Officers had an arrest warrant for the defendant, and they were staking out his place. He got in a cab and left, and the officers waited for a traffic offense to stop the cab. [Like they needed one? Doesn’t the arrest warrant provide PC in itself? But I digress.] The cab was speeding, so the officers stopped the cab and got defendant out. The cab driver on his own removed defendant’s black bag from the cab and put it on the trunk, and the officers could see marijuana in the bag. That justified searching the bag. [The court talks of the cab driver having authority to consent to a search of the cab, but the cab driver has no apparent authority to consent to search a passenger’s luggage, so that part of the holding goes unnecessarily far. Same result, however.] United States v. Dixon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133489 (M.D. Fla. November 18, 2010), adopted 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133437 (M.D. Fla., Dec. 16, 2010):

Lastly, a number of reasons also justified the search of the Defendant’s bag. Not only were the items in the bag in plain view (the cab driver removed the bag from the passenger compartment and placed it on the taxi’s trunk), the cab driver had authority to consent to the search of the cab, and the detectives would have discovered the controlled substances in any event. See Harris, 526 F.3d at 1339 (cab driver has common authority over passenger compartment and can consent to search); United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying inevitable discovery doctrine). Besides, the detectives were justified in seizing and searching the bag incident to the Defendant’s lawful arrest. Arizona v. Gant, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1719, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009) (reiterating that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found inside the vehicle).

There was an arrest warrant for defendant, and his address was known. Officers went to the address, and it turned out that there might be two buildings at that address. When they announced their purpose, the door was slammed in their face, and the officers had a reasonable belief that he was inside and that was the correct address. United States v. Shaw, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133973 (W.D. Tenn. December 17, 2010).*

Defendant’s being suspicious on the fenceline of a military installation was reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying a patdown. United States v. Kulkarni, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133493 (E.D. Cal. December 2, 2010).*

Good faith cures (nearly) all ills. The overbroad search warrant here was saved by good faith exception. [Because it’s child porn, that’s why.] United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2010):

The United States Government appeals the order of the District Court suppressing evidence seized and a statement made during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant. The Court held that the warrant was general and not cured by the affidavit of probable cause because it was not incorporated into the warrant. The Court also concluded that a reasonably objective police officer would have recognized that the warrant was defective, and thus the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. On appeal, the Government argues that the warrant was not general because it incorporated the narrower affidavit, that the search was limited to the scope of that affidavit, and that, in any event, the good faith exception applies to the circumstances of this case.

Relying on our decision in Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2004), we conclude that the warrant did not incorporate the affidavit of probable cause, and thus the narrower affidavit did not cure the concededly overbroad warrant. We also conclude that the Government waived any arguments based on the exception to the incorporation rule applied in United States v. Leveto, 540 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2790, 174 L. Ed. 2d 294 (2009), by failing to raise them before the District Court. However, we hold that application of the exclusionary rule is not justified because the officers acted in good faith by relying on the validity of the warrant. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s order suppressing the evidence seized as a result of the search and the statement made during the search, and remand for further proceedings.

Videotaping student athletes in a private school’s “open gym” did not invade any privacy interest or the Fourth Amendment. The school was barred from a state athletic tournament. St. Patrick High Sch. v. N.J. Interscholastic Ath. Ass’ns, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17993 (D. N.J. March 1, 2010).*

Defendant was found asleep at the wheel and hard to wake up in an intersection in Kansas City. Officers awoke him and he tried to drive off. He was quite obviously under the influence, and a field sobriety test was not a prerequisite to his arrest. An inventory of the seized vehicle was proper under Gant. United States v. Tinsley, 365 Fed. Appx. 709 (8th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Battery by punching is not the type of exigent circumstance that justifies a warrantless entry into defendant’s house. There was no weapon involved. People v. Davis, 398 Ill. App. 3d 940, 338 Ill. Dec. 207, 924 N.E.2d 67 (2010)*:

