The great Yale Kamisar: ‘Mapp v. Ohio’ 50 years later / Critics of the exclusionary rule bewail its heavy costs. But the Fourth Amendment itself imposes these costs, in this Monday’s National Law Journal:

June 19 marks the 50th anniversary of Mapp v. Ohio, the most famous search-and-seizure case ever decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. Moreover, most commentators believe Mapp has another claim to fame — it marked the beginning of the Warren Court’s revolution in American criminal procedure. (Mapp was soon followed by the much celebrated right-to-counsel case, Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), and then two landmark confession cases, Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) and Miranda v. Arizona (1966).)

Mapp overruled another well-known search-and-seizure case, Wolf v. Colorado (1949), and held that the state courts must exclude illegally seized evidence as a matter of federal constitutional law. Up to that time, state courts had been free to admit or exclude illegally seized evidence as they saw fit, and about half of them had chosen to admit such evidence. (Federal courts had no option; ever since 1914 they had to keep out illegally seized evidence.)

Do Police Officers Conducting a Search Have Fourth Amendment Rights Not To Be Secretly Taped by Government? by Eugene Volokh, Volokh Conspiracy re United States v. Wells, 2011 WL 2259748 (N.D. Okla. May 12, 2011) (No) just posted on Westlaw where a Tulsa cop was recorded in a sting.

Search warrant for an x-ray border search is “nonroutine” and it was issued with reasonable suspicion of smuggling. United States v. Paulino, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60182 (D. Guam June 6, 2011):

Although neither a warrant nor probable cause is required to conduct a border x-ray search, in the Ninth Circuit, there is a strong preference that customs officers obtain a warrant prior to conducting such an intrusive search. See United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1976)). Accordingly, an affidavit supporting a border x-ray search need only establish a reasonable suspicion of body cavity smuggling to be upheld; probable cause is not required. See id. at 383 (finding that a magistrate need only find a clear indication of body cavity smuggling to support a border x-ray warrant); see also Camacho, 368 F.3d at 1186 n.1 (citing Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540-41) (recognizing the Supreme Court’s disapproval of the clear indication standard and adopting the reasonable suspicion standard for nonroutine border searches).

Probable cause to search a house for a gun existed where defendant ran into the house with a gun and came back out without it. United States v. Bennett, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60285 (N.D. Ind. June 6, 2011).*

The search of defendant’s vehicle was with probable cause and it was mobile, so the automobile exception applied. United States v. Castellanos, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11439 (11th Cir. June 6, 2011) (unpublished).*

Special prosecutor and Sheriff Arpaio did not have immunity under the allegations of the complaint for a late night raid and arrests of an alternative newspaper’s executives allegedly without probable cause. The complaint alleged sufficient facts to proceed under the First and Fourth Amendment. Lacy v. Maricopa County, 09-15703 (9th Cir. June 9, 2011).* See Courthouse News Service.

The CI was new but corroborated, and defendant’s arrest was with probable cause. United States v. Exum, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60240 (E.D. Mo. April 28, 2011).*

Wait of 30 minutes for drug dog on a stop with reasonable suspicion was not unreasonable. United States v. Garibay, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60264 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2011).*

Search warrant for defendant’s “mobile office” in his Lincoln Navigator was reasonable and issued with probable cause. Amex discovered an identity theft operation getting credit cards, and a controlled delivery was set up. When the card was attempted to be delivered to a particular address, it was refused, but defendant stopped the delivery truck and sought the package. In the Navigator was an open laptop and an apparent mobile office. The fact another computer could have been used for the identity theft did not negate the probable cause for this one. United States v. Adigun, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60310 (N.D. Ga. May 4, 2011):

Defendants also argue that there was no statement in the affidavit that Onyekaba used any computer, much less the laptop in the vehicle, to commit credit card fraud or identity theft, and that he “could have easily been using a home computer … or the computer of a third party.” [Doc. 49 at 7]. However, such a possibility does not remove the laptop in the vehicle from suspicion. See Fama, 758 F.2d at 838. Investigator Meeks stated in his affidavit and during his testimony that he believed that the fraudulent application was “made via internet connection” and “very likely done using the laptop visible in the Navigator.” [Doc. 49-1 at 4]. He also testified that it appeared, based on the laptop and the paperwork surrounding it, that Onyekaba was using the Navigator as a “mobile office,” and was driving to locations to pick up deliveries of fraudulent credit cards. [Doc. 49-2 at 4:30, 4:58]. Investigator Meeks also reported that when the officers approached Onyekaba to question him, he fled the scene on foot, leaving behind the laptop and other items in the Navigator. [Doc. 49-1 at 4].

