“[T]he closely regulated business exception permitted a warrantless administrative inspection of certain areas of the tractor trailer, but the search turned unlawful when it progressed into unregulated areas without the exigent circumstances required by State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 28, 965 A.2d 114 (2009). We reverse the order denying the suppression of evidence ….” State v. Pompa, 414 N.J. Super. 219, 997 A.2d 1107 (2010):

For decades, tractor trailers have been subject to extensive federal regulation. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 300-399; see also N.J.S.A. 39:5B-32; N.J.A.C. 13:60-2.1. These regulations govern a vast array of topics, including, among other things: hours of service, 49 C.F.R. § 395; necessary parts and accessories, 49 C.F.R. § 393; driver qualifications, 49 C.F.R. § 391; record retention, 49 C.F.R. § 379; and licensing, 49 C.F.R. § 383. The regulations also purport to authorize warrantless roadside inspections of commercial vehicles to ensure compliance with safety standards. 49 C.F.R. § 396.9.

These regulations contain specifications for sleeper cabins. For example, the regulations contain length, width, and shape requirements for the sleeper cabin and demand that the cabin have at least two access points so that emergency exits are not unduly hindered. 49 C.F.R. § 393.76. The regulations impose bedding requirements and provide that all sleeper cabins not contained within the driver compartment must contain communication devices between the sleeper cabin and the cockpit. Ibid. Thus, truckers may reasonably anticipate administrative inspections for the purpose of ensuring compliance.

. . .

The circumstances presented here differ because the Trooper’s search was not concerned with the trailer portion of the vehicle, but focused instead on the sleeper cabin and, even more specifically, a closet within the sleeper cabin and closed containers within that closet. These areas were certainly more private than a cargo hold or, as in Hewitt, a secret compartment attached to a cargo hold. Accord United States v. Knight, 306 F.3d 534, 535 (8th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the closely regulated business exception does not permit the opening of a truck driver’s briefcase without a warrant during an administrative inspection).

See Law.com: More Than a Whiff of Weed Needed for Warrantless Truck Search, N.J. Court Rules.

Defendant’s failure to allege he had standing in the place searched was fatal to his suppression motion. People v. Scully, 2010 NY Slip Op 3799, 14 N.Y.3d 861, 903 N.Y.S.2d 302, 929 N.E.2d 364 (2010).

Defense counsel could not be ineffective for not moving to suppress a search of defendant’s sister’s home because defendant did not show any standing there. People v. Peele, 2010 NY Slip Op 3804, 73 A.D.3d 1219, 900 N.Y.S.2d 776 (3d Dept. 2010).

Officer had reasonable suspicion for detention of nervous defendant towing a boat from Texas to Tennessee, ostensibly to see his mother for Mother’s Day, and he was stopped minutes before midnight Mother’s Day in Louisiana. Consent included the boat, and marijuana was found. State v. Snelling, 36 So. 3d 1060 (La. App. 5th Dist. 2010).*

Plaintiff’s suit against the state for a wrongful parole search fails because the parole officer had the authority to do what he did. Cutler v. McGee, 38 So. 3d 481 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2010).*

First pursuit of the defendant was unlawful, but defendant dropped a gun when he fell. He ignored the officer’s command to not reach for the gun–grabbing it, he ran again. The second pursuit was lawful. If he had dropped the gun and not grabbed it and ran again, the court would have suppressed. Commonwealth v. Taggart, 2010 PA Super 110, 997 A.2d 1189 (2010).*

Defendant was arrested for “upskirting,” and a search warrant was obtained for his home, computer, and car to look for the storage device. The court concludes that “upskirting” in a shopping mall is not a crime under the Tennessee law for video recording in a place where there is an expectation of privacy. Therefore, the SW was issued under a mistake of law, and the case is reversed. State v. Gilliland, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 501 (June 17, 2010).*

A defense pretrial subpoena duces tecum to a third party amounted to a search warrant of a computer for e-mails, and it was an excessive use of the subpoena power. Limiting the defense power did not violate the right to put on a defense or compulsory production, either. The DA had standing to bring the issue. In re: People v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2010):

Because the Nixon test addresses and prevents potential abuse of the rule as a broad discovery tool, we adopt a substantially similar standard, adding an initial element to make explicit what is otherwise inherent. Accordingly, when a criminal pretrial third-party subpoena is challenged, a defendant must demonstrate:

(1) A reasonable likelihood that the subpoenaed materials exist, by setting forth a specific factual basis;
(2) That the materials are evidentiary and relevant;
(3) That the materials are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by the exercise of due diligence;
(4) That the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and
(5) That the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general fishing expedition.