The offense for which Willer sought to arrest defendant–the battery of Harrison–certainly involved a form of violence in that defendant allegedly punched Harrison. Nothing in the record indicates, however, that this offense was particularly grave; there was no evidence that as a result of the alleged battery Harrison suffered any sort of injury, sought medical treatment, or was in any way hindered in performing her normal activities. In addition, the police had no reason to believe that defendant was armed or otherwise posed a threat to the police or others; no evidence was presented that the police suspected defendant was armed, that a weapon was involved in the battery of Harrison, or that the police knew whether defendant had a particularly violent history. Moreover, no evidence was presented indicating that defendant was likely to flee unless he was swiftly apprehended. The State presented no evidence that defendant knew or was likely to be aware that Harrison had called the police and that the police were on the way to his apartment.

Defendants’ stop was based on his license plate light being out, and he ultimately consented to a patdown of his person which was valid. Harper v. State, 2010 Ind. App. LEXIS 330 (March 1, 2010).*

Defendant’s lawful stop and subsequent consent were valid. United States v. Grey, 365 Fed. Appx. 711 (8th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

The trial court’s conclusion that the defendant abandoned the car by flight when he was stopped and thereby waived any reasonable expectation of privacy in the car was susceptible to two interpretations: privacy interest in the contents v. possessory interest in the contents. It was his responsibility to provide a clear appellate record for review. Defendant didn’t so he loses. State v. Payne, 121 Conn. App. 308, 996 A.2d 302 (2010), appeal denied by State v. Payne, 297 Conn. 919, 2010 Conn. LEXIS 261 (2010).* [Does it actually matter? Should it? Both the majority and the concurring opinion find the distinction important, but differ on application.] In footnote 3 of the majority opinion:

FN3 In the present case, the court did not determine whether the defendant expected privacy in the invaded area. The concurring opinion reasons that this omission is inconsequential because “that line of inquiry need not be addressed if any such expectation held by the defendant is objectively unreasonable.” Thus, the concurring opinion, reviewing a trial court decision that is devoid of a proper factual analysis of the claim, disposes of the claim on purely constitutional grounds. Even if we were to assume that the court’s analysis of abandonment properly was rooted in fourth amendment principles, as opposed to property law, it is patently unclear whether the trial court applied the doctrine of abandonment because it found that the defendant did not expect privacy in the automobile or its contents at the time of the search or whether the court applied the doctrine because it concluded as a matter of law that the defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable.

[Query to complicate it more: If the driver flees from the car with the keys and locks the car, has he retained the reasonable expectation of privacy in the car? What about the locked trunk? Should flight always be a waiver of privacy in the car? A car registered to the accused with locks (locked or not) is far different than a packet of drugs or a bag or a gun. It is a far more significant container. After alleged abandonment, the car may be towed and impounded, but the towing company and the police will attempt to reunite the defendant with the car. Of course, the prosecutor will attempt to reunite the defendant and the contraband in court for criminal liability. Should a car be treated differently?]

The DUI scene blood draw by an Arizona State Police phlebotomist was reasonable on these facts, so it did not violate Schmerber. The program as a whole had already been sustained, and the trial court erred in holding that it caused an unreasonable search. State v. Noceo, 223 Ariz. 222, 221 P.3d 1036 (Ct. App. 2009):

¶8 Here, we are presented with facts nearly identical to those in May, yet the trial court suppressed the evidence based on its findings regarding the phlebotomy program as a whole rather than the circumstances of Noceo’s blood draw in particular. The fundamental question with respect to compelled blood draws and the Fourth Amendment, however, is not whether the blood draw program as a whole is reasonable—a question our state legislature implicitly has answered in A.R.S. §§ 28-1321 and 28-1388—but rather, “whether the means and procedures employed in taking [a suspect’s] blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768. Thus, the trial court erred as a matter of law by evaluating the entire DPS phlebotomy program instead of the reasonableness of Noceo’s particular blood draw. As a result, it abused its discretion.

¶9 Moreover, even if the trial court’s evaluation of the DPS phlebotomy program had been appropriate, the court’s findings do not appear to be supported by the record.