Beating me to the punch, on Slate.com: Mapp v. Ohio turns 50 / If a moderate Texan could love the exclusionary rule, why can’t judicial conservatives? by Alexander Wohl:

An important measure of success is resilience in the face of attack. If so, the achievement of the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio—the decision spelling out the modern meaning of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures”—was a singular accomplishment. The Mapp decision celebrates its 50th anniversary on June 19 and conservative judicial activists, still busily trying to get it overturned, have entirely misunderstood that it represents constitutional fidelity and adherence to the rule of law at its best.

Under siege by conservatives since the moment it was decided, Mapp provided for the first time that the exclusionary rule—barring evidence seized without a search warrant—applied to state prosecutions. (Like all provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment applies only to actions by the federal government, unless the court has “incorporated” it through the 14th Amendment’s due process clause.) Today, the assault on Mapp continues, led by the current Supreme Court’s conservative bloc. But that attack is misplaced, given that the opinion, written by the moderate Justice Tom C. Clark, offers a model for how true conservatives should apply the broad language and meaning of the Constitution.

This is Dolly Mapp. I have a different picture of Dolly Mapp from a dear friend in Oregon in my office given me years ago. TruTV has a webpage devoted to Dolly Mapp.

The officer turned off the audio to his video when he called in information with his password and forgot to turn it back on when he asked for and got consent. He remembered, turned it back on, and reconfirmed the consent, which the court finds credible. The stop continued too long, however, and it became an arrest without probable cause. Ultimately, the court finds that defendant’s consent was invalid and not a product of free will during the stop, and his computer with child pornography was searched. United States v. Padilla, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58035 (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2011)*:

Even where a consent is voluntary, if there has been a preceding constitutional violation, that consent is not valid unless it is also an independent act of free will. Id. at 407. “The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether there was a ‘break in the causal chain’ between the constitutional violation and the consent; that is to say, consent cannot be the product of the illegal detention.” Id. (citing United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002)). To determine whether consent was independent, the Court considers: (1) the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the initial misconduct. Id.

Here, the Court finds that all three factors weigh against a finding that the written consent was an act of free will. Padilla was still being illegally detained at the time that he gave the consent and thus there were no intervening circumstances between the constitutional violation and the consent. The first two factors clearly weigh against the Government. United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 243 (5th Cir. 2000)(noting illegal detention that continued until time of consent meant that the first two factors weighed against consent being independent). Lastly, the Court finds that the initial misconduct here was flagrant, considering the prolonged detention that Padilla endured on the basis of questionable evidence. In sum, the Court finds that the written consent, though voluntary, was the product of the illegal detention and not an independent act of free will. Because Padilla’s consent was not valid, the search of his computer violated the Fourth Amendment and the Motion to Suppress must be granted.

I normally don’t bother with trial court opinions in civil cases, but this one is significant: After two trips to the Tenth Circuit [Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2007) (prosecutorial immunity denied for search warrant application); Mink v. Suthers, 613 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2010) (sufficient allegation of violation of clearly established constitutional rights)], the District of Colorado grants summary judgment on liability for the blogger of The Howling Pig who was the target of a clearly unconstitutional search warrant issued without probable cause and in retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights. The search warrant was issued by a judge and the blogger’s house was searched and his computer seized. The alleged crime was “criminal liable” but it was clearly protected speech as satire. [which is probably unconstitutional in itself; Arkansas held that 35 years ago]. Mink v. Knox, 04-cv-00023-LTB-CBS (D. Colo. June 3, 2011):

Accordingly, Mr. Mink has established that Ms. Knox’s alleged conduct violated his Fourth Amendment rights because there was no probable cause to believe that he had committed criminal libel. Ms. Knox’s argument that she is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because she made a reasonable mistake that her actions were constitutional is directly contradicted by the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion, unaffected by the additional facts she presents, that no reasonable prosecutor could have believed that it was probable that publication of THP statements constituted a crime warranting the search and seizure of Mr. Mink’s property.