See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699-700; Mason, 989 P.2d at 761 (requiring the prosecution to demonstrate probable cause to obtain the defendant’s protected bank and telephone records from third parties by showing (1) a reasonable likelihood that the evidence exists and (2) a nexus between the materials and the charges against the defendant).

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense, and he had warrants out. He was arrested on the warrants. The search of his car was valid as an inventory or a search incident with good faith, although prior to Gant. United States v. Scroggins, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17357 (W.D. Mo. February 8, 2010)* (W.D. Mo. already follows McCane from the 10th Cir. Here, however, it was unnecessary to say that because this was a custodial arrest situation.)

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense after the officer tried to get him to pass the patrol car. The numerous factors indicative of reasonable suspicion of alien smuggling are set out in the opinion. United States v. Telles-Montenegro, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17259 (M.D. Fla. February 4, 2010).*

Defendant’s stop was reasonable in length and within the period for getting a return on the DL check before the officer asked for consent. United States v. Geboyan, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 3893 (11th Cir. February 24, 2010) (unpublished).*

Appellant’s “own brief fails to identify a single argument upon which his motion to suppress could have been granted if it had been raised timely,” so it is waived. United States v. Ross, 367 Fed. Appx. 519 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant did not show sufficient evidence of standing to challenge the search of a place where smuggled aliens had stopped to rest, and he was with them. This was a commercial enterprise. United States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

Clear plastic baggie of drugs in plain view under the arm rest was probable cause for a search of the car. United States v. Jolly, 368 Fed. Appx. 17 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant was not seized when the officer pulled him away out of the road. There was reasonable suspicion for a pat down from defendant’s admission he had a weapon, plus his suspicious conduct. United States v. Holloway, 367 Fed. Appx. 431 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Officer Catoggio did not “seize” Holloway. The district court credited Officer Catoggio’s testimony that Holloway was stepping into a traffic lane and he grabbed Holloway’s arm to protect him from moving vehicles. Given this evidence, the district court did not clearly err when it determined that Holloway was not “seized” at that juncture.

Seizure of defendant’s cell phone as incident to arrest was valid. Admission into evidence of a telephone number on the contacts list was proper. [Not argued as a search incident of the contents of the phone being illegal.] United States v. Fuentes, 368 Fed. Appx. 95 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s computer was accessed via Limewire, and child pornography was found. That justified a search warrant for defendant’s computer. Staleness was not an issue because child porn possessors always keep it a long time. United States v. Cunningham, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19444 (W.D. Pa. March 4, 2010).*

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense, and he and the passenger were extremely nervous. The officer suspected drugs were being hauled in the empty trailer, and he got consent to search it. He also got them to follow to a nearby exit where the axle was drilled and cocaine was found inside. The search was valid. United States v. Flores, 368 Fed. Appx. 424 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant was suspected of bank robbery and he had clothes left where he once stayed. The police got the owner to give them the clothes. She was not acting as a governmental actor at the time. United States v. Wiest, 596 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2010).*

An exigent circumstances letter to an ISP for information about defendant who was attempting to extort sex from minors was not unreasonable. United States v. Beckett, 369 Fed. Appx. 52 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).

It was reasonable to ask a passenger for her identification when seeking an alternative driver for the car. State v. Flores, 2009 N.M. LEXIS 792 (May 26, 2009):

P20 We conclude that asking Defendant for her identification and running a warrants check on her was reasonably related to the initial justification for the stop and to the developing events that had resulted from it. Putting the car into the care of a lawfully licensed and capable driver would not only avoid the trouble and expense to its owner of a towing and impoundment, it would result in allowing all passengers to proceed on their journey more rapidly than if the car were towed and impounded. There was no impermissible prolongation of the stop. There was no evidence that Defendant was ever deprived of her freedom of movement in any respect, other than the fact that the car in which she was riding already had been lawfully stopped because of the conduct of its driver.

The Coast Guard had reasonable suspicion to search a boat that it stopped for a safety violation from the operator’s refusal to acknowledge blue lights or stop. United States v. Ferreira, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22144 (S.D. Fla. February 25, 2010).*

Placing a GPS device on defendant’s car violated no Fourth Amendment rights under Cardwell and Knotts. Alternatively, placing the device was at least with reasonable suspicion. United States v. Burton, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (N.D. Fla. 2010), Magistrate’s recommendation at United States v. Burton, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33515 (N.D. Fla., Apr. 1, 2010):