It was reported to by a “police spotter” that defendant juvenile was flashing a gun in his waistband to others. That was reasonable suspicion for a frisk. W.H. v. State, 928
N.E.2d 288 (Ind. App. 2010).*

Police received a 911 call that an unidentified male had rung a doorbell at 2 a.m. Getting no response, he left. Officers responded and saw a person matching the description in a car in the neighborhood. He stopped too long at a stop sign, and the police pulled him over. The stop was with reasonable suspicion, and he was DUI. Ertel v. State, 928 N.E.2d 261 (Ind. App. 2010).*

Defendant was arrested for sexual assault, and the police conducted a protective sweep of his nearby vehicle. Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging this search. Commonwealth v. Jones, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 53, 928 N.E.2d 374 (2010).*

Defendant’s call for police assistance at his house and then inviting them in was not a Fourth Amendment issue. United States v. Jackson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11764 (N.D. W.Va. February 9, 2009).*

Defendant’s stop was unjustified. They had no arrest or search warrant and did not observe defendant commit an offense. No specific facts provided reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Because the out-of-state defendant and his car were illegally seized and he was Mirandized, frisked, seated in a police car, and dispossessed of his car for over 40-50 minutes, he was under arrest. A reasonable person from out-of-state without a car would not have considered himself free to leave with two officers interrogating him and two officers searching his car. The motion to suppress was properly granted. People v. Vasquez, 2009 Ill. App. LEXIS 54 (February 11, 2009).*

Oregon school search was without PC and, therefore, invalid. The CI was a student who was prone to lie to deflect “heat” from himself and just lacked credibility on his own. State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. M. A. D., 226 Ore. App. 21, 202 P.3d 249 (2009),* revd State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. M. A. D., 348 Ore. 381, 233 P.3d 437 (2010) (posted June 13, 2010).

“[W]hen an automobile is stopped in a public place with probable cause, no more exigent circumstances are required by art. 14 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights] beyond the inherent mobility of an automobile itself to justify a warrantless search of the vehicle.’ Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 124, 676 N.E.2d 795 (1997). In this case, we conclude that this principle applies even when the police had ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, provided that there has been no unreasonable delay.” Delaying an arrest so another person would be implicated and be subject to arrest was reasonable. Commonwealth v. Eggleston, 453 Mass. 554, 903 N.E.2d 1087 (2009).

General police knowledge of use of firearms in the vicinity is not reasonable suspicion as to this defendant who was seen in the area. There was nothing about the defendant that gave reasonable suspicion either, so the stop was unreasonable and suppressed. Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 903 N.E.2d 567 (2009).*

A protective sweep of the house in this case was unjustified. An officer responded to a call about a suicidal woman, and he got to the scene and found her and a man outside. One thing led to another and the man got tasered by the officer while the woman was egging him on. By then, the defendant’s brother was also on the scene, but there was nothing to indicate that there was another person in the house. Entering the house for a protective sweep that led to the discovery of evidence was unjustified. Brand v. State, 204 P.3d 383 (Alas. App. 2009).

Defendant was suspected of a murder of a child, and his DNA was taken in connection with that case, which was affirmed a week earlier. State v. Cope, 2009 S.C. App. LEXIS 94 (April 2, 2009). That DNA connected him to a burglary and attempted rape where he was stabbed with a screwdriver by the victim. The blood draw in the other case was usable here, and no additional search warrant or court order was required to compare it. State v. Sanders, 387 S.C. 608, 693 S.E.2d 409 (2009):

A blood sample validly obtained in connection with one crime may be used in a subsequent unrelated case. See State v. McCord, 349 S.C. 477, 484, 562 S.E.2d 689, 693 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding no improper search or seizure where defendant’s blood, voluntarily submitted in an unrelated case, is used in a subsequent case); see also Washington v. State, 653 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla. 1994) (“[O]nce the samples were validly obtained, albeit in an unrelated case, the police were not restrained from using the samples as evidence in the murder case.”); Bickley v. State, 227 Ga. App. 413, 489 S.E.2d 167, 169 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (holding the DNA evidence should not be “suppressed on the basis that additional testing of defendant’s blood … required an independent warrant”); Patterson v. State, 744 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[U]nder the facts of this case, society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable an individual’s expectation of privacy in a blood sample lawfully obtained by police.”); Wilson v. State, 132 Md. App. 510, 752 A.2d 1250, 1272 (Md. Ct. App. 2000) (holding Fourth Amendment claims are no longer applicable once a person’s blood sample has been lawfully obtained).