In addition, the warrant was overbroad:

It follows that Ms. Knox’s argument that there was no violation of Mr. Mink’s constitutional rights because none of his property was seized pursuant to a single paragraph in the Warrant referenced in my June 12, 2008 dismissal order is without merit. I further note that in addressing the Warrant’s compliance with the constitutional requirement of particularity, I concluded that it was overly broad because it authorized the seizure “- among other things- of ‘any and all correspondence, … or other communications in written or printed form.’” See Doc # 79 (emphasis added).

Hat tip to Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press.

Defendant’s conversations with a minor on the internet did not provide probable cause to search his computer for child pornography. Moreover, the officer’s deliberate omission of his knowledge of the minor’s serious credibility issues and prior false allegations required suppression of the search. “The protections of the Fourth Amendment are not lessened based on the nature of the crime investigated.” United States v. Davis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57133 (E.D. Wash. May 27, 2011):

The protections of the Fourth Amendment are not lessened based on the nature of the crime investigated. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Given the current environment of increasing government surveillance and the long memories of computers, we must not let the nature of the alleged crime, child pornography, skew our analysis or make us “lax” in our duty to guard the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.”) see also United States v. Krupa, 633 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. February 11, 2011) (Berzon, J. dissenting) (“I cannot help but think that had this case involved anything but child pornography, it would come out differently. I fear that understandable abhorrence of this particular crime can infect judicial judgment. We would do well to remember that the protections of the Fourth Amendment do not depend on the nature of the suspected criminal activity.”).

As stated by now Justice Sotomayor, courts are not insensitive to the need for law enforcement to have a certain amount of flexibility in conducting criminal investigations, however, requiring a sufficient showing of probable cause “will simply focus law enforcement efforts on those who can reasonably be suspected of possessing child pornography. If this proves to be a hindrance, it is one the Fourth Amendment demands.” United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 124 (2nd Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

When considering the serious credibility concerns surrounding GT, which were deliberately or recklessly omitted by Detective Ashley, the court finds the information contained in the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. The court finds that had the issuing state court judge been truthfully provided with the omitted information about GT, the judge would not have issued the warrant without requiring Detective Ashley to conduct further investigation and obtain corroborating information. Accordingly, the Motion to Suppress (ECF No. 30) must be, and is, GRANTED.

The court does not reach this conclusion lightly, nor does this decision minimize the very serious nature of the allegations against Davis. However, the Fourth Amendment commands that warrants be issued only “upon probable cause” and supported by truthful information (“supported by Oath or affirmation”), and the warrant in this case was not. The Ninth Circuit has stated: “In the absence of countervailing evidence to bolster the informant’s credibility or the reliability of the tip, an informant’s criminal past involving dishonesty is fatal to the reliability of the informant’s information, and his/her testimony cannot support probable cause.” United States v. Reeves, 210 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000)(emphasis added). Although GT did not have a criminal conviction for a crime of dishonesty, it is clear that she had made false statements to the police regarding the alleged sexual assault by Cody Little, and two years prior had made an “unfounded” allegation against her father. Detective Ashley conducted virtually no investigation to corroborate the statements of GT, and thus presented no countervailing evidence to bolster GT’s credibility or reliability. A judge reviewing all of these circumstances with knowledge of the serious credibility issues of GT, GT’s mother’s vague suspicion that “something” had occurred, the GT identified Myspace chats, and Davis’ dated criminal history would have had such serious questions as to the existence of probable cause that he would have found no substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed and would have required further investigation and inquiry prior to the issuance of a search warrant for the Defendant’s personal computer.

