A Fourth Amendment warrant to arrest an alleged parole violator is not required. The warrant can be issued by a designated official of the parole board as an administrative warrant, and the statute required reasonable suspicion. State v. Barker, 256 P.3d 463 (Wash. App. 2011):

Moreover, unlike the Vargas-Amaya court, the Sherman court was required to address the constitutionality of its holding that an administrative warrant need not comply with the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. Sherman, 502 F.3d at 883. The court concluded that because searches and seizures of parolees generally are not subject to the requirements of the warrant clause, the Fourth Amendment does not require an administrative parole violator warrant to be supported by oath or affirmation. Sherman, 502 F.3d at 884.

Former RCW 9.94A.740 (2009) justified the issuance of the warrant here and implicates an administrative rather than judicial warrant. The statute’s plain language authorizes the secretary to issue a warrant to any offender who violates a community custody placement condition. See Sherman, 502 F.3d at 876 (“[s]ection 4213 expressly authorizes only ‘the Commission’ to issue a parole violator ‘warrant’ and thereby provides for an administrative warrant”) (emphasis in original). In addition, the statute omits any reference to Fourth Amendment requirements, stating only that community custody officers must have reasonable cause to believe a violation has occurred. See Sherman, 502 F.3d at 876-77 (distinguishing several other statutes and rules that express a “probable cause” requirement). Given the obvious limitations of Vargas-Amaya, we conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that the Fourth Amendment requires an arrest warrant for probationers to be issued by a detached and neutral magistrate based on facts set out by oath or affirmation. Under Sherman, an administrative warrant issued by a designated administrator without an oath or affirmation is constitutionally permissible. Sherman, 502 F.3d at 884.

The entry into the house here was with exigent circumstances. The information collected at the scene created a reasonable possibility that there had been a shooting during a domestic dispute, and the police went in to check on it. Inside, they found marijuana plants which led to this forfeiture action. United States v. 5 Anchor Drive, Sandwich, Massachusetts, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13610 (D. Mass. February 1, 2011)*:

In this case, the circumstances demanded immediate action that rendered reasonable the warrantless search of the house at 5 Anchor Drive. The police had received two reports of gunshots and they learned that the owner of the house, Tracy Harsh, held a firearm license. Despite diligent efforts, they were unable to contact her. Then Baker, who claimed to be the owner and sole occupant, arrived with two friends and told a suspect story about an earlier appearance of two women in need of a telephone and a man waving a gun. He also gave an unlikely explanation as to Harsh’s whereabouts which raised the possibility of a serious domestic dispute. Finally, one of the friends admitted to having two guns in his truck. Given this scenario, Sergeant Dwyer was fully justified in entering the house to ascertain that no one had been shot and lay injured inside the home. The officers acted promptly, after appropriate deliberation, when they entered the home minutes after their alarming interaction with Baker and his two friends. Their search of all areas of the home in which a person might be located, including the two plywood rooms, was appropriate in scope.

The court finds the officer credible that defendant consented although he might have been in handcuffs at the time of consent. The court finds incredible the claim that he was beaten on the side of the road before the consent. United States v. Martinez, 771 F. Supp. 2d 378 (E.D. Pa. 2011).*

Defendant agreed to “intensive” supervision which meant more intrusive searches, and he was bound by it. He moved to change it, but he cannot unilaterally change a contract. People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 950 N.E.2d 659 (2011):

We find this case to be analogous to [People v.] Evans[, 174 Ill.2d 320, 220 Ill.Dec. 332, 673 N.E.2d 244 (1996)] and, therefore, similarly governed by principles of contract law. Here, defendant and the State entered into a fully negotiated plea agreement in which defendant pled guilty to a charge in exchange for the State’s recommendation of a specific sentence: two years’ probation, with the first year being “intensive.” Faced with the possibility of imprisonment and a complete loss of freedom and privacy rights, defendant opted to avoid incarceration and agree to probation, including a year of the more restrictive “intensive” version and its greater invasion of privacy. This bargain was advantageous to defendant, as he avoided jail time and gave up nothing by agreeing to probation and its restrictions. The bargain was also advantageous to the State, in that it assured that defendant was required to comply with the more restrictive conditions of intensive probation for the first year. It is undisputed that the agreement was explained to defendant, he understood its provisions and he freely signed the form.

