It was not unreasonable for officers to look between a mattress and box springs of a bed during a protective sweep because fugitives often hide there. United States v. Jollivette, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48642 (W.D. La. April 13, 2011):

Jollivette argues, however, that the officers could not have reasonably believed that he would be found under the mattress because a cursory inspection of the bed did not indicate that a person could be hiding between the mattress and box spring. The deputies’ testimony, which the Court finds credible, refutes this claim. Each of the deputies testified that they have, on numerous occasions, found fugitives hiding under a bed or between the mattress and box springs of a bed. Accordingly, based on their experience in executing arrest warrants, it was reasonable for them to look for Jollivette between the mattress and box springs.

Furthermore, Deputy Gary testified that he always looks for fugitives in these places, and, in this case, looked under the bed and mattress in the bedroom which he searched. Likewise, Lieutenant Thomas testified that he generally pulls up the mattress, and then the box spring, in order to look under the bed. He does this because it is safer than stooping down to look under the bed first.

Unnamed untested informants’ hearsay could not provide a legal basis for a protective sweep, which could be on reasonable suspicion. State v. Guggenmos, 350 Ore. 243, 253 P.3d 1042 (2011):

In sum, the record does not demonstrate that the reports of the unnamed informants to Mogle and Deese were credible or reliable. Bates requires that an officer’s suspicion of an immediate threat of serious injury be based on “specific and articulable facts.” 304 Ore. at 524. Those reports of the unnamed informants to Mogle and Deese do not satisfy that standard. Those reports are insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that any of the occupants of the Third Street house posed an imminent threat of serious physical injury to the officers during Mogle’s visit.

As a matter of first impression in Missouri, running a DL number is not an unreasonable search. “‘[E]very circuit that has considered the issue in a precedential opinion has held that license plate checks do not count as searches under the Fourth Amendment.’ U.S. v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007) …” State v. Loyd, 2011 Mo. App. LEXIS 477 (April 12, 2011).

Colorado wiretap orders are governed by the state wiretapping law and the Fourth Amendment. The wiretap orders here were issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. People v. Gallegos, 251 P.3d 1056 (Colo. 2011).*

The padlocked back of a U-Haul truck was not a “trunk” within the PD’s inventory policy, so the product of that search had to be removed from the affidavit for the search warrant. The record contains other evidence of probable cause, but the trial court should determine whether it was sufficient. State v. Newcomb, 161 N.H. 666, 20 A.3d 881 (2011).*

The record did not support that the appellant was removed from the property to prevent him from objecting to somebody else consenting. And, even if there was, the part of Randolph about removing somebody to prevent consent is dicta. Mills v. State, 62 So. 3d 553 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).*

Defendant’s concession he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises prevented him from challenging seizure of items in plain view. State v. Tarkington, 187 P.3d 94 (Ariz. App. 2008).*

Defendant’s car was used in a shooting, so its impoundment after defendant’s arrest was valid, and so was the inventory. United States v. McCalla, 286 Fed. Appx. 610 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

There is no absolute defense right to see the full unredacted records of the drug dog’s certification records. United States v. Thomas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45989 (D. Ariz. February 18, 2011):

Defense counsel objected to the admission of redacted canine certification records on the grounds that the redacted records are insufficient to establish the reliability of the canine team that conducted the search in this case. Counsel cites United States v. Cedano-Arellano, 332 F.3d 568, (9th Cir. 2003), in support of his position. However, in Cedano-Arrellano the trial court had denied the defense motion for any discovery of the canine certification records. The government correctly argues there is precedent in this district for denying a defense request to view unredacted canine certification records and precedent for a court’s reliance on redacted canine certification records.

This court recommends that the District Court rule that the redacted canine certification reports (Exhibit 2) are admissible and deny the defense motion to discover those unredacted reports. The redacted reports establish the reliability of the canine team.