Law.com: The Fourth Amendment in the World of E-Communications by Stephen Treglia of the New York Law Journal, June 03, 2011

The past 12 months have seen an unprecedented shift in the law as it pertains to electronic communications. What makes this recent evolution particularly dramatic are the scope of the shift, the fact that the shift has affected multiple levels of e-communications, and that each level of the evolution has headed in the same direction — toward increasing the restrictions that prevent law enforcement from gaining evidence from e-communications.

The irony is that at the very start of this 12 month period, the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to be warning the entire legal system against precisely this course of conduct in City of Ontario v. Quon, when it stated:

The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment. … Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior.

Defendant leased a laptop computer from Aaron’s and he had it password protected. This gave him a legitimate expectation of privacy in it. Thumbnail images were presented to a USMJ for a search warrant, and the court was uncomfortable with most of them being child pornography, but one image of a nude child facing the camera in a slightly provocative pose was enough to support the warrant. United States v. Howe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57491 (W.D. N.Y. May 27, 2011).*

Nexus to the premises was shown by trash pulls. United States v. Hill, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56840 (N.D. Fla. May 26, 2011).* On a second search warrant, nexus was shown by direct observation of the officers of defendant’s comings and goings to drug deals. United States v. Hill, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56854 (N.D. Fla. May 26, 2011).*

The affidavit showed a large scale drug operation for a search of ten residences, so it was not stale. United States v. Curran, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57117 (W.D. Pa. May 27, 2011).*

An officer could not search a mislaid iPhone under the excuse that it was to find who the owner was since it was undisputed that the owner was coming back for it. People v. Schutter, 249 P.3d 1123 (Colo. 2011):

We need not here decide whether, and if so, to what extent, police officers may conduct a warrantless examination of property that has been lost or mislaid but not abandoned. Under the undisputed facts of this case, the defendant’s iPhone was neither abandoned, lost, nor mislaid such that the Aspen police would have had any cause to identify the owner to return it. Whether or not he knew the defendant’s name, Officer Burg was aware from the moment the iPhone came into his possession that the defendant inadvertently left it in the store’s locked restroom and knew precisely where it was; that his immediate demand for its return had been refused by the store clerk, who controlled access to the restroom; and that he left the area only when he was told by the clerk that he would have to come back later to retrieve his phone.

According to Officer Burg’s own undisputed testimony, the store clerk told him all of this when he handed over the phone. See People v. Rivas, 13 P.3d 315 (2000) (“When controlling facts are undisputed, even though they are not specifically included in the findings of the trial court, the effect of those facts will also be treated as a matter of law.”). Officer Burg also testified that it was 4:20 in the morning, and at that time, the defendant had been gone from the store for at most an hour. Under these circumstances, the officer had no grounds to believe the property’s safe return required the discovery of any further information. Assuming, without deciding, that the Fourth Amendment could tolerate, under some set of circumstances, some kind of warrantless examination of a cell phone to ascertain how it might be returned to its owner, this case cannot present that set of circumstances.

Defendant was the passenger in a car stopped for probable possession of drugs. The driver was arrested and defendant was handcuffed, told he was not under arrest, and then transported to the police station for further search. All they had on defendant was that he was a known associate of the other defendant and they went to NYC the day before allegedly to buy drugs. Nothing was found associated with defendant in the car on this search. Taking him in violated the Fourth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 124, 944 N.E.2d 595 (2011):

Even if reasonable suspicion existed to question and conduct a pat-down of the defendant, once nothing more was learned or discovered, either on him or in the car, the defendant should not have been further detained. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 159 (1997), quoting from Commonwealth v. Torres, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 6, 9-10 (1996) (“[O]nce any potential threat to the officer’s safety was dispelled and there was no reasonable suspicion that criminal activity [involving the defendant] was afoot, any basis for further detention evaporated”). Compare Commonwealth v. Wing Ng, 420 Mass. 236, 237-238 (1995) (no automatic right to pat frisk companion solely for being in company of one lawfully arrested).

