court’s finding that the defendant did not feel restrained, the court of appeals (People v. Oliver, 387 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 901 N.E.2d 482, 327 Ill. Dec. 154 (2009)) erred in reversing the finding that defendant did not consent to the further search of his car. He had already consented to the search of the interior. The trial court’s finding of consent is affirmed. People v. Oliver, 236 Ill. 2d 448, 925 N.E.2d 1107 (2010).*

The Arizona Court of Appeals was bound by statute to follow the federal constitution on application of the exclusionary rule to a no-knock violation. Under Hudson, there is no suppression. State v. Roberson, 223 Ariz. 580, 225 P.3d 1156 (App. 2010).*

Hearsay was admissible at the suppression hearing, and the evidence is sufficient to support the findings. Even without it, there was enough. State v. Ulmer, 2010 Ohio 695, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 579 (4th Dist. February 12, 2010).*

Defendant was stopping and going in a high crime area, and when the officer approached he was reaching for something on the floor and the officer directed him to show his hands, and he was slow to do so. This was reasonable suspicion. State v. Scrivens, 2010 Ohio 712, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 590 (11th Dist. February 25, 2010).*

The frisk of defendant’s vehicle was justified by the officer’s reasonable suspicion that he was a dangerous person. Quint v. Deerfield, 365 Fed. Appx. 697 (7th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

There were symptoms of driving under the influence, so the use of a PBT was reasonable. State v. Scheffert, 279 Neb. 479, 2010 Neb. LEXIS 28 (February 26, 2010).*

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Defendant was stopped for following too close on an interstate highway, and, as the officer walked up to the car, defendant drove off and fled on foot when the vehicle was stopped. This was probable cause and exigent circumstances for a search of the car. Alternatively, the abandonment would have led to an inventory. United States v. Wright, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131554 (S.D. Ga. November 5, 2010).*

The Arkansas Motor Carrier Act provides sufficient protection to be a warrant substitute. United States v. Ruiz, 569 F.3d 355, 357 (8th Cir. 2009). The inspection of defendant’s truck would have been justified, and defendant consented to a more detailed search anyway. United States v. Harris, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131209 (E.D. Ark. November 30, 2010).*

Defendant’s common law wife had apparent authority to consent to a search. She was also advised in English and Spanish of her right to refuse consent. United States v. Huerta-Rodriguez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131603 (D. N.M. October 20, 2010).*