Probable cause and the automobile exception permitted a search under the hood and behind the gas filler door where guns and drugs were found. The defendant had been seen dealing drugs out of the car in the recent past. United States v. Goncalves, 642 F.3d 245 (1st Cir. 2011).*

Sheriff’s deputies attempting to serve civil process on plaintiffs violated the Fourth Amendment when plaintiff’s wife attempted to close the garage door to keep them out, but one broke the safety beam with his foot, and the door reopened. The garage was a part of the house. However, there was not a case in point, so the officers get qualified immunity. The court explains in great detail the qualified immunity analysis of finding a case with “obvious clarity” for guidance, finding none here. Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 2011):

We need not decide in this case whether entering an open garage in order to utilize a passageway to gain access to a visible door to the home is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. We hold, however, that, under the totality of the circumstances, the Deputies’ entry into the Coffins’ garage was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The garage here is attached to the home itself, putting it in closer proximity to the home than an unattached garage. In contrast with a carport, the attached garage has walls on three sides and has the capability, if the outside door is rolled down, of being closed to maintain privacy. Ms. Coffin also attempted to exercise her Fourth Amendment rights. In her first conversation with Lutz, she explained that her husband might need a while before he would be able to come to the door. Lutz expressed his willingness to wait, and Ms. Coffin, by closing and locking the front door, indicated that she was maintaining her privacy in the meantime. Following this encounter, when Ms. Coffin noticed Lutz walking up to her window through her bushes, she screamed at him to get out of her bushes and off her property and threatened to call the police. Finally, and most significantly, when Lutz and Brandau remained on the property, Ms. Coffin attempted to close the garage door in order to maintain privacy in that area as well. Under these circumstances and in light of Ms. Coffin’s indications that she intended to maintain privacy, we hold that entering the garage as Ms. Coffin attempted to close it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

. . .

Although we have concluded that, especially in light of Ms. Coffin’s instruction for the officers to leave her property and her attempt to close the garage door, the Deputies’ entry of the garage did in fact violate the Fourth Amendment, we cannot conclude that the law was clearly established such that reasonable officers facing these circumstances would know that their conduct would violate federal law. Several reasons inform our conclusion in this regard.

In a case of first impression, directing the driver of a vehicle to “perform[ ] a set-up procedure” of rolling up the vehicle’s windows and turning the blower on high for a dog sniff was not any different than “prepping” a suitcase by squeezing the air out of it first. (Over a vigorous dissent.) People v. Bartelt, 241 Ill. 2d 217, 349 Ill. Dec. 949, 948 N.E.2d 52 (2011) (4-3):

After a lawful traffic stop, a police officer performed a set-up procedure, which entailed ordering the driver, defendant, Cheryl L. Bartelt, to roll up her truck’s windows and turn the ventilation system’s blowers on high before a second officer conducted a canine sniff of the exterior of her truck. The dog alerted on both doors of the truck, and a subsequent search of the truck resulted in discovery of drug evidence. Defendant was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of methamphetamine …. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered during the traffic stop. The circuit court of Adams County granted the motion to suppress. The State filed an interlocutory appeal …. A majority of the appellate court reversed the circuit court’s order suppressing the evidence. 384 Ill. App. 3d 1028. This appeal followed.

We are asked to determine whether the officers’ actions in ordering defendant to roll up her windows and turn the blowers on high before conducting a dog sniff of the truck’s exterior constituted an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment. We hold that it did not. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

. . .

In addition, it is undisputed that the officers had the authority to conduct an exterior dog sniff of defendant’s truck during the traffic stop and that the dog sniff itself was not a search subject to the fourth amendment. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408-10 (holding that a suspicionless dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance no individual has any right to possess is not a search subject to the fourth amendment).

Finally, there is no dispute that Officer Tyler ordered defendant to comply with the set-up procedure. As noted, the State conceded in the circuit court that Officer Tyler ordered defendant to perform the procedure and did not give her the option of refusing to comply.

The only issue on appeal is whether the officers’ actions in ordering defendant to roll up her windows and turn the blowers on high before conducting the dog sniff of the truck’s exterior constituted an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment. This seems to be an issue of first impression nationwide because the parties have not cited, nor has our research revealed, any decisions that have addressed the issue.