Applying the foregoing standards to the facts of this case, it is clear that the Defendant’s request for operation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule because of law enforcement’s use of a GPS tracking device on the Defendant’s vehicle to trace the Defendant’s movements must be denied. First, the Defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the movements of his automobile on public roads. The Defendant “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.” Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82. There is no Fourth Amendment violation for using a tracking device as a substitute for visual surveillance where “‘[t]he substitute … is for an activity, namely following a car on a public street, that is unequivocally not a search within the meaning of the amendment.'” United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Moreover, the intrusion caused by affixing the magnetic tracking device to the Defendant’s vehicle is minimal. The device was not placed on the interior of the vehicle, and required no dismantling, opening, or otherwise significant disturbance of the vehicle to attach or activate it. The Chevrolet Avalanche was not fenced in, kept inside a garage, or otherwise shielded from contact with any member of the public. In fact, the device was placed under the vehicle from a public sidewalk.

Hot pursuit justified officers’ entry into a mobile home after defendant for whom officers had a PV warrant. State v. Fuller, 196 N.C. App. 412, 674 S.E.2d 824 (2009).*

Tennessee law does not explicitly require a license plate light, so a stop for not having one in working order was without reasonable suspicion. Stop suppressed. State v. Hunt, 302 S.W.3d 859 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009).*

The state proved that exigent circumstances existed by a call for aid. The mere fact a knock was not answered is not exigent circumstances, but the facts known to the officers at the time were sufficiently exigent to justify an entry without a warrant. Montgomery v. State, 904 N.E.2d 374 (Ind. App. 2009).*

Reviewing the U.S. Magistrate Judge’s R&R de novo, the District Judge concludes that officers in fact had a reasonable suspicion to detain defendant based on the CI’s information. United States v. Singleton, 608 F. Supp. 2d 397 (W.D. N.Y. 2009)*, prior post of USMJ’s rejected R&R here.

Ten month old information in a child porn case was not stale. The Third Circuit has upheld three year old information. United States v. Bogle, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33310 (W.D. Pa. April 20, 2009).*

While a few normal questions would not be a seizure, pointed questions here became a seizure where it would be apparent to the defendant he was not free to leave and terminate the encounter. State v. Pitts, 2009 VT 51, 186 Vt. 71, 978 A.2d 14 (2009):

[*P13] Other courts applying traditional Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure law have reached similar conclusions where relatively innocuous field inquiries concerning the subject’s identity, address, or destination progress to more pointed police inquiries about drug possession or other criminal conduct suggesting that the person is the focus of a particularized police investigation into criminal activity. See, e.g., United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that consensual encounter became seizure which invalidated subsequent consent to search where police officers’ statements to the defendant that they were attempting to stop the flow of drugs indicated that the defendant was the “particular focus of a narcotics investigation”); State v. Contreras, 742 A.2d 154, 160-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (concluding that narcotics officers “clearly conveyed to defendants the message that the officers suspected them of criminal activity,” which escalated consensual encounter to seizure where the officers had defendants exit a train, explained that they were investigating drug trafficking, and asked defendants if they were carrying any contraband); Parker v. Commonwealth, 496 S.E.2d 47, 49, 51 (Va. 1998) (holding that, where police clearly followed the defendant and then “asked the defendant if he had any guns or drugs in his possession,” a reasonable person would not have believed that he was free to leave).

[*P14] Assessed in light of these standards and authorities, and viewing the encounter in its full factual context, we conclude that a reasonable person in Yosef’s circumstances would have concluded that he was the subject of a focused police investigation into criminal activity and was not free to disregard the officers’ questions and requests. The encounter with the police, it bears emphasizing, did not begin at Henry Street, but at an earlier time and place several miles away, where Yosef was identified and questioned by officers serving a subpoena at a suspected drug house. As the officers acknowledged, their suspicions were immediately aroused because Yosef appeared to be nervous and matched the description of an alleged accomplice in the drug-dealing operation.

[*P15] Yosef plainly would have been aware that he was followed across town by the same two officers, who immediately approached his taxi driver for permission to search for anything that Yosef might have left inside. Although the officers’ first few questions to Yosef were the kind that courts have uniformly held to be innocuous and non-confrontational, they rapidly progressed to inquiries indicating a particularized suspicion of criminal activity.

Defendant’s conditional release expired about six weeks before the search of his house, so his condition could not justify the search. Issuance of a violation arrest warrant before that date did not extend conditional release. United States v. Franklin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61993 (M.D. Fla. March 29, 2010), adopted 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61981 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2010).