Defendant was arrested in his boxer shorts in his house on a warrant for being an illegal alien. He asked for clothes to go to jail in, and they officers took him to his bedroom. There, an officer saw his wallet and opened it looking for identification and found a gun permit. Then they searched for a gun. Defendant was arrested for being an alien in possession of a weapon. The plain view search of the wallet was invalid. United States v. Rivera-Padilla, 365 Fed. Appx. 343 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished):

Agent Pausic was authorized to enter Rivera-Padilla’s home for the purpose of arresting him. After accomplishing that task and associated precautionary measures, he decided that he would look for evidence tending to confirm Rivera-Padilla’s identity and establish his country of origin, a search which he was not authorized to make. While the plain view doctrine might arguably have extended his authority to seize such evidence had it been in plain view, no such evidence, or any other incriminating evidence, was in plain view. All that was in plain view was an ordinary wallet whose contents, in which Rivera-Padilla retained a reasonable expectation of privacy, were not visible. It was not until Pausic searched inside the wallet that the gun permit came into plain view. The plain view doctrine does not authorize an otherwise unauthorized search, even if it is a fruitful one. Indeed, the plain view doctrine does not authorize searches; by definition, it only authorizes seizures of items in plain view to which the officer has a right of access. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375.

In Berenguer, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was confronted with a situation almost identical to the one before us. Berenguer was arrested in his apartment on a drug charge. After he had been shackled and placed on a bed, the arresting agents conducted a protective sweep of the apartment. They observed a billfold, which when searched was found to contain approximately $3,200 in $100 bills. The District Court declined to suppress the cash, relying on the “plain view” doctrine. The Court of Appeals reversed because that doctrine required that “the incriminating nature [of the seized item] must be immediately apparent,” and this requirement was clearly not met. Berenguer, 562 F.2d at 210. There, as here, the “billfold offered no immediately apparent evidence of an inculpatory nature. It was only after the billfold itself had been searched that the large denomination currency was revealed.” Id.

“The question presented is whether a resident’s consent to search her home is invalid because it was preceded by an allegedly illegal search of which the resident was unaware. We hold that the consent to search is valid under the circumstances.” State v. Guillen, 223 Ariz. 314, 223 P.3d 658 (2010):

¶15 Assuming, without deciding, that the dog sniff violated Article 2, Section 8, we conclude that Mrs. Guillen’s consent was valid because under Brown’s three-factor test, intervening circumstances obviated any alleged taint and the first dog sniff conducted from outside the garage was not flagrant police misconduct.

. . .

¶17 Mrs. Guillen’s lack of knowledge of the dog sniff constitutes a major break in the causal chain. See, e.g., United States v. Furrow, 229 F.3d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Lack of knowledge of a prior search is an intervening factor which dissipates the coercion inherent in a request for consent made after an unconstitutional search.”), rev’d on other grounds by United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1155 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that a defendant waived his Fourth Amendment rights when he consented to search without knowledge of prior illegal police search); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986) (“Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.”).

¶15 Assuming, without deciding, that the dog sniff violated Article 2, Section 8, we conclude that Mrs. Guillen’s consent was valid because under Brown’s three-factor test, intervening circumstances obviated any alleged taint and the first dog sniff conducted from outside the garage was not flagrant police misconduct.