. . .

The set-up procedure at issue in this case is analogous to the luggage “prepping” procedure approved by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Viera, 644 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1981). In United States v. Viera, Drug Enforcement Administration agents “prepped” the defendants’ suitcases before a dog sniff by pressing them lightly with the hands and slowly circulating the air, the purpose of which was to procure a scent from the bags. Viera, 644 F.2d at 510. The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument that the “prepping” procedure was a search in violation of the fourth amendment, holding that a dog sniff is not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment and that a light press of the hands along the outside of the suitcases was not sufficiently intrusive to require a different result. Id.

Similarly, in the present case, a dog sniff is not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and ordering defendant to roll up her windows and turn the blowers on high before conducting the dog sniff was not sufficiently intrusive to require a different result. See id.

JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:

This appeal squarely presents the question of whether a police officer’s order to a driver, during a routine traffic stop, to perform a “set-up” procedure to facilitate a canine sniff for narcotics, is an unreasonable seizure which violates the fourth amendment. It is my view that it is. Despite the fact that this precise issue was litigated by the parties in the circuit court, and even though the majority’s own recitation of the factual background and procedural history of this cause repeatedly references seizure principles, my colleagues decline to analyze this appeal in the context of whether defendant was subjected to an unreasonable seizure. Instead, they review the propriety of the police action by inquiring whether the “ordering” of defendant to perform the set-up procedure is “an unreasonable search.” Slip op. at 8. Using this inappropriate analytical framework, the majority holds that there is no constitutional violation. As I agree with neither the majority’s analysis nor the result, I respectfully dissent.

[Note: I find United States v. Viera, 644 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1981), completely unavailing to the majority. The suitcase there was sitting in front of them. Is sitting on it a search? Not really, although if I were the judge, I say yes, but I’m not. Look at this case at its irreducible minimum: Could the officer have entered the car to do the “set up procedure”? If the answer is no, then how could the driver be ordered to do the “search” for the police? The driver couldn’t. And, just saying Cabelles says a dog sniff isn’t a search is no answer because they would have to enter the car to make it work, and that is where the majority completely fails in its duty here.]

The car was stopped for a taillight violation, and the defendant passenger made a furtive movement down. The officer did a protective sweep of the area and found a glove which he picked up. While it did not contain a weapon, it contained a pipe, and the office was not required to ignore it. Suppression order reversed. People v. Brant, 252 P.3d 459 (Colo. 2011).*

Defendant’s car was stopped with the hood up, and an officer, suspecting him of possession of drugs, approached him to ask if he had car trouble. In a non-threatening manner, the officer asked to conduct a patdown and a search of the car, which defendant agreed to. People v. Walters, 249 P.3d 805 (Colo. 2011).*

Defendant on arrest was Mirandized and lawyered up. He was put in a police car and taken to the police station. While riding, he started talking without prompting, and then he was asked for consent to a search of his car which he granted. The search was valid. State v. Ashby, 339 S.W.3d 600 (Mo. App. 2011).*

Where a stop was with reasonable suspicion, and that included the passenger, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment to run the passenger’s ID through the system. An arrest warrant would not be suppressed. State v. Walker, 251 P.3d 618 (Kan. 2011), affg State v. Walker, 41 Kan. App. 2d 337, 202 P.3d 685 (2009).

Defendant’s stop was with reasonable suspicion, and seeing a black gun on the floorboard (a toy gun) was in plain view. Commonwealth v. Brown, 2011 PA Super 67, 2011 Pa. Super. LEXIS 135 (April 4, 2011),* on reargument from Commonwealth v. Brown, 2010 PA Super 27, 2010 Pa. Super. LEXIS 53 (2010) (and reaching same result).