Getting GPS location data from cell phone provider so defendant could be located to be arrested did not violate the Fourth Amendment or the N.J. Constitution. State v. Earls, 420 N.J. Super. 583, 22 A.3d 114 (2011):

Similarly, in Devega, the police ascertained a murder suspect’s general location on a public highway by having his cell phone provider “ping” his phone. 689 S.E.2d at 299. In rejecting the defendant’s argument that his trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to move for suppression of evidence on the theory that such electronic monitoring violated the Fourth Amendment, the court stated:

“The GPS tracking device [and ‘ping’ information] in the case at bar is simply the next generation of tracking science and technology from the radio transmitter ‘beeper’ in Knotts, to which the Knotts Fourth Amendment analysis directly applies.” … Because the warrantless monitoring of his cell phone location revealed the same information as visual surveillance, there was no Fourth Amendment violation.

[Id. at 300 (quoting Stone, supra, 941 A.2d at 1250).]

We conclude, as did the courts in Forest and Devega, that the use by the police of information obtained from T-Mobile concerning defendant’s general location, derived from signals emitted by his cell phone, which together with visual surveillance resulted in discovery of his car in a motel parking lot, did not violate any legitimate expectation of privacy defendant may have had regarding the location of his car. As in Knotts, “[w]hen [defendant] traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction … and the fact of his final destination” at the motel, 460 U.S. at 281-82, 103 S. Ct. at 1085, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 62, and “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them,” id. at 282, 103 S. Ct. at 1086, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 63.

We reach the same conclusion under Article I, paragraph 7, of the New Jersey Constitution. …

I can’t decide whether this case is correct as far as it goes. Five years ago, I wouldn’t have thought about it like I do now, and I am troubled by the future. Everybody should be. While we wring our hands over the planted GPS case, what of using the fact that all cell phones sold in the U.S. since 2008 have GPS in them? Can the government uniformly follow anybody by the GPS in their telephones without a warrant? It’s a Brave New World, and it scares the hell out of me.

Defendant was having a party in his house, and a bunch of people were in there. The police showed up because of a noise complaint [think of the scenes in “Social Network” or “Super Troopers”] and walked through the premises looking for the responsible persons. In a bedroom upstairs, they saw pills. While the entry into the house was lawful, a broad search of the house was not. “[T]here is no broad ‘nuisance abatement’ exception to the general rule that warrantless entries into private homes are presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Kaltner, 420 N.J. Super. 524, 22 A.3d 77 (2011):

Unlike those cases, here there was no open invitation to the public to enter the premises. Although crowded and noisy, there is no evidence that the party was an “open house.” Merely because some in attendance were mutual friends of invited guests did not mean that total strangers would be freely admitted or welcomed. Under those circumstances and contrary to the State’s contention, we do not view as any lessened or diminished the legitimate expectation of privacy that defendant, who was not even present at the party, continued to enjoy in his residence, and even more so, in his third-floor bedroom. Nor, for obvious reasons, did defendant abandon his privacy interest by having the home indirectly exposed to the public by loud noise emanating therein.

Given this reasonable expectation of privacy, federal and state constitutional provisions “express[] a preference” that, before conducting a search, government officials should first obtain a warrant founded on probable cause issued by a neutral and detached judge “‘particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’” … Thus, warrantless searches have been permitted when, among other circumstances, incident to lawful arrest, consent is obtained, government officials act in a community-caretaking function, or exigent circumstances compel action. Johnson, supra, 193 N.J. at 552, 940 A.2d 1185. Of course, the State carries the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that a search falls within one of these or other carefully crafted exceptions and that it was premised on probable cause. Ibid.; State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19-20, 853 A.2d 887 (2004).