The passenger’s furtive movement as the officer walked up during a traffic stop justified a frisk of the car. Defendant’s arguments the search violated state law is inapplicable in federal court. United States v. Gaulden, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62468 (D. Minn. June 14, 2010).*

Search of work lockers for missing equipment was justified under the circumstances and reasonable under O’Connor. Narotzky v. Natrona County Mem. Hosp. Bd. of Trs., 610 F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 2010).*

Man on the street pointing was like an anonymous tipster. Garcia v. Commonwealth, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 116 (June 25, 2010)*:

Although the pointing man in this case is similar to the two pointing individuals in the Kelly case [Commonwealth v. Kelly, 180 S.W.3d 474 (Ky. 2005)], there is nothing in the record that reflects that Officer May reasonably believed that he had face-to-face contact with the actual tipster. In fact, the only testimony Officer May gave with respect to this issue was that he saw a man in a van pointing to the Appellants’ vehicle and that he did not have a conversation with the pointing man. Additionally, the trial judge made the following finding at the suppression hearing: “We have no way of knowing if the person in the van was the anonymous caller. An argument could be made that maybe they [sic] were. But just as likely, maybe it wasn’t.” Further, unlike the tipsters in Kelly who identified their place of employment, the tipster in this case did not provide any identifying information. Accordingly, the tip at issue in this appeal was not from an identifiable citizen informant.

Red rejection sticker for state vehicle inspection was reasonable suspicion for a stop. Commonwealth v. Rivas, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 929 N.E.2d 328 (2010).*

Plaintiffs’ arrest for a passive protest of “consumerism” was without probable cause. They were engaged in expressive speech, not disorderly conduct or even fighting words. Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465 (8th Cir. 2010).*

Two Hispanic women driving together on I-5 in California who stopped and switched cars was not reasonable suspicion. United States v. Vasquez, 367 Fed. Appx. 799 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)*:

Here, the finding of reasonable suspicion rested on the fact that two Hispanic women in southern California switched cars twice and ultimately headed north on I-5. The exchanges between the cars took place in broad daylight. The government offered no facts suggesting, for example, that the officers found the types of vehicles suspicious or that the drivers or passengers acted in any evasive or unusual manner, or that the cul-de-sac particularly was known to house alien smugglers. While transferring between cars may be odd, it does not give rise to “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18.

Having failed to set forth sufficient facts to support a finding of reasonable suspicion, the government suggested at oral argument that we remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing. Not only did the district court find an evidentiary hearing unnecessary because no facts were in dispute, see United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 2000), but the government opposed the request for a hearing. Thus, no hearing is warranted now.

Defendant was stopped because there was a commercial vehicle tag on a passenger vehicle that was not on file. The officers observed several things, which in his experience, were indications of a hidden compartment. United States v. Beltran-Diaz, 366 Fed. Appx. 950 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant missed a turn and ended up at the main gate of a military base, and she stopped and asked for directions. She was asked to move over to the side and for her DL which was run and produced an outstanding arrest warrant. Her car was searched incident to arrest, and morphine was found in her purse. By stopping at the main gate, even by accident, she was on military property and subject to their control. United States v. Collins, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14841 (E.D. Cal. January 29, 2010).

The police had probable cause to believe that the black duffle bag in defendant’s possession and car was full of cocaine because they had surveilled other similar drug movements. The search of his house occurred after he was arrested outside and detained there for safety reasons. His wife’s consent to search was valid, and it cannot be shown that he was arrested and detained to prevent him from consenting. United States v. De La Rosa, 366 Fed. Appx. 757 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

There was plenty of probable cause for defendant’s arrest based on his conduct. This is hardly guilt by association. United States v. Sotelo, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14441 (D. Minn. February 18, 2010).*

55% reliability of trained drug dog was enough for probable cause under Gates‘s “fair probability” standard. United States v. Anderson, 367 Fed. Appx. 30 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished):

There was extensive evidence concerning Aron’s certification and training with Deputy Gazdick. In addition to this evidence, the government also provided proof of Aron’s reliability by offering his field records into evidence. Even assuming Anderson’s view of the statistics, Aron had a 55% accuracy rate in finding measurable amounts of drugs. “Absolute certainty is not required by the Fourth Amendment.” … Probable cause requires “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) (emphasis added). Here, the district court did not err in determining that the narcotics detection dog’s alert was reliable and gave rise to probable cause to search Anderson’s vehicle.

