Defendants were arrested in Sri Lanka for fraud, and their belongings and computers were searched. A U.S. crime was potentially involved, and the FBI viewed the evidence seized in Sri Lanka. A criminal complaint was lodged in the U.S. and defendants were returned at government expense with their luggage, computers, and cell phones, being put in airport jail in Frankfurt between flights. When they entered the U.S. at Dulles near D.C., all that stuff was seized as a criminal investigatory seizure, but apparently not searched. The computers and other evidence were transported to Tampa for the prosecution, but one defendant with apparent authority consented to a search at her detention hearing in Tampa. The seizure at Dulles customs was valid as a border search despite is investigatory nature. United States v. Morgan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83081 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2011):

Against this legal backdrop, there can be no dispute that Customs performed a valid border search at the Dulles airport upon the Morgans’ arrival into the United States. As in Gurr, the fact that the FBI was present and advised Customs agents of the nature of the charges against the Morgans and requested they be on the lookout for particular matters of evidentiary value does not alter that conclusion. As for the Customs official’s segregation of such evidentiary items found within the Defendants’ property into plastic bags, Gurr suggests such seizure was justifiable as within the scope of the routine border search and thus raises no Fourth Amendment concerns. In sum, I agree with the parties that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment in the Customs search of the Defendants’ property. Insofar as the Customs officials seized certain items believed to be of evidentiary value from the luggage, such too was justified under the border search exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, to the extent of the items seized and segregated into separate plastic bags – the so-called 1B11 items – the seizure too was consistent with Fourth Amendment considerations. Given that the items in 1B11 were properly seized, I find no Fourth Amendment issue arising from the agents’ subsequent warrantless review of these same matters upon their arrival in Tampa, Florida. Cf. United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (“The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated.”).

Update: On review, the District Court adopts the part denying suppressing the search, but orders and additional hearing on some additional items seized. United States v. Morgan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86729 (M.D. Fla. August 5, 2011).*

In executing a state search warrant, the warrant was not shown to the defendant before the search began. This does not violate Rule 41 or the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Mitchell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85741 (D. S.C. August 3, 2011)*:

In reference to federal search warrants, the Supreme Court has held that “neither the Fourth Amendment nor Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the executing officer to serve the warrant on the owner before commencing the search.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562 n.5, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068 (2004) (emphasis added). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(f)(1)(C) simply states that “[t]he officer executing the warrant must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken or leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where the officer took the property.” The officers executing the search warrant had no legal obligation to show defendant a copy of the search warrant when they entered his residence. Defendant admitted that he was unable to produce any state or federal case law stating otherwise.

In a credibility contest over whether consent was given for a search of the car, where the conversation was not recorded, the defendant’s credibility was shot by his statements in the patrol car that were recorded that contradicted his suppression hearing testimony. United States v. Khaleel, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85077 (N.D. Iowa August 2, 2011)*:

Most persuasive on the issue of credibility, however, is Defendant’s testimony at the hearing that he did not know there were drugs in the bag. This testimony is inconsistent with statements made by Defendant while in the squad car prior to the search. Before the drugs were found, Defendant told the driver that “I told him the bag is mine,” “take care of my baby,” “visit me in jail,” and “he will find it.” Defendant told the driver that “you don’t know nothing, it’s my bag.” These statements are consistent with Defendant knowing that drugs would be found in the bag. If Defendant is willing to lie under oath at the hearing regarding his knowledge of drugs in the bag, then it is likely that he is also lying regarding the issue of consent to search.