. . .

Rather, the question in this case is whether, once legitimately inside, the police acted lawfully in fanning out in search of those in control of the premises in an attempt to abate the noise nuisance. In this regard, the State relies exclusively on the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement. On this score, the court found credible the testimony of Officer Camacho “that he and the other officers embark[ed] upon a search of the house to locate the owner or the … person in charge of the … residence[,]” but nevertheless concluded it was unreasonable for the police to extend their search beyond the first floor main living area because “[t]here [were] no exigent circumstances.”

As to the community care taking exception:

As is evident here, the community caretaking doctrine does not fit neatly within the “exigent circumstances” or “emergency aid” constructs and therefore their analytical framework is inapposite to a consideration of whether such police action is constitutionally tolerable. Indeed, no exigency existed here at least in the traditional law enforcement sense of hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, removal or destruction of evidence, or imminent danger to life or property. Yet the constitutional allowance of such intrusions simply recognizes that “some situations addressed by officers within their community caretaking functions, though not within the scope of traditional law enforcement, can still present important government interests that may rise to the level of traditionally recognized ‘exigent circumstances.’” Ray, supra, 626 F.3d at 176 (quoting United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1521-22 (6th Cir. 1996)).

Thus, the relevant question in community caretaking situations focuses not on the compelling need for immediate action or the time needed to secure a warrant, but instead on the objective reasonableness of the police action in executing their service function. Bogan, supra, 200 N.J. at 80, 975 A.2d 377.

. . .

We agree with Rohrig to the extent that there is no broad “nuisance abatement” exception to the general rule that warrantless entries into private homes are presumptively unreasonable. We adhere, as did the Bogan Court, to the “objectively reasonable” test, Bogan, supra, 200 N.J. at 81, 975 A.2d 377, and to the case-specific nature of the inquiry.

Governed thusly by the reasonableness standard, and weighing all of its component competing interests, we conclude that the police action in this instance was not constitutionally permitted. Although police entry into the dwelling was initially justified, their subsequent action in fanning out and conducting, in essence, a full-blown search of the home was neither reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the entry in the first place nor carried out in a manner consistent with the factors supporting the entry’s initial legitimacy. Indeed, unlike Rohrig, the objective of noise abatement could have been achieved well short of the full-scale search engaged in by the officers in this matter.

Live monitoring of GPS on defendant’s car four separate times did not violate the Fourth Amendment, straining to find a way to distinguish Maynard, and following the majority view. United States v. Walker, 771 F. Supp. 2d 803 (W.D. Mich. 2011):

As Defendant notes in her objections, the Supreme Court has not yet considered whether GPS monitoring of a vehicle’s location constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, but several circuit courts have and are split on the issue. (Objections ¶ 11.) Defendant relies on a recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit holding that prolonged GPS monitoring — 24 hours a day for four weeks — was a Fourth Amendment search and was unreasonable without a warrant. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). It appears, however, that the great weight of the law from other federal circuits rejects this view. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that GPS tracking is not a search); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We conclude that the police did not conduct an impermissible search of [defendant’s] car by monitoring its location with mobile tracking devices.”), reh’g en banc denied 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Sparks, No. 10-10067, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120257 at *34 (D. Mass. 2010) (“[N]o warrant or other court order is necessary to install or monitor the GPS.”); Morton v. Nassau County Police Dep’t, No. 05-CV-4000, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87558, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007) (“[T]he use of the GPS Device was not an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. Jesus-Nunez, No. 1:10-CR-00017, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76107, at *12 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2010) (“[T]here was no Fourth Amendment search or seizure by the Government’s use of the GPS device.”); United States v. Williams, 650 F. Supp. 2d 633, 668 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (“[T]he Court is comfortable in concluding that no