Officers had probable cause to arrest defendant without a warrant. He was arrested in a car, and his handcuffing and detention was irrelevant and Gant did not apply because the automobile exception permitted the search of the car. United States v. Brown, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81595 (E.D. N.Y. July 25, 2011).*

“The Government has established, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that Mr. Harris consented to the search of his bedroom on December 22, 2010. As Defendant argues, Agent McCormick’s and Special Agent Zeppieri’s testimony at the hearing was inconsistent as to various significant details. Their testimony was wholly consistent, however, as to the pivotal fact; whether Mr. Harris consented to the search.” [Of course; doesn’t it always?”] United States v. Harris, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82170 (S.D. N.Y. July 26, 2011).*

911 dispatch got an anonymous call that a man was screaming that he was going to shoot somebody, and he was one of four black males that got into a metallic color 90’s Buick with a missing right rear hubcap. Shortly thereafter, an officer saw a metallic color 90’s Oldsmobile with a missing right rear hubcap. The officer had reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, although this was a “close case.” United States v. Daniels, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81712 (D. S.C. July 26, 2011).*

Boilerplate suppression motion should be denied for that reason alone. United States v. Torres, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81117 (D. Minn. July 7, 2011):

In the current motion, Defendant Torres does not present any additional evidence—aside from boilerplate allegations—in support of suppression. “It is well established that the burdens of production and persuasion generally rest upon the movant in a suppression hearing.” United States v. Starks, 193 F.R.D. 624, 629 (D. Minn. 2000) (quoting United States v. de la Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932, 97 S. Ct. 2640, 53 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1977)); see also United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 325 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that the ultimate burden of proof is on the defendant who seeks to suppress evidence). “At a minimum, it is defendant’s burden to come forth with some evidence and argument to support his position that evidence … should be suppressed.” United States v. Rosetter, Crim. No. 10-83 (JNE/JSM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132393, 2010 WL 5184991, at *23 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2010) (citing Starks, 193 F.R.D. at 629) (“[E]ven in those circumstances where the Government has the ultimate burden of persuasion, Defendant has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing of illegality.”). And “[f]ailure to provide the Court with any support for the motion is a sufficient basis for denial of the motion.” Rosetter, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132393, 2010 WL 5184991, at *23. Defendant Torres has not met his burden.

On Wired.com today: Document: FBI Surveillance Geeks Fear, Love New Gadgets by Kim Zetter:

Can’t wait for 4G to become the ubiquitous standard for mobile communication? On the edge of your seat for the unveiling of Microsoft’s secret Menlo Project and Greenfield application?

You’re not the only one watching the growth of these and other new technologies with rapt attention. According to an internal FBI document (.pdf), the law enforcement agency has a keen interest in evaluating each new technology for its surveillance possibilities and challenges.

The FBI fears, for example, that 4G will require agencies to “deal with significantly higher data rates than in current wireless network intercepts,” according to the document. “Managing this ‘fire hose’ of data is complicated by the lack of buffering or reliable delivery requirements. … These higher data rates could place a greater emphasis on the filtering of data to identify specific content.”

Double hearsay from a CI was sufficient where the officers corroborated only innocent details. State v. Ralston, 2011 Ohio 3552, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 3000 (4th Dist. July 7, 2011)*:

[*P17] As Appellant correctly notes, there are no facts in the affidavit upon which the magistrate could have found a substantial basis for believing that there was a factual basis for the information the third party furnished to the informant. Nothing in the affidavit reveals how the third party came to know that Appellant was trafficking in or cultivating marijuana. The affidavit did not contain an “explicit and detailed description of the alleged wrongdoing” so the magistrate could distinguish the third party’s claim from idle rumor. It was not stated that the third party had personally obtained from the stash house the marijuana he displayed to the informant. It was not stated that the third party had ever been inside of the stash house and observed any wrongdoing, giving him firsthand knowledge.

. . .

[*P19] Though law enforcement only corroborated innocent facts, this does not negate their cumulative effect and contribution to the determination of probable cause, especially in light of the third party’s allegations. Specifically, knowledge of a prior arrest and conviction relating to drug trafficking is a “‘practical consideration of everyday life’ upon which an officer or magistrate may properly rely in assessing the reliability of an informant’s tip.” State v. Underwood, 4th Dist. No. 03CA2930, 2005 Ohio 2309, at ¶43.

I’m stunned. This is bizarre. Nothing protects against an idle street rumor or revenge becoming probable cause.

Wyden Continues Push To Prevent Government Phone Tracking by Josh Smith:

Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., grilled a lawyer for the National Security Agency on Tuesday as he continued his quest to make sure government agencies aren’t illegally tracking Americans with their own cell phones.