Police came on an assist to retrieve children from a house by a father who said that his wife claimed to talk to the dead. He feared the children were not being fed. When they knocked at the door, the defendant only acknowledged that she was inside but further refused to communicate. The defendant’s actions rose to the level of concern for the welfare of the children under the community caretaking function. People v. Hand, 408 Ill. App. 3d 695, 349 Ill. Dec. 343, 946 N.E.2d 537 (2011).*

Defendant had the burden of showing that she was unaware of a condition of her bond that she submit to searches of her property or self, and she didn’t. Curry v. State, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 316 (March 30, 2011).* [Note: Not a word about the reasonableness of a search condition as a condition of bond, and, as far as I am concerned, that is a Fourth Amendment impossibility. Parolees and probationers are subject to search conditions because their status as convicts reduces their expectation of privacy. Nowhere near the same argument is available as a condition of bail as a person still presumptively innocent. I’ve seen such search conditions on occasion before, but I objected and it was removed.] [Update: A reader and good friend of mine pointed out what I should have looked up, but was in a hurry this morning: United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2006), is the first federal case to reject such pretrial release conditions.]

A soccer team on a road game was the target of angry fans and potential racial violence. The team bus was boxed in by police cars. Consent was sought from the coach who debated making the officers get a warrant, but he decided to “take the high road,” and he consented to a search of the players. Everybody had tough choices to make here, and it cannot be said that the officers acted unreasonably such that they would be denied qualified immunity. “Like Coach Marchand, the police officers faced a tough decision in a difficult situation. Whether the officers made the correct decision is not the point.” Lopera v. Town of Coventry, 640 F.3d 388 (1st Cir. 2011).*

Defendant’s driving justified the stop under Terry. United States v. Brunson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35410 (D. N.J. March 31, 2011).*

The officer preparing the search warrant was using a computer template for their “Attachment 2”s to their search warrants that include a description of the place to be searched. Here, the officer used the template, but accidentally picked up the wrong one and attached it to the search warrant. The officer preparing the search warrant was the one who investigated, and he went to the defendant’s house, not the one named in the search warrant. Nevertheless, the search was valid because there was no reckless or knowing mistake, and the good faith exception would have saved it anyway. Also, the affidavit for the search warrant did not support a search warrant for the place in Attachment 2, but it did for defendant’s house. There was no particularity failure. United States v. Peoples, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75295 (W.D. N.C. June 9, 2011):

Secondly, there was no reasonable probability of a mistake being made in locating the actual premises that were to be searched. The officer requesting the search warrant and the officer executing the search warrant were the same person: Det. Trantham. Trantham had been involved in the surveillance of the dwelling house located at 61 East Marshall Street and knew that was the premises he wanted to search. Courts recognize this is a factor in supporting the validity of the search warrant. May, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28588, 2009 WL 928386, at *10. Trantham testified he never intended to search any dwelling house except the dwelling house located at 61 East Marshall Street. The mistake in the description on Attachment 2 had no affect upon the search of the correct dwelling house. Trantham went unerringly to 61 East Marshall Street. There was no probability of a search taking place at either of the addresses described in Attachment 2. In short, the officer in possession of the Search Warrant could reasonably ascertain and identify the intended place to be searched in spite of the facial defect in Attachment 2. See Owens, 848 F.2d at 463 (holding that facially deficient search warrant assigning the wrong apartment number to be searched did not invalidate the warrant and violate the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement); Brooks, 294 F. Appx at 73 (“Even if the description of the place to be searched is mistaken, there is not [sic] Fourth Amendment violation when the officers executing the search reasonable [sic] believe that the warrant is sufficiently particular and that they are searching the correct location.”); Watts, 352 F. Appx at 785 (“Moreover, even where a warrant contains a technical inaccuracy, a sufficient description of the premises, especially where the executing officer had knowledge of the particular place to be searched, will meet the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.”).