There was probable cause for the defendant’s arrest where she got out of a car that the CI said had a trashbag of marijuana in it, and she came in at the same time as the trashbag. State v. Hale, 2010 Ohio 3306, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 2802 (8th Dist. July 15, 2010).*

Defendant’s challenge to the search came for the first time on appeal so it is waived. State v. Layne, 2010 Ohio 2308, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 2819 (12th Dist. May 24, 2010).*

Defendant’s guilty plea waived any suppression issue. State v. Roberts, 2010 Ohio 3302, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 2800 (8th Dist. July 15, 2010).*

Officers approached defendants to talk to them and saw drugs in plain view, and that justified getting them out of the car and searching. State v. Moore, 2010 Ohio 3305, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 2799 (8th Dist. July 15, 2010).*

The CI pointed out a car as being involved in a coming bank robbery, and it was seen near the scene of the robbery three times. That corroborated the CI. Brown v. State, 334 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. App. — Tyler 2010),* Released for Publication April 25 2011, Petition for discretionary review refused by In re Brown, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 359 (Tex. Crim. App. March 9, 2011).

The witness to an accident was taken to defendant’s premises to take a look at him, and the witness ID’d him. While the entry onto the curtilage to make the view violated the Fourth Amendment, it was harmless. In addition, the court would not suppress the identification because the witness’s identification in court was shown to be from independent recollection. Tijerina v. State, 334 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. App. — Amarillo 2011).

“All persons” search warrant for a suspected meth lab in an automobile repair garage was reasonable and with probable cause. State v. Hash, 2011 Ohio 859, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 765 (9th Dist. February 28, 2011).*

When defendant spotted the officers as their patrol car passed, defendant’s eyes widened, and his jaw dropped. He immediately thereafter reached to the vehicle’s floorboards. The officers testified that, based upon their previous experience, defendant’s actions were unusual and raised safety concerns because actions of that type suggested that defendant could be trying to retrieve a weapon or hide a weapon or other contraband. Defendant’s actions were sufficiently suspicious to justify an investigative stop, and the controlled substances found during that stop were properly admitted into evidence. (Lexis overview) State v. Waldrup, 331 S.W.3d 668 (Mo. 2011).*

Defendant was on an Indian reservation in Franklin County NY that was partly in New York and Quebec. He was observed crossing the border at an unmanned border crossing by a tribal officer and then promptly return. The tribal officer was designated to make border stops by CBP, but he needed advance telephone authority which he lacked here. The stop was invalid. United States v. Wilson, 754 F. Supp. 2d 450 (N.D. N.Y. 2010). The conclusion:

Sgt. Rourke and Inv. Barnes’ stop of Wilson’s vehicle was outside the legal boundary of the St. Regis Mohawk Reservation and thus they lacked authority to conduct the stop as St. Regis Mohawk tribal police officers. Although Sgt. Rourke possessed delegated Title 19 authority to act as a customs officer, he failed to notify the ICE agent in charge before stopping defendant’s vehicle as required by the Designation Agreement. Because he did not telephone the agent in charge and obtain authorization prior to performing his Title 19 duties, he was not acting in his Title 19 capacity when he and Inv. Barnes seized defendant’s vehicle near the intersection of Route 37 and Route 37C.

Likewise, Sgt. Rourke and Inv. Barnes cannot rely on New York Indian Law Section 114(8) to validate the stop of Wilson’s vehicle off the reservation. Their pursuit did not commence on the reservation because they did not observe Wilson’s vehicle until it was at Truck Stop #9, located off the reservation. Nor did they have probable cause to arrest Wilson within the boundary of the St. Regis territory based solely on the radio traffic reports and their speculation that he was not going to report to a port of entry as required by 19 U.S.C. § 1433(b).

While Wilson’s exit from and reentry to the United States within a short time frame coupled with the officers’ knowledge of drug trafficking behavior in the area may have been enough to establish reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop, the fact remains that as SRMPD officers, Sgt. Rourke and Inv. Barnes did not have authority to conduct a Terry stop outside of the boundary of the St. Regis Mohawk Reservation. Because they were acting in their official capacities as on duty SRMPD officers, the stop cannot be justified as a citizen’s arrest.

Lastly, simply because Agent Chamberlain was allegedly planning to stop the vehicle and had the authority to do so as a USBP Agent does not mean that the discovery of the marijuana in the trunk was inevitable. The Government has failed to establish its inevitable discovery by a preponderance of the evidence and thus this exception will not save the otherwise unlawful seizure.