NSA chief counsel Matthew Olsen, who has been nominated to lead the National Counterterrorism Center, told Wyden and the Senate Intelligence Committee that there may be “certain circumstances” where the spy agency has the authority to track Americans.

Update: Cato has an interesting post on this.

The failure of a state trial judge to sign a search warrant was mere ministerial or clerical act. While it may have violated Massachusetts law, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment and the warrant clearly issued as the issuing judge intended. United States v. Lyons, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78931 (D. Mass. July 19, 2011):

Signs point to the warrant being valid. “[T]he text of the Fourth Amendment demands that a warrant be ‘issue[d].’ Issuance serves to demonstrate that a neutral and detached magistrate has reviewed the warrant application and affidavit and made an independent and objective determination that probable cause exists to justify the search.” United States v. Evans, 469 F. Supp. 2d 893, 897 (D. Mont. 2007) (internal citations omitted). “Issuing a warrant is not synonymous with signing a warrant.” United States v. Hondras, 296 F.3d 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2002). Indeed, where a warrant is unsigned, it is still validly “issued” as long as there exists “some indication that the search is officially authorized.” Evans, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 897; see also United States v. Jackson, 617 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (“[S]igning a search warrant is just one of a number of methods that an issuing authority may use to signal that the warrant complies with the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement.”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d) (requiring magistrate’s signature only for telephonic warrants).

Other United States District Courts have suggested that the following can constitute indicia of issuance: (1) an indication on the warrant of the date before which the search must be conducted, (2) the presence of a case number indicating that the warrant has been filed, (3) the presence of the issuing authority’s initials or other imprimaturs of judicial authority on the warrant, and (4) an in-person acknowledgment by the issuing authority to the affiant that probable cause has been found.

Jackson, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 321. The Second Circuit has viewed signatures on warrants as “purely ministerial” and not required by the Fourth Amendment. Turner, 558 F.2d at 50 (holding that magistrate’s delegating task of signing warrant to subordinate did not violate Fourth Amendment, and “[a]s long as the magistrate in fact performs the substantive tasks of determining probable cause and authorizing the issuance of the warrant, the amendment is satisfied”).

Here, the primary indicator of the state court judge’s intent to issue the warrant is the fact that he signed the warrant application and affidavit, as well as his post-hoc explanation in the re-execution order that the failure to sign the warrant was an administrative oversight. …

Geek.com reports that TSA’s backscatter machine provider has finally come up with software that does not provide such a clear image of the person under their clothes. Instead, suspect areas show as a box on the screen. See No more naked scanner pictures before you fly by Jennifer Bergen. [Actual article link not working here.] I saw the image of my scan at DCA a couple of months ago, and an air pocket in my shirt back showed as a box on the screen. All the TSA guy did was touch the spot, feel there was nothing there, and that was it, except for the extra radiation. The body image showed on the screen similar to the one on this blog post.

The main question that remains unanswered is why the TSA didn’t do this from the start? It seems like it would have been much more complex to get a full-body scan with detailed imaging that’s so in depth than it is to get a cookie-cutter-like shape that doesn’t reveal everything about the person except the necessary information. Even so, the change is being billed as a software upgrade so some development must have been necessary to create the generic images.

Although it took two years, we’re at least glad the software is available now.

During a stop, a “request” for identification is really a demand, and the officer’s keeping the ID while running it is a seizure of the person. Nevertheless, on the totality of circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant. United States v. Zuniga-Valencia, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73538 (D. Neb. June 3, 2011).*

The affidavit for the search warrant for defendant’s property showed nexus, which is a part of the probable cause analysis. In addition, the affidavit was not so bare bones that the good faith exception should not apply. United States v. Beetz, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73557 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 2011).*

Plaintiff’s cell phone was confiscated at school for using it to make a call. The principal told the student he looked through the pictures on the phone while it was in his possession. Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings denied. N.N. v. Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73637 (M.D. Pa. July 8, 2011),* commented on at Are Student Cell Phone Records Discoverable? on Law.com.

Independent Mail.com: Franklin [SC] sheriff, probation officers team up to tackle crime telling us that police and probation officers are shaking down probationers via their search terms:

A new relationship between the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office and the Northern Judicial Probation Office is helping to get probation violators off the streets.

Franklin County Sheriff’s deputy Major Ken Eavenson said the new working relationship recently netted a number of arrests.

“The sheriff’s office and officers with the Northern Judicial Probation Office conducted a probation check on probationers residing in Franklin County. The officers conducted about 20 interviews July 15 and seven ended up being arrested for probation violations,” Eavenson said.