An IP address for shared child pornography is sufficient nexus for probable cause. The possibility somebody else could have used his wireless router to access child pornography does not negate probable cause. United States v. Gillman, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15932, 2011 FED App. 0531N (6th Cir. August 2, 2011) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s permitting a peer-to-peer download of child pornography was probable cause for a search warrant for his computer. “Assuming that Defendant had a subjective expectation in privacy in the information, that subjective expectation is one that society and the law is not prepared to recognize. A person has no legitimate expectation in privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties. [¶] Further, once an investigator locates prohibited data using a peer-to-peer program, the internet subscriber information which is available to the investigator is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. … There is no legitimate expectation of privacy in noncontent customer information provided to an internet service provider by one of its customers.” United States v. Conner, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85452 (S.D. Ohio August 3, 2011).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not finding that defendant’s prior conviction did not involve a gun or that he was permitted to travel to an adjoining county. He was on parole and subject to a parole search condition, and the search would have occurred anyway, so there is no prejudice. United States v. Henry, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85524 (E.D. Pa. August 3, 2011).*

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review editorial piece: In Their Own Words–-FL Governor Rick Scott & Economic Profiling:

Last month, Governor Rick Scott of Florida signed a bill requiring Temporary Assistance for Needy Families recipients to undergo drug testing. If a recipient tests positive for drugs, she or he becomes ineligible for benefits. Scott reasoned that this law prevents taxpayer money from subsidizing drug addiction.

The passage of this legislation sparked a debate in the legal community regarding whether Governor Scott’s drug testing requirement violates the Fourth Amendment rights of welfare recipients. This Constitutional discussion is certainly important – indeed, critics’ Fourth Amendment arguments against the legislation may ultimately lead to its invalidation – however from a civil rights perspective, the discriminatory nature of the legislation is even more important.

Scott’s legislation sanctions a form of mass profiling – “economic profiling.” It forces lower-income individuals to undergo intrusive tests in order to receive government benefits, but does not render benefits received by other groups contingent on undergoing such tests. Supporters of the bill assert that there is nothing discriminatory about it; they claim that it simply addresses the reality that a disproportionate amount of welfare recipients are drug users. Even if this claim were true (and it is questionable), it cannot justify government action that targets a broad population based on purported characteristics of some of its members. Such action constitutes a paradigmatic example of discrimination.

BBC: Rioters’ mobile phones could help police investigation:

Police may be able to use rioters’ mobile phone information to help convict them, say legal experts.

Investigators can apply to see the contents of text and instant messages, as well as their location.

However, authorities may not be able to access the full wealth of data available to telecoms companies because of legal restrictions.

Guidelines require police to find out individuals’ identities first before obtaining records from trouble spots.

A jury view of property during a trial did not violate the Fourth Amendment. It was judicially authorized, and it saw what the public could see. Monus v. Day, 2011 Ohio 3170, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2675 (7th Dist. June 13, 2011).

Defendant was not in custody during the execution of the search warrant on his property, and his statements made during the execution of the warrant were admissible. State v. Mangual, 129 Conn. App. 638, 21 A.3d 510 (2011).*

In an administrative prosecution for violating the Smoke-Free Workplace Act, the Health Department’s investigator entered a public area and then a private area observing smoking. The offense was observed in plain view in the public area, so whether the Burger test applies to this administrative search doesn’t have to be decided. Trish’s Café & Catering v. Ohio Dep’t of Health, 2011 Ohio 3304, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2763 (10th Dist. June 30, 2011).*

The affidavit for the search warrant for defendant’s cell phone showed more than a “fair probability” that evidence of drug dealing would be found there. United States v. Jauregui, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18385 (D. Minn. February 9, 2011).*

Merely because the officer gets the driver out of the car and summons him back to the patrol car for a few questions and leaves the passenger does not make a stop unreasonable. United States v. Legge, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3693 (10th Cir. February 23, 2011) (unpublished).*

Collectively, the information showed reasonable suspicion: inconsistent travel plans, third party rental car, nervousness (a minor factor), except this was excessive, and prior drug arrest (a minor factor). Consent was valid. United States v. Davis, 636 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 2011).*

