TN: Keeping SWs in a briefcase is “keeping [in the] official records”

A magistrate keeping his copies of issued search warrants in a brief case and not a file cabinet satisfies state rule 41 requiring search warrant papers separate. The purpose of the rule is to prevent alteration, and that suffices. State v. Waters, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 732 (August 21, 2009):

The issue on appeal is whether storing copies of search warrants in a briefcase amounts to “keep[ing] one copy as part of his … official records.” The Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require a magistrate to keep copies of search warrants in any specific manner. Rather, as this Court has discussed in the past, the purpose of this Rule is to “protect[] against any post-issuance alteration of the original warrant” and to “give[] the judge control to insure that the warrant is executed and returned to the magistrate in a timely manner.” State v. Brewer, 989 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing State v. Gambrel, 783 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)). In our view, a briefcase is adequate to store a magistrate’s copy of a search warrant. We agree with the trial court’s finding, and we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Police received an anonymous complaint about a possible DUI and had specific information about the vehicle. The vehicle was seen parked where the caller said it would be a few minutes away from where the vehicle left. The anonymous tipster was corroborated by the detail that proved to be correct. State v. Jones, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 731 (August 21, 2009), appeal denied 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 336 (Tenn., Mar. 1, 2010).*

A minor appearing intoxicated is not PC to believe he is in possession of alcohol, so his search was invalid. State v. J.D.L.C., 293 S.W.3d 85 (Mo. App. 2009).*

Officer had PC to stop defendant who drove from a parking lot without seatbelt on. State v. Paige, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 725 (August 31, 2009).*

Overtinted windows PC for stop. United States v. Valentine, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78555 (E.D. Pa. September 1, 2009):

The question before the Court is not whether the Civic’s windows violated the window tint statute, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1)–indeed, the government presented no evidence on that issue. Instead, the question is whether “an objective review of the facts shows that [Officer Ganksy] possessed specific, articulable facts that [defendant] was violating [the Pennsylvania window tint statute] at the time of the stop.” Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 398.

. . .

The government has not cited any cases on this issue. However, the Court, through its own research, has found several cases which held that an officer’s testimony concerning his inability to see through a defendant’s vehicle windows was sufficient to establish the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the windows were overly tinted in violation of Pennsylvania law. See United States v. Bellinger, 284 F. App’x 966, 968 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Leal, 235 F. App’x 937, 938-39 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Truley, No. 08-105, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59368, 2009 WL 2029975, *2 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2009); United States v. Lynch, 290 F. Supp. 2d 490, 495 (M.D. Pa. 2003); see also Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 191 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court finds these cases instructive and concludes, notwithstanding the fact that the record is not as developed as in Ushery, that Officer Gansky’s testimony concerning his inability to see through the windows of defendant’s Civic is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion in this case.

[posted 9/6]