Eavenson said the officers went door-to-door to the residences where probationers were known to live. At a number of the residences, he said they also found grounds for additional charges.

“Most of them have a Fourth Amendment waiver, meaning their home and vehicle can be searched at any time and they have to submit to a drug screen,” Eavenson said. “In some of these cases, as they did the interview, they went a little bit further and did a search of the residence and found drugs and weapons. Some of these individuals were already wanted for probation violations and they located them on that night as well,” Eavenson said.

NPR: Liberty, Security, and Biometrics: “Liberty, security, and biometrics. Eye scans, facial recognition systems. Police and more are using them. We’ll look at the stakes.”

The use of an agent to rent a hotel room under an assumed name did not defeat a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. They had keys to the room and their stuff was in it. That was enough. United States v. Domenech, 623 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2010):

Had the Domenech brothers rented Room 22 under their own name, they unquestionably would possess a legally cognizable expectation of privacy. See Allen, 106 F.3d at 699. That they used an agent to rent the room for them does not change this. The D.C. Circuit focused on the relationship of self-registration to one’s expectation of privacy in a hotel room in United States v. Lyons, where “a key to the room that had been rented on [the defendant’s] behalf was given to him by a third party (whose identity remains secret) ….” 706 F.2d 321, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The court held that one can possess a reasonable privacy expectation—even though lacking a legally enforceable contract or property right to the room—because “each [guest] regards the space provided for him as his temporary place of abode.” Id. at 327; see also Washington, 573 F.3d at 283 n.1 (“A person may acquire a reasonable expectation of privacy in property in which he has neither ownership nor any other legal interest.”).

. . .

We do not read Carr as espousing the registration-required-for-privacy rule applied by the district court, but, instead, understand it to confirm that “[important considerations in the expectation of privacy equation include ownership, lawful possession or lawful control of the premises searched.” Carr, 939 F.2d at 1446; see also United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir. 1998) (relying on Carr’s list of considerations). Carr and Bruce easily reconcile with suppression of the evidence garnered from Room 22 at the Green Acres Motel. The Domenech brothers demonstrated lawful control/possession with evidence that they procured the room for their own use through their agent, paid for the room, possessed the key to the room, and occupied it both physically and with belongings.

Cases from other Circuits also hold that the use of an alias does not eliminate Fourth Amendment protections. ….

This case was reversed on rehearing on United States v. Domenech, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14452, 2011 FED App. 0467N (6th Cir. July 12, 2011) (unpublished), posted July 19, 2011, on exigent circumstances, whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy or not.

The inventory of defendant’s car was reasonable and under standardized procedure to take the car into custody, too. The fact the inventory sheet was destroyed after the car was picked up was not bad faith by the police department and did not make the inventory unreasonable. United States v. Arline, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1428 (D. S.C. January 6, 2011).*

The defendant officer threw a flashlight into a moving car in an effort to stop it. This was a seizure and unreasonable under cases decided up to the time it happened, particularly Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999) involving shooting into a moving car. Therefore, no qualified immunity. Couden v. Duffey, 412 Fed. Appx. 476 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished)*:

Our decision in Abraham, which was issued prior to the conduct in question, is sufficiently similar to the facts of this case so as to make it clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct, as described by the plaintiff-appellants, was unlawful. As discussed, Abraham held that it was unreasonable for an officer to fire a bullet into the side of the car even when the car had already hit another car and the driver was reasonably believed to be intoxicated. Accordingly, a reasonable officer would have known that throwing a flashlight into a moving car, which was not headed directly towards the officer, was equally if not more unreasonable under the law.

The sued officers showed that there was sufficient belief the person sought in the arrest warrant was in the plaintiff’s house. Therefore, the officers have qualified immunity. Payton v. City of Florence, 413 Fed. Appx. 126 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished)*:

As to police officers’ “on the spot determination” of whether the suspect is within the home at the time, “court must be sensitive to common sense factors indicating a resident’s presence.” Id. at 1263. For example, “officers may presume that a person is at home at certain times of the day — a presumption which can be rebutted by contrary evidence regarding the suspect’s known schedule.” Id. at 1267 (quotation marks omitted).

Here, we conclude that the officers’ search of Payton’s home did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Under the circumstances, the officers had a reasonable basis for believing Philip lived at Payton’s house. Three of the four documents in the information packet for Philip’s arrest warrant (the warrant itself, the printout of the “Phillip” entry in the FPD’s Spillman database, and the LETS database printout) listed Philip’s address as 1618 Northern Boulevard. Only the “Philip” Spillman database entry listed a different address. Notably, each document whose information came from Philip himself — including Philip’s driver’s license and the appearance bond he issued upon his arrest for the charge the warrant covered — listed the Northern Boulevard address.

Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by positioning him so it was more difficult to observe the search they were going to conduct. He consented twice orally and twice in writing, and his hands were on the police car facing away for safety purposes. United States v. Gonzalez, 412 Fed. Appx. 967 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):

Because Gonzalez’s hands were on the patrol car, officers were able to monitor his movements during the search. Besides the fact that Gonzalez was asked to place his hands on the car, there was no relevant change in circumstances between his consent and the search. Finally, officers applied no pressure or force on Gonzalez to prevent him from observing the search. Gonzalez was merely asked to face the patrol car and place his hands on the car. There is no indication Gonzalez attempted to turn around to view the search, or that he was prevented from doing so.

Defendant was stopped at a DUI roadblock, and he was seen trying to hide a mirror and snorting device. When he was gotten out of the car, a gun was found at his ankle. The roadblock was reasonable under the Sitz factors, and the driver had the option of avoiding the roadblock [but if he did, would he be stopped for that?]. United States v. Brock, 632 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 2011).

Defendant was stopped in a restaurant parking lot and arrested. It was reasonable to tow his vehicle under protocol rather than just leave it, so the inventory was valid. Since the search was valid as an inventory, Gant was inapplicable. United States v. Frasher, 632 F.3d 450 (8th Cir. 2011):

The record supports the determination that the search of the vehicle was permissible as an inventory search. Frasher’s vehicle was parked in a restaurant parking lot, and there was no responsible person able to take immediate custody of the vehicle. Standard protocol was to tow Frasher’s vehicle. Fries arrived after Frasher’s arrest and did not know that Tilley had discussed a tow waiver with him. Fries offered to help with the search and the tow waiver to comply with the standard police procedures; he did not decide to tow the vehicle solely to search the vehicle for incriminating evidence. Even after Frasher called his father, Frasher had no right to a tow waiver, and Tilley could not grant the waiver without a supervisor’s approval. Tilley did not tell Fries about the tow waiver because he determined that he should have followed standard protocol. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in adopting the magistrate judge’s finding that the search was conducted pursuant to standard police procedure and not for the sole purpose of investigation.

The immigration phase of the stop was over and consent was granted in ten seconds, and it was valid, despite the fact the officers suspected defendant was carrying drugs. United States v. Garcia, 412 Fed. Appx. 693 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Officers entered defendant’s home with alleged arrest warrants, but none were produced at the suppression hearing. To survive the motion to suppress, the state had to put into evidence their legal authority for the entry, the arrest warrants, to show that they were complying with the Fourth Amendment, so the conviction and affirmance by the court of appeals is reversed. The motion to suppress his statements made when the officers were in the house is also reversed. State v. Borst, 281 Neb. 217, 795 N.W.2d 262 (2011).

Seizure of a gun in a car in NYC could not be justified by plain view where the officer had to lean in the car to make the view. The prosecution’s alternate basis of furtive movements in the backseat giving reasonable suspicion for a car frisk for the gun was not resolved by the trial court, so the case is remanded for a finding on that. People v Washington, 2011 NY Slip Op 2047, 2011 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1995 (1st Dept. March 22, 2011).*

A Vietnamese naturalized citizen argued that culturally he was predisposed to consent. The court found consent valid. “While Tran’s cultural background may have made him less inclined to refuse consent, the court’s determination that he voluntarily consented was not clearly erroneous.” United States v. Tran, 412 Fed. Appx. 923 (8th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Missouri regulates trucks under NASIP, and the random stop of defendant’s tractor trailer at a weigh station was proper. The stop was reasonable as an administrative stop and “search” when defendant consented. United States v. Parker, 587 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2009). Note: The same case is posted here on Oct. 19 with the same case number. United States v. Parker, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22749 (8th Cir. October 16, 2009). Go figure.

Dog sniff in a common area of a storage unit was not unreasonable. State v. Washburn, 201 N.C. App. 93, 685 S.E.2d 555 (2009).*

Because the state could assume that a search incident was valid at the time, it did not have the incentive to develop the record of the need for the search incident in light of Gant, so the case was remanded for it to do so. State v. Bliss, 153 Wn. App. 197, 222 P.3d 107 (2009).*

[posted 11/22]

Defendant was arrested with a warrant in his house by U.S. Marshals. A drug dog swept his car outside the house, and the dog alert supported the search of the car, even though the defendant was in custody and could not move the car. State v. Adkins, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1047 (December 16, 2010).*

Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his girlfriend’s cellphone records which were used to connect him to a crime. Commonwealth v. Benson, 2010 PA Super 234, 10 A.3d 1268 (2010).*

Furtive movements in a car as the car was stopped justified asking the passengers for their ID, too. State v. Frierson, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1043 (December 14, 2010).