Officers had a reasonable belief that defendant was on the premises for Payton purposes. They didn’t have to have actually seen defendant go in; they had information from reliable CIs that defendant was inside. United States v. Chisholm, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78673 (D. Utah July 19, 2011).*

Defendant was found to have consented on the totality of circumstances. While some factors favor him, the defendant was clearly in custody and guns were drawn. There had been a shooting, however, and defendant was not the suspect so the guns were not pointed at him. Therefore, on the totality, it was still voluntary. United States v. Franco-Lombera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79181 (D. Idaho July 20, 2011).*

The traffic stop here produced reasonable suspicion, and the delay for the drug dog was reasonable. United States v. Randle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79259 (D. Minn. June 22, 2011).*

Refusal to identify the person driving the car plaintiff was in was sufficient PC to arrest for obstruction of a law enforcement officer for qualified immunity. Kaufman v. Higgs, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83609 (D. Colo. July 29, 2011):

More importantly, in determining whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by his arrest, the question is not whether Plaintiff committed the crime of obstructing a peace officer but whether Defendants had probable cause to believe that he did. Cortez, supra. See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 n.13, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) (“[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”). Here, based on the plain language of the obstruction statute itself, I conclude that Defendants could reasonably believe that Plaintiff’s assertion of “privilege” and refusal to identify the driver of his vehicle constituted an “obstacle” that obstructed, hindered, or impaired their investigation of the hit and run accident involving Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff has therefore failed to meet his burden of establishing that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause.

Defendant who was told to put his hands on the patrol car so he could be searched, denied him the ability to talk to a friend, and prolonged the detention for a frisk on reasonable suspicion make stop into a de facto arrest. United States v. Lara-Pantoja, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85030 (N.D. Iowa August 2, 2011):

The defendant maintains that the stop became a de facto arrest when Officer Dennler (1) requested the defendant to place his hands on the patrol car so he could search the defendant; (2) denied the defendant’s request to speak with his friend at the nearby grocery store; and (3) prolonged the detention on the basis of a subjective motive to investigate other matters. The defendant contends that Officer Dennler continued to question him without probable cause, without a warrant, and without advising him of his Miranda rights. The court disagrees. These minor restraints on the defendant’s activities did not constitute an arrest. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 n.6, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (“[O]nce a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.”). “[T]he officer does not need to be certain that the suspect was armed. …

Daily Tech.com: ACLU Fights for Answers on Police Phone Location Data Tracking:

Back in the 1990s, in order to track a cell phone you would have to triangulate the signal to its source — an imprecise science that would merely put you “in the ballpark” of the caller. That all changed when GPS chips were added to today’s smartphones.

Stop the Drug War.org: National Poll Finds Support [53%] for Welfare Drug Testing by Phillip Smith:

A Rasmussen poll released this week found majority support for automatic drug testing of new welfare applicants and lesser, but still high, levels of support for drug testing people already receiving welfare benefits.

The poll comes as a new Florida law mandating the suspicionless drug testing of welfare applicants and recipients is about to be implemented. Missouri has also passed a law requiring the drug testing of welfare recipients if there is “reasonable suspicion” to suspect drug use.

53% of Americans easily don’t recognize the Fourth Amendment if it were read to them. Back in 1991, 1/3 of Americans didn’t recognize the Bill of Rights. I don’t think that figure has changed.

NPR today: Home Visits And Other ‘Secrets Of The FBI’:

Steve Inskeep talks with author Ronald Kessler about his new book, “The Secrets of the FBI.” [Link added; out today]

Mobile biometrics to hit US streets / Despite fuzzy legality, US law enforcement will soon be able to perform mobile iris scans and fingerprinting by D. Parvaz on Al-Jazeera (WTF? Why them and not some US source):

We’re fast approaching a time when law enforcement will no longer need to ask you for your identification – your physical self, and the biometric data therein, are all that will be required to identify you.

A gadget attached to a mobile phone can photograph and plot key points and features on your face (breaking the numbers down into biometric data), scan your iris and take your fingerprints on the spot.

This gizmo doesn’t exist in a futuristic world–it’s already been prototyped and tested. By autumn, the Mobile Offender Recognition and Information System (MORIS), which will allow 40 law enforcement agencies across the US to carry out such biometric diagnostics, will be rolled out. So far, the 1,000 units on order–at $3,000 and 12.5 oz per device – will be going to sheriff and police departments.

Proponents of the technology figure the deployment is a plus – having biometric data available almost instantly might prevent an officer from mistakenly identifying someone (via, say, a driver’s license, which could be forged) and unnecessarily hauling them in for processing.