The district court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress on an alternate ground, so defense counsel could not be ineffective for not further pressing the other ground which would not have mattered. United States v. Smith, 415 Fed. Appx. 826 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Reasonable suspicion developed from defendant’s unusual travel plans and odd route of travel, the fact he came from Mexico three days earlier, possession of two cell phones, and finding a “bondo” container. Defendant was not obligated to answer the questions put to him [HA!], but he did, and the officer can develop reasonable suspicion in his experience from what he learns. United States v. Guerrero-Sanchez, 412 Fed. Appx. 133 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Defendant police officer had probable cause that plaintiff committed forgery and could arrest him. Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2011).*

A prison inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell, and the plaintiff’s case was “‘patently meritless and beyond all hope of redemption.’” Pope v. Bernard, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2764 (1st Cir. February 10, 2011) (unpublished).*

Georgia v. Randolph does not require that the defendant be asked for consent. Third party consent was still valid without him being asked. United States v. Hatten, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141660 (E.D. Tenn. July 12, 2010).*

Defendant had no standing in the stolen car he was driving. United States v. Clemons, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18960 (D. Idaho February 25, 2011).*

Defendant’s § 2255 Fourth Amendment claim was a rehash of the issues litigated on the merits, so it is denied. United States v. Osorio, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19107 (S.D. Tex. February 24, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense, and [for some reason] he was asked if the backpack in the vehicle was his, and he said no, and that was an abandonment. United States v. Hinsey, 414 Fed. Appx. 983 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s abandoning his truck and iPhone in flight from the police was a waiver of his expectation of privacy in both. United States v. Self, 414 Fed. Appx. 611 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

In an argument over whether the third attachment to a search warrant was there when it was executed, the court finds that it was, although not to the copy in the return. Moreover, the search warrant adequately addresses the attachment. United States v. Glinberg, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139697 (E.D. Wis. November 22, 2010).*

Defendant succeeds in showing that he was not violating the statute on unsafe backing when he was stopped by the police, so the stop would be invalid on that ground. Instead, the officer knew his license was suspended, and that forms an independent basis for the stop. United States v. Guice, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139711 (M.D. Ala. November 3, 2010)*

The protective sweep of defendant’s house was justified because “the officers had reason to believe that Portis had firearms in his house and had just shot at someone. They were also aware that Portis was both a person of interest in a homicide investigation and an army-trained ‘expert marksman.’” And, there was reason to believe another was in the house. United States v. Portis, 407 Fed. Appx. 669 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished)

Entry into defendant’s backyard by the consent of the landlord was ineffective because a landlord cannot consent to a search of the renter’s property, including the curtilage. Here, however, we also have a consent to search inside the house for child pornography seven hours later which purged the taint of the illegal search of the backyard. United States v. Howe, 414 Fed. Appx. 579 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):

First, a considerable period of time — more than seven hours — elapsed between Healy’s entry onto the curtilage and the seizure of evidence related to child pornography. There was also a significant period of time between Healy’s entry and his request for consent to search. Further, Howe’s voluntary consent to the search of his home was an intervening act of free will. See [Brown v. Illinois,] at 549 & n.10 (holding, albeit in dicta, that consent to further police interaction is sufficient to “sever the connection between an unlawful act and the acquisition of additional evidence”). Finally, Healy’s warrantless entrance onto the curtilage of Howe’s property, while unlawful, was neither flagrant nor offensive. Id. at 550. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, although on modified grounds.

Officers responding to a noise complaint at defendant’s trailer ended up inside. They knew that defendant was a convicted felon, so seeing a gun in the premises made it “immediately apparent” that the gun was evidence of a crime for plain view purposes. United States v. Burch, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141795 (S.D. Ga. July 6, 2010).*

The police were called over a domestic dispute where a woman complained that defendant threatened her with a gun. Defendant was handcuffed and removed from the basement. The gun wasn’t found, and the officer returned to the basement to look for it. He searched and didn’t find it, and reported back to the other officer. He went back to the basement, and he noticed that a ceiling tile was ajar. He looked up there and found a gun. The woman’s consent to go look for him implicitly included looking for the gun, too, and her suppression hearing testimony to the contrary was rejected. United States v. Toyer, 414 Fed. Appx. 584 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):