The Virginia Court of Appeals en banc reaffirms the panel decision in Foltz v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 107, 706 S.E.2d 914 (2011), previously posted here, where GPS surveillance was conducted of defendant’s employer’s work truck that he was driving. When he showed a pattern of conduct that strongly suggested a sexual assault was coming, they swooped in and arrested him in the act. What they saw in public was attenuated from any possible Fourth Amendment violation.

From our review of the record on appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the eyewitness testimony of the police officers. We reach this conclusion without addressing whether the use of the GPS device, attached to employer’s van assigned to appellant, without first obtaining a search warrant, violated appellant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Virginia Constitution.

The panel decision was previously posted here September 7, 2010.

A passenger riding without a seat belt is in violation of state law, and, when the vehicle is stopped, the officer has reason to ask the passenger for identification to issue the citation. Commonwealth v. Washington, 459 Mass. 32, 944 N.E.2d 98 (2011).*

The court finds that the officer did not testify falsely about how some information was gathered about defendant’s AmTrak ticket. So, a Franks hearing is rejected. And, even if it he did testify falsely, it would not change the outcome of the suppression hearing because there was probable cause without it. United States v. McKenzie, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21202 (D. N.M. February 10, 2011).*

While the N.C. following too close statute is subject to subjective interpretation by an officer, the “one car length per 10 miles per hour” is a reasonable evaluation and makes it less subjective. United States v. Flores-Duran, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20898 (E.D. N.C. February 3, 2011), adopted by, motion denied by United States v. Flores-Duran, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19487 (E.D.N.C., Feb. 25, 2011).*

After defendant’s arrest in another’s car at 4:30 am in a high crime area, it was reasonable under the circumstances to impound the car. There were risks in leaving it and there was nobody to drive it off. Also, it was reasonable not to call the owner at that hour to come and take possession of it. Commonwealth v. Eddington, 459 Mass. 102, 944 N.E.2d 153 (2011):

… Although we need not examine the reason of the police officers for not attempting to contact Rodriguez, the reason for not doing so — the early morning hour — provided a sound basis for their decision. We also find significant the facts that Eddington was unable to operate the automobile because he had been placed under arrest (for operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license) and Cappas had been drinking and was not known to be authorized to drive the automobile. See Coleman v. State, 1983 OK CR 101, 668 P.2d 1126, 1130 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073, 104 S. Ct. 986, 79 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1984) (impoundment justified where driver placed in custody and passenger had been observed drinking beer). Cf. Commonwealth v. Ellerbe, supra at 775-776 (impoundment justified in part based on fact that driver was arrested and passenger had no license with her); Commonwealth v. Daley, supra at 750 n.4 (impoundment justified in part because vehicle could not be turned over to third person). Nor was the vehicle’s registration produced. See G. L. c. 90, § 11 (“Every person operating a motor vehicle shall have the certificate of registration for the vehicle … and his license to operate, upon his person or in the vehicle, in some easily accessible place …”). Cf. Commonwealth v. Daley, supra at 750 (impoundment justified in part because vehicle was unregistered, uninsured, and had attached plates belonging to another vehicle). All these reasons, together with the interests protected by conducting an inventory search as well as the “the proposition that an officer’s judgment in the matter is to be tested by what reasonably appeared to him at the time, rather than to us in long afterthought,” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 415, 664 N.E.2d 868 (1996), support impoundment. We thus conclude that the police acted reasonably in deciding to impound the automobile in the circumstances.

By the time claimant withdrew his consent, the officer had probable cause to believe evidence of likely crime was in the vehicle, and that independently supported the search. United States v. $57,610.00 in United States Currency, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47116 (D. Neb. May 13, 2010).*

Defendant’s claim that he was arrested without the officer’s identifying himself was unsupported by the record, even if it would have provided a ground for relief. State v. Dewitt, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 375 (May 12, 2010).*

“[T]he defendant had neither an actual, subjective expectation of privacy nor an objective expectation of privacy in the recorded conversations” from the jail. He argued for a reduced, but reasonable, expectation of privacy, but failed. State v. Hill, 333 S.W.3d 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).*