Plaintiff’s car was booted for unpaid parking tickets and then towed. It was moved to an impound lot and notice was mailed, but plaintiff had an incorrect address. The car was sold off. The seizure of the car was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and she was afforded due process. Tate v. District of Columbia, 627 F.3d 904 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied 179 L. Ed. 2d 1198, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3522 (U.S., May 2, 2011).*

Consent form language “any letters, writings, paper, materials, or other property” included the home computer. “[C]lairvoyance cannot be expected of police officers to know in what form a defendant may maintain his records.” Commonwealth v. McDermott, 448 Mass. 750, 864 N.E.2d 471, 488-89 (Mass. 2007). State v. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 794 N.W.2d 482 (2010).

Defendant’s stop near the border was without reasonable suspicion, and his motion to suppress is granted. All of the factors of reasonable suspicion were innocuous, including driving carefully. United States v. Hernandez-Lopez, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (D. N.M. 2010).*

The trial court erroneously granted the motion to suppress here because the officer going up the driveway was not required to have reasonable suspicion nor close his eyes to what he saw. State v. Seidl, 939 N.E.2d 679 (Ind. App. 2010).

Defendant’s computer was stolen and recovered at a vacant building when trespassers were arrested. The computer was open and on and a text document open. Through the serial number, the officers were able to locate the owner, and he was called. While waiting on the owner, the officer tried to open the document the thieves had opened to see if it incriminated them. He couldn’t find it, so he explored and clicked on “My Pictures” and found thumbnails of underage females. He turned off the computer. When defendant arrived, they asked him for consent to search the computer for evidence of the thieves on the computer. A forensic examination was done, and evidence of sexual exploitation of a child was found. On defendant’s motion to suppress, the court holds that a negligent violation of Fourth Amendment rights was here enough to not apply the exclusionary rule, analyzing all the factors. State v. Newland, 2010 UT App 380, 253 P.3d 71, 672 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (2010):

[*P26] We must now decide whether the trial court correctly concluded that the consent was not obtained through exploitation of the initial illegality.

[T]he exploitation analysis requires a balancing of the relative egregiousness of the misconduct against the time and circumstances that intervene before the consent is given. [Thus, t]he nature and degree of the illegality will usually be inversely related to the effectiveness of time and intervening events to dissipate the presumed taint.

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1264 (Utah 1993). “This balancing [test] necessitates consideration of all factors without giving any of them dispositive weight.” State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1995). The factors, however, are not of mathematically equal importance. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975) (noting the particular importance of the purpose and flagrancy factor); accord Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263-64. “[W]here it appears that the illegality arose as the result of negligence, the lapse of time between the misconduct and the consent and the presence of intervening events become less critical to the dissipation of taint.” Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264. In this case, because the temporal proximity factor is neutral, only the absence of intervening circumstances must be weighed against the lack of purposefulness and flagrancy. In light of the unchallenged negligence finding, however, “a clean break in the chain of events between the misconduct and the consent” was not required. Id. Moreover, because the officer’s conduct was due to negligence, we agree with the trial court that the deterrent value of suppression is minimal and “greatly outweighed by society’s interest in placing all relevant evidence before the jury,” see id. at 1274. The trial court therefore correctly denied Newland’s motion to suppress.10

10 In affirming here, to the extent that the initial search may have been illegal, we are not condoning an officer’s violation of Newland’s constitutional right to freedom from unreasonable searches of his personal effects. The United States Supreme Court, however, has “never suggested that the exclusionary rule must apply in every circumstance in which it might provide marginal deterrence.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter–to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way–by removing the incentive to disregard it. But [d]espite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.

Brown, 422 U.S. at 599-600 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.

This case is thoughtfully analyzed, and the court does not consider itself bound by the trial court’s negligence finding. When you get to the end of the opinion, though, you wonder “what happens next time” with this officer or in Utah in general. If the exclusionary rule is “calculated to prevent rather than repair,” does this case add anything to prevention? Should it? Considering how the computer was found, how likely was it that the “My Pictures” folder would have pictures of the thieves? One would surmise that clearly the officer had no business going anywhere other than the open text document or search files found created after it was reported stolen. Hard cases make bad law.