¶16 Mrs. Guillen’s consent was obtained within a few hours after the dog sniff took place. Although this fact favors Guillen, see Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d at 1300 (citing cases in which courts have held invalid consent given between a few minutes and a few hours after the illegal conduct), it does not weigh heavily in our analysis because of the presence of intervening circumstances. See State v. Reffitt, 145 Ariz. 452, 459, 702 P.2d 681, 688 (1985) (noting that the “factor of temporal proximity is scarcely outcome determinative” and “is often the least helpful of [Brown’s] three criteria”).

¶17 Mrs. Guillen’s lack of knowledge of the dog sniff constitutes a major break in the causal chain. See, e.g., United States v. Furrow, 229 F.3d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Lack of knowledge of a prior search is an intervening factor which dissipates the coercion inherent in a request for consent made after an unconstitutional search.”), rev’d on other grounds by United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1155 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that a defendant waived his Fourth Amendment rights when he consented to search without knowledge of prior illegal police search); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986) (“Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.”).

Arrest warrant’s affidavit that was merely the conclusions of the officer and did not offer facts to the magistrate was insufficient under the Fourth Amendment. The omission of the date anything happened was fatal, too. State v. Jordan, 315 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. App.–Austin 2010).*

Defendant ran into the back of an off duty officer in uniform outside the officer’s jurisdiction. The officer ordered defendant from his vehicle, then back into it to wait for the local police, and took his keys. The officer suspected defendant was DUI, also having six priors. The arrest was invalid as a citizen’s arrest, and the DUI is set aside. Commonwealth v. Limone, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 903, 928 N.E.2d 669 (2010).*

Defendant could not raise on appeal from his revocation of probation conviction the search that led to his guilty plea that put him on probation in the first place. It was waived by the plea. State v. Lenard, 2010 Ohio 2220, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1822 (8th Dist. May 14, 2010).*

The trial court’s findings that the state did not prove that consent was valid by clear and convincing evidence is binding on appeal because it is supported by the evidence. State v. Tell, 2010 Ohio 2217, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1814 (8th Dist. May 20, 2010).*

The state showed sufficient necessity for continuing the wiretaps in this drug investigation to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. People v. Roberts, 184 Cal. App. 4th 1149, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 736 (4th Dist. 2010).*

Searching for the Fourth Amendment: Looking for Law in All the Wrong Cases by Stanley A. Goldman of Loyola Law School Los Angeles

Abstract:

Whether we are speaking of Hudson v. Michigan, Herring v. United States, Arizona v. Gant, Thornton v. United States or even though slightly older Illinois v. Wardlow, these cases represent a trend by the high court to limit the scope of both the 4th amendment and the exclusionary rule. The result is that law enforcement will obtain greater freedom to engage in stop and frisk as well as search and seizure without fear that the evidence may be excluded during the course of any subsequent criminal trial. The problem with these cases may be that they fail to recognize the societal costs of giving police such free reins without consequences. In this 25 page paper, the author summarizes and examines these and other recent United States Supreme Court cases and concludes that they are often being interpreted by lower courts to create broader powers in the police than the cases themselves actually provide. In some respects, this article is both an examination of what the cases “could” stand for if interpreted either broadly or narrowly. There is much for prosecutors in these cases, but there is also a surprising amount left to be argued by defense counsel, who may still find arguments for exclusion in the modifiers that are provided by either an essential 5th vote concurrence or by the majority opinion itself. If nothing else, this article provides a quick summary of the essentials of these transformative cases.

Defendant consented to a search of his car. He expressed reservations at a dog sniff, but he did not revoke consent. United States v. Benavides, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135039 (W.D. Tex. December 21, 2010).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop and continued detention from suspicious circumstances, including a dash that did not work and getting off at an exit for gas that had no re-entry for that direction. United States v. Allen, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135084 (E.D. Tenn. December 21, 2010).*

The officer was justified in a frisk of defendant who he saw with a gun in hand in a high crime area where a drug sale had just occurred. Defendant admittedly had no standing in the house searched, and the search of his car was valid under the automobile exception without regard to a search warrant. United States v. Haywood, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135082 (W.D. Tenn. October 8, 2010), adopted 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135083 (W.D. Tenn. December 20, 2010).*

