D.Colo.: Prosecutor liable for procuring search warrant without probable cause or particularity

I normally don’t bother with trial court opinions in civil cases, but this one is significant: After two trips to the Tenth Circuit [Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2007) (prosecutorial immunity denied for search warrant application); Mink v. Suthers, 613 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2010) (sufficient allegation of violation of clearly established constitutional rights)], the District of Colorado grants summary judgment on liability for the blogger of The Howling Pig who was the target of a clearly unconstitutional search warrant issued without probable cause and in retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights. The search warrant was issued by a judge and the blogger’s house was searched and his computer seized. The alleged crime was “criminal liable” but it was clearly protected speech as satire. [which is probably unconstitutional in itself; Arkansas held that 35 years ago]. Mink v. Knox, 04-cv-00023-LTB-CBS (D. Colo. June 3, 2011):

Accordingly, Mr. Mink has established that Ms. Knox’s alleged conduct violated his Fourth Amendment rights because there was no probable cause to believe that he had committed criminal libel. Ms. Knox’s argument that she is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because she made a reasonable mistake that her actions were constitutional is directly contradicted by the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion, unaffected by the additional facts she presents, that no reasonable prosecutor could have believed that it was probable that publication of THP statements constituted a crime warranting the search and seizure of Mr. Mink’s property.

In addition, the warrant was overbroad:

It follows that Ms. Knox’s argument that there was no violation of Mr. Mink’s constitutional rights because none of his property was seized pursuant to a single paragraph in the Warrant referenced in my June 12, 2008 dismissal order is without merit. I further note that in addressing the Warrant’s compliance with the constitutional requirement of particularity, I concluded that it was overly broad because it authorized the seizure “- among other things- of ‘any and all correspondence, … or other communications in written or printed form.’” See Doc # 79 (emphasis added).

Hat tip to Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press.

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