We found, in Hylton, implicit consent to search the apartment in which the defendant and his girlfriend lived based on the circumstances and the girlfriend’s words. 349 F.3d at 786. This court found that the girlfriend gave the police consent to search the apartment to enable her to return to the apartment safely, and that the officers reasonably inferred that she authorized them to retrieve the gun that had put her at risk. Id. We were also persuaded by the fact that the girlfriend had advised the officers of the specific circumstances inside the apartment, concluding that “when a tenant calls police for assistance … expressing fear about the presence of a gun, and describing precisely where the gun is located, it can be inferred that she is authorizing the police to enter the apartment and retrieve the gun.” Id. at 786-87.

The situation here — one of a domestic dispute involving threats of violence with a gun — is similar to the situation in Hylton, and even if Ballard and Elliot did not give express consent to search the house for weapons, the officers reasonably inferred that such implicit consent had been given. The government’s burden is heavier where consent is not explicit, since consent is not lightly to be inferred. Neely, 564 F.3d at 350 (citing United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1984)). But the government meets the burden in this case. In their testimony, both officers stated that Ballard and Elliot seemed concerned and scared that Toyer had threatened Elliot with a gun, and told the officers that Toyer was in the basement of the house with the weapon. Additionally, Elliot told Officer Adams that the gun was on a shelf, but then later told another officer that the gun may have been in the drop ceiling. Though she did not explicitly state “I consent for you to search the basement area for the gun,” it is reasonable to believe that a rational officer would find her statements about the whereabouts of the gun to be consent to search for the gun. Furthermore, it is reasonable for the officers responding to the frantic 911 call to believe that both Ballard and Elliot were giving consent for the officers to enter the house, search for Toyer and his weapon, and diffuse the potentially dangerous situation.

Detention of suspected illegal alien until ICE officer could arrive was not unreasonable. United States v. Nunez-Betancourt, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141037 (E.D. N.C. November 15, 2010), R&R adopted, 766 F. Supp. 2d 651 (E.D. N.C. 2011):

Defendant contends, however, the officers had no authority to detain him on suspicion of being an illegal alien because the officers were not federal actors and could not enforce federal immigration law. Assuming without deciding the officers had no authority to arrest Defendant on immigration charges, there is nothing in the statutes or case law cited by Defendant to suggest state officers have no authority to temporarily detain persons reasonably suspected of federal law violations. Federal and state law enforcement officials often work together on investigations; indeed, the Columbus County Sheriff’s Department first learned of the possible drug trafficking at 519 Old Baggett Road through information passed along by SA Swivel, a federal agent. Defendant directly informed Detective Worley of his illegal status. Lieutenant Worthington in turn informed SA Swivel of Defendant’s potential immigration violation. SA Swivel requested that Defendant be detained until he could personally interview him. Under the circumstances, it was entirely reasonable for the officers to temporarily detain Defendant until SA Swivel could arrive to confirm his illegal status.

The search of defendant’s computer did not exceed the consent. The mouse wasn’t working properly, and the officer had to scroll through programs and clicked on a game program and stumbled upon child pornography. The officer did not even click on programs that had more suggestive names. United States v. Whaley, 415 Fed. Appx. 129 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished)*:

In this case, Whaley permitted Schoenfeld to use his computer, but only for the limited purpose of viewing the flight simulator program. We discern no clear error in the magistrate’s finding that Schoenfeld was, in fact, searching for the flight simulator when he opened the “auto racing 13” icon. Because the laptop’s mouse pad was not working, Schoenfeld had to scroll through the icons one by one. Therefore, it is plausible that he did not notice the “Microsoft Flight Si” icon at the time. If Schoenfeld’s interest in the flight simulator was actually a pretext for conducting a search for contraband, he likely would not have clicked on the “auto racing 13” icon because the file name was not suggestive of child pornography or other illegal materials. And, in fact, there were other icons on the computer with more suggestive titles that Sgt. Schoenfeld did not click on. These included “beautiful kiss,” “girls gone wild9best o…,” etc.