An unidentified citizen’s report of a man with a gun in his waistband apparently casing a gas station to rob it was sufficient to stop and frisk him. The officer went to the gas station within a minute of the report and found the defendant who he had assume the position, finding the gun. The stop and frisk was reasonable. A citizen complaint is different than an anonymous report. State v. Cisternino, 2010 Ohio 6027, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 5056 (8th Dist. December 9, 2010)*:

[*P15] We disagree with Cisternino, and instead find, as did the Weisner court, that an ordinary citizen informant who does not happen to give a name should not be treated like an anonymous informant. See State v. Jordan, Montgomery App. No. 18600, 2001 Ohio 1630, citing Weisner. The Second District Court of Appeals held that “[i]nformation from an ordinary citizen who has personally observed what appears to be criminal conduct carries with it indicia of reliability and is presumed to be reliable.” State v. Carstensen (Dec. 18, 1991), Miami App. No. 91-CA-13, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 6116, unreported. Similarly, the First District Court of Appeals held that an unidentified informant who stops an officer to provide information about a crime is not anonymous: “There is nothing even remotely anonymous, clandestine, or surreptitious about a citizen stopping a police officer on the street to report criminal activity.” State v. Ramey (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 409, 416, 717 N.E.2d 1153.

[*P16] In the case before us, the citizen who flagged down Officer Rock to report what he suspected was criminal conduct was not “anonymous” under the three classifications of informants. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the citizen would have refused to give his name if asked or that he attempted to conceal his identity in any way. Whether an informant is “anonymous” depends on whether the informant himself took steps to maintain anonymity, not on whether the police had time to get his name. See Ramey, supra.

The defendant was speeding. The officer called in the license plate and found that the owner had a suspended license. The driver met the description of the owner. The stop was justified by the speeding. State v. Jenkins, 2010 Ohio 5943, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 4999 (3d Dist. December 6, 2010).*

Defendant’s house was the subject of a drug nuisance injunction and ordered boarded up. By the time the injunction expired, he was occupying again, and the police entered without a warrant, even though it was still boarded up. He had an expectation of privacy anyway. The police never checked to find out that the injunction had expired. State v. Harris, 2010 Ohio 6019, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 5063 (8th Dist. December 9, 2010).

Defendant was parked in a high crime area after midnight, standing outside his car with the door open. When the officer called out to him, he got in the car and left. The officer had reasonable suspicion for a stop. State v. Rowe, 2010 Ohio 6030, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 5069 (8th Dist. December 9, 2010).*

The four corners of the affidavit shows probable cause for issuance of the search warrant. United States v. Nguyen, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130626 (D. Minn. October 13, 2010).*

Defendants’ stop was with probable cause for not signaling an abrupt turn. During the stop and running the paperwork, the owner of the car validly consented. United States v. Crawley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135212 (E.D. Tenn. June 29, 2010)*:

In summary, Everett establishes a simple framework for prolongation cases: if the traffic stop is “completed” or “definitively abandon[ed],” the officer must have independent reasonable suspicion supporting any further detention at the moment of completion or abandonment. See United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 574 (6th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, if the officer continues to pursue the purposes of the original traffic stop throughout the encounter, a reviewing court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the duration of the stop as a whole, with due consideration to the time spent on unrelated inquiries (such as questioning or dog sniffs), was reasonable—in other words, whether the “bulk of the interaction” between the officer and the suspect was monopolized by the unrelated inquiry. Everett, 601 F.3d at 494, 495.

Here, the traffic stop was never abandoned, and it was not completed until after Crawley, the owner of the car, gave consent to search the inside of the car. Lilly’s undisputed testimony established that Crawley told Lilly he could search the “inside” of the car before Lilly issued the summonses to Allen. The relevant inquiry in this case, therefore, is whether Lilly “diligently” pursued the purposes of the traffic stop throughout the encounter, and if he did not, whether the prolongation was supported by independent reasonable suspicion.