Scans taken on the road are checked against a database of stored scans from those who have in the past been or are currently incarcerated. Essentially, the idea is to see if a suspect has a prior record.

It’s accurate. It’ll keep us safe. It’ll help law enforcement do its job.

Congress out to spy on your ‘puter by Julian Sanchez in the NY Post:

If Congress had to name laws honestly, it would be called the “Forcing Your Internet Provider to Spy On You Just In Case You’re a Criminal Act of 2011” — a costly, invasive mandate that even the co-author of the Patriot Act, Rep. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wisc.), says “runs roughshod over the rights of people who use the Internet.”

But because it’s disguised as the “Protecting Children from Internet Pornographers Act,” the House Judiciary Committee approved it last week by a wide margin — even though it’s got little to do with child porn and won’t do much to protect kids.

The centerpiece of this ill-conceived law is a sweeping requirement that commercial Internet providers retain a one-year log of all the temporary Internet Protocol addresses they assign to their users, along with customer-identification information. The Justice Department says this will help track down child-porn peddlers by linking online activity and real-world identities. But the government would be able to access that sensitive data for all kinds of investigations, most of which would have nothing to do with child porn.

Stem to stern customs inspection of a ship at the Alabama docks revealed DVDs of bestiality in one of the crew rooms. The crew member was asked about it, and he admitted having child pornography. The seizure of the computer was valid. This case is a virtual replica of the Eleventh Circuit’s Alfaro-Moncada which was an agriculture customs search that produced child porn from a computer. United States v. Manta-Carillo, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83039 (S.D. Ala. July 28, 2011).*

Successor counsel did file motions to suppress which were ruled on. The fact former counsel didn’t is pretty much meaningless for IAC purposes. United States v. Johnson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83255 (S.D. Miss. July 28, 2011).*

Defendant was visiting a friend, and he went upstairs to take a nap. Police officers watching the house saw a known prostitute and drug dealer come out, so they came to the door. The homeowner let them in to look around. Next to the sleeping defendant was a bag of drugs. Defendant’s casual nap did not amount to him being an overnight guest [I disagree that is the standard; read Olson] to give him standing. Nevertheless, the homeowner’s consent was enough [which it was]. Wilson v. State, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 3551 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 12, 2010), Released for Publication January 20, 2011, Petition for discretionary review refused by In re Wilson, 2010 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1669 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2010)* [Not on court’s website.]

Defendant’s patdown was unjustified by the circumstances, and the recovery of a pill bottle with cocaine in it should have been suppressed. State v. Mejia, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 583 (July 27, 2011)* [The officer’s name was Justus. How fitting.]

Wisconsin’s CA certifies to the state supreme court whether an extended probation condition from a trial court can permit any LEO to search without cause. State v. Rowan, 2011 Wisc. App. LEXIS 599 (July 28, 2011)* [not on court’s website]:

The issue presented by this appeal is whether a sentencing court violated the Fourth Amendment or Wis. Const. art. I, § 11, by setting a condition of extended supervision that allows any law enforcement officer to search the defendant’s person, vehicle, or residence for firearms, at any time and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. While it is clear that a court may impose conditions of extended supervision that limit a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, the issue presented here is whether it is permissible to impose a condition that, in essence, eliminates those rights. There are no cases in Wisconsin that address this issue. Because this is a novel issue of statewide importance that is certain to recur, we hereby certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court for its review and determination, pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.61 (2009-10).

As a metaphor for the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule consider “Monty Python and the Holy Grail” (1975), with Eric Idle’s “Dead Collector” as Chief Justice John Roberts, and the “Large Man with Dead Body” as Samuel Alito.

The script here. An excerpt:

I’m not dead.
’Ere, he says he’s not dead.
Yes he is.
I’m not.
He isn’t.
Well, he will be soon, he’s very ill.
I’m getting better.
No you’re not, you’ll be stone dead in a moment.

(In Spamlot, the man says “I’m not dead yet.”)