The key question in this case is whether an officer exceeds the scope of an individual’s consent to search for a particular computer file when the officer opens another file in the reasonable, though mistaken belief, that it is the file that was the subject of the individual’s consent. Although we do not have any published opinions directly on point, other Circuits have decided cases involving similar facts. …

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment to subscriber information provided to an internet service provider. People v. Stipo, 124 Cal. App. 3d 688, 195 Cal. App. 4th 664 (2d Dist. 2011).*

Traffic stop led to a valid plain view of marijuana and then cocaine. Commonwealth v. Liddie, 2011 PA Super 104, 21 A.3d 229 (Pa. Super. 2011).*

Defendant’s § 2255 is frivolous: The claim that the search was without probable cause is false and already litigated. United States v. Wilson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52077 (W.D. Pa. May 16, 2011).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion that the vehicle might have been stolen, but that was dispelled during the stop, and there was no reasonable suspicion that the vehicle had contraband. Nevertheless, the defendant lawfully consented to a search of the vehicle. United States v. Lopez-Urquiza, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51810 (E.D. Tenn. May 13, 2011)*, R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51786 (E.D. Tenn. March 14, 2011).*

Defendant was the target of a controlled buy of marijuana that had recently been brought across the border in a backpack and the courier detained. The courier agreed to make the delivery. When the police heard the code words on the wire, they came in to make the arrest, and found another backpack that belonged to defendant. The warrantless search of his own backpack violated the Vermont Constitution. The court rejects claims that just because the controlled delivery happened in a public place defendant had no expectation of privacy in the closed container. State v. Birchard, 2010 VT 57, 188 Vt. 172, 5 A.3d 879 (2010):

[*P13] In Savva, we announced the rule controlling our decision today that police cannot open and search a closed container when there is ample opportunity to obtain a warrant prior to doing so. 159 Vt. at 88, 616 A.2d at 781 (summarizing its conclusion that where no exigency exists, “a legitimate expectation of privacy was implicated” by the defendant’s closed paper bags found in the hatchback of his car). Our decision in that case was grounded in a “separate and higher expectation of privacy” for the contents of such containers over objects in a vehicle exposed to plain view. Id. Even where probable cause exists to seize a closed container, that does not override the requirement for a warrant: police must proceed in the least intrusive manner with respect to a defendant’s expectations of privacy in that container, obtaining a defendant’s permission to search or seeking the oversight of a magistrate. Id. at 90, 616 A.2d at 782; …. Once seized, the container may be either opened pursuant to a warrant or under an exception to the requirements of Article 11. See Savva, 159 Vt. at 89, 616 A.2d at 782; accord Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141 n.11 (1990). We have declined to approve of administrative efficiency serves as an adequate grounds for such an exception, Bauder, 2007 VT 16, PP 11-12, choosing instead to preserve, whenever possible, the essential checks on unrestrained executive power by ensuring review by an impartial magistrate prior to a governmental invasion of privacy. Id. P 13.

Salon.com: Big Brother is tracking you: GPS and the 4th Amendment by Jordan Smith:

When is a search not a search?

Or, more pointedly: When are electronic or other forms of surveillance of an individual considered a search under the Fourth Amendment — thus requiring a valid warrant to conduct such surveillance in a manner that protects the individual from “unlawful search and seizure”?

How the U.S. Supreme Court answers that question, in a case on its docket for the term starting in October, will have far-reaching implications for the power of government and for the privacy of individuals, according to lawyers and privacy rights advocates.

If the Court holds that warrants are not required for this type of surveillance, it could mean “the technological death of the Fourth Amendment,” warns Arkansas-based attorney John Wesley Hall, a leading Fourth Amendment expert who also writes a blog and runs a website.