Altered 2004 Mercury Marquis to look like Ford Crown Victoria with recently replaced windshield was a strong indication of the use of a hidden compartment in the firewall that the Mercury has and Ford doesn’t. The windshield alone was reasonable suspicion, but the altered emblems was probable cause, in the officer’s experience. United States v. Banuelos-Romero, 597 F.3d 763 (5th Cir. 2010).*

Officers [clearly] had reasonable suspicion for a patdown of defendant from his entering a building after being told not to, wearing “baggy gang-related clothes capable of concealing a weapon,” and nervousness on confronting the police. United States v. Brown, 366 Fed. Appx. 784 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Under Hodari D., defendant did not submit to the officer’s show of authority at first by backing up. By the time he did submit, the officer had reasonable suspicion. United States v. Salazar, 609 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 2010):

Trooper Berner explained that, as Mr. Salazar’s truck began to back away, he was concerned that “this vehicle [was] trying to allude [sic] me,” Aplt’s App. at 24, and that, at that point, “I’m not quite sure what he’s doing or why he’s doing what he’s doing.” Id. at 31. We find that assessment entirely reasonable. From the point of view of a “prudent, cautious, and trained officer[],” see Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1233, Mr. Salazar’s backing up could have suggested a nascent attempt to flee, an effort to buy time so that he could dispose of contraband or formulate an explanation to provide to the officer, or simply a period of indecision before he determined what to do. In light of these reasonable interpretations of Mr. Salazar’s backing up his pickup truck, we agree with the government that he did not submit to Trooper Berner’s authority until he complied with the command to get out of the truck. Cf. United States v. Letsinger, 93 F.3d 140, 145 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that, in order to constitute submission, “the suspect must clearly acquiesce to the officer’s show of authority”) (emphasis added).

In conducting a search for evidence of a shooting, officers did not exceed the scope of search by going into the kitchen. Evidence of the shooting could have been found there. Drugs were instead. State v. Munroe, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 507 (June 18, 2010).*

Search warrant for child pornography showed probable cause where the child porn was obtained by a specific IP address and the defendant had that IP address at the time of the access. United States v. Murray, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (D. Ariz. 2010).*

Two CIs can corroborate each other. Here, though, the biggest corroboration came from admissions from the defendant. United States v. Buchanan, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112500 (D. S.C. May 8, 2008).*

Defendant was patted down and then the officer asked whether he had anything on him. He was not in custody when the officer asked. United States v. Hunter, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112506 (W.D. N.Y. April 18, 2008).*

On a traffic stop, the smell of alcohol and cigar wrappers and loose tobacco is reasonable suspicion. State v. Hobbs, 2010 Ohio 420, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 345 (9th Dist. February 10, 2010).*

The officer stopped the defendant for various traffic offenses. After he let him go, he saw what appeared to be a bag of drugs tossed from the car. This was justification for a further stop. United States v. Hinojosa, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11421 (E.D. Tex. January 29, 2010).*

Defendant’s IAC claim against counsel for failing to pursue his search and seizure claim was defaulted, but would have lost on the merits as an inventory search. Lattimore v. State, 37 So. 3d 678 (Miss. App. 2010).*

Alleged Franks violation was pretty much irrelevant here with a dog alert and other factors for reasonable suspicion. United States v. Andujar-Aponte, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11438 (D. P.R. February 10, 2010).*

Rental property inspection statutes does not require an unreasonable search. If the owner does not consent, the inspectors have to get a search warrant. People v Laroche, 2010 NY Slip Op 20142, 27 Misc. 3d 97, 902 N.Y.S.2d 878 (2d Dept. 2010):

Defendant argues that North Hempstead Town Code § 2-103 — which makes it unlawful for the owner of a dwelling to permit the occupancy of such dwelling as a rental without having a valid permit to do so — is unconstitutional because it requires a property owner to submit to a warrantless search of his or her property. However, since North Hempstead Town Code § 2-110 provides for the inspection of residential dwellings upon consent and pursuant to a warrant, North Hempstead Town Code § 2-103 does not compel a residential property owner to consent to a warrantless search and is not unconstitutional (see Pashcow v Town of Babylon, 53 NY2d 687, 688 [1981]).

Contraband in defendant’s outbuilding was not in plain view. The outbuilding was on the curtilage, and the entry was unreasonable. Consent was not voluntary, and inevitable discovery did not apply because the contraband was part of the decision to get a warrant. State v. Bradford, 2010 Ohio 1784, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1476 (4th Dist. April 19, 2010).*

The state’s argument defendant lacked standing was not raised until a motion to reconsider, so it is waived. However, on the merits, there was a reasonable probability if defense counsel filed a motion to suppress, it might have succeeded, so defense counsel was arguably ineffective, and the evidence supports the trial court’s findings. Kolle v. State, 386 S.C. 578, 690 S.E.2d 73 (2010). [Note: I can’t help but note that cases on similar facts result in the search being sustained, anyway. Here, the issue was an entry on exigent circumstances. Police responded to a loud music complaint, the door looked like it had been broken open, and nobody responded to the door. The officers entered to look for possible incapacitated persons and conducted a protective sweep.]