Taken as a whole, the officer had reasonable suspicion for defendant’s detention for nervous behavior, failure to make eye contact, driving on a drug corridor in a rented car claiming no rental contract. United States v. Derrick, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135585 (M.D. Ill. December 22, 2010).*

Defendant’s arrest for driving on a suspended DL came after he was stopped for speeding. The computer check is PC. The officer did not have to Mirandize him before asking why he was speeding. United States v. Shirley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135376 (N.D. Ga. November 8, 2010).*

An internet predator sting developed information on defendant soliciting a child for sex. When the police got a search warrant for his computer for evidence of solicitation they included child pornography. Under United States v. Hodson, the search warrant was overbroad for lack of probable cause for child pornography. The good faith exception does not apply. United States v. Underwood, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134534 (W.D. Ky. October 18, 2010):

Hodson remains good law in this circuit and has not been overruled or otherwise abrogated by subsequent published appellate case law. A number of decisions from federal appellate and trial courts, however, have distinguished Hodson based on its facts.8 But no meaningful distinction can be made under the facts of this case. Here, Det. Jackman in his affidavit included no references to the transmission of pornographic or sexually explicit images from Defendant Underwood, nor did Jackman make reference to the repeated requests for such images by Underwood. Jackman’s affidavit is similar in all material respects to the affidavit of KSP Det. Pickrell with the relatively minor distinction that Jackman applied for his search warrant within approximately 30 days after his final online exchange with the Defendant, whereas approximately three months passed between kidlatino12’s last conversation with Hodson and Det. Pickrell’s search warrant application on Jan. 19, 2006. Hodson, 543 F.3d at 287. Otherwise, both affidavits suffer the exact same defect — each sets forth probable cause for one crime (sexual solicitation of a minor) in the warrant application while requesting authorization to search for evidence of a separate crime (possession of child pornography) and receiving authorization through the warrant to search only for evidence of the crime of child pornography.

The Court in such circumstances must agree with the panel in Hodson that not only does the Jackman affidavit fail to establish probable cause to conclude that child pornography would be found in Underwood’s home on March 28, 2008, but also that no objectively reasonable police officer could rely upon such a search warrant in good faith to search for child pornography. The Government does not argue otherwise insofar as Hodson is concerned.

TSA is now bragging about finding drugs in full body scans: WaPo: More body scanners are coming to an airport near you, by Derek Kravitz.

And how is that relevant to “transportation security”? It is a general search. If it doesn’t look like an explosive or a weapon, they should just ignore it.

“Mission creep” personified.

Airports with full body scanners are here.

“Agent Ramirez’s decision to stop Defendant’s vehicle was based on factors too common to support a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 285 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) (reasonable suspicion cannot rely solely on generalizations that, if accepted, cast suspicion on large segments or entire categories of the law abiding population).” Apparently, being a law abiding citizen is believed to be reasonable suspicion in Arizona. United States v. Mikels, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133895 (D. Ariz. November 3, 2010).*

There was reasonable suspicion for defendants’ stop as drug traffickers, and a drug dog was called and alerted, and that made probable cause for a search of the vehicle. The court suggests that it was defendants’ burden to show that the search was invalid. “Although Defendant Cooper offers no substantive argument in support of his claim that the search of the Lincoln was unlawful – beyond the claim that the stop and detention were unlawful, he asserts that there was neither probable cause nor consent for the search. … Defendant is wrong.” United States v. Parker, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133789 (N.D. Ga. November 18, 2010).*

A male Lt. Col. in the Army was married to a female Capt. He was the subject of a child molestation investigation from being stationed in PR. In Georgia, Army investigators called in the Capt. for questioning, and she consented to a search of their home office, which should could do because she had joint access. After Army CID officers got in, they got a search warrant for child pornography in the computers and videos, which they validly found. The computers arguably were within his exclusive control, but access to them was by search warrant. United States v. Pagan-Torres, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133832 (N.D. Ga. November 15, 2010).*