The government’s motion for cell phone location data to locate a person it has an arrest warrant for where there has been no showing of any attempt to flee or that the data would reveal a crime is denied. In Re an Application of The United States for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Information of a Specified Wireless Telephone, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85638 (D. Md. August 3, 2011):

The issue before the Court is the government’s authority to prospectively acquire precise location information derived from cellular and Global Positioning System (“GPS”) technology (collectively “location data”) to aid in the apprehension of the subject of an arrest warrant. The government has reported no attempts of the subject to flee and the requested location data does not otherwise constitute evidence of any crime. The government argues its entitlement to prospective location data under these circumstances pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Stored Communications Act, the All Writs Act, and the inherent authority of the court. In so doing, the government asks to use location data in a new way — not to collect evidence of a crime, but solely to locate a charged defendant. To some, this use would appear reasonable, even commendable and efficient. To others, this use of location data by law enforcement would appear chillingly invasive and unnecessary in the apprehension of defendants. In any event, there is no precedent for use of location data solely to apprehend a defendant in the absence of evidence of flight to avoid prosecution. The government did not submit, and the court did not find, any sufficient authority for this use of location technology. In light of legitimate privacy concerns and the absence of any emergency or extraordinary considerations here, the Court concludes that approval of use of location data for this purpose is best considered deliberately in the legislature, or in the appellate courts. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the underlying warrant applications, but sets forth its guidance on the showing necessary for law enforcement access to prospective location data to aid in the execution of an arrest warrant.

[I can’t find a free link to this case yet, not even on EFF.org, and I don’t have the capability to internally store and link it here. If somebody gets a link, please forward it.]

Strip search of a parolee arrested or detained without any cause violated the Fourth Amendment. The parolee still had some Fourth Amendment rights. Smith v. City of Oakland, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85989 (N.D. Cal. August 4, 2011):

Even if defendants could vault over the unlawful stop and bring themselves within the ambit of suspicionless searches of parolees, they still cannot justify conducting a strip search of a parolee or arrestee in public. They failed to take the precautions of conducting searches in a professional manner by conducting them in public. They failed to conduct them in a place that afforded privacy. The searches were not merely visual searches; they were not within the State’s statutory definition of strip searches, which contemplates the person, not the officer, rearranging or removing items of clothing for visual inspection by the officer. Nor have the officers justified the searches as being for a proper purpose. Searches of this nature, conducted in public, in view of passersby and others, are arbitrary, capricious and harassing. They do not pass constitutional muster.

Qualified immunity was rejected noting that Terry held that there had to be a basis for a stop as long ago as 1931.

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not forecasting Gant. State v. Pearsall, 156 Wn. App. 357, 231 P.3d 849 (2010):

At the time of the search and throughout Pearsall’s trial, the United States Supreme Court had not yet issued Gant. There is no basis for us to find ineffective assistance for defense counsel’s failure to move to suppress evidence in anticipation of a change in the law. See Millan, 151 Wn. App. at 502-03 (citing United States v. Fields, 565 F.3d 290, 296 (5th Cir. 2009); State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335-36, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995)). In State v. Contrerras, 92 Wn. App. 307, 318-19, 966 P.2d 915 (1998), for example, we refused to reverse a conviction on ineffective assistance grounds when Contrerras could not demonstrate that the trial court would have granted a motion to suppress even if defense counsel had brought such a motion. Such is the case here.

911 call was insufficient for an entry into defendant’s house because there was insufficient showing of exigency of an injury of anybody inside. State v. Ford, 2010 VT 39, 188 Vt. 17, 998 A.2d 684 (2010).

Defendant was standing outside of a grocery store talking first to one man and then another and exchanging telephone numbers. The officer initiated a stop and questioned the defendant and it became a seizure without reasonable suspicion. While the conduct appeared suspicious, it was without reasonable suspicion because it also was legal. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 2010 PA Super 96, 995 A.2d 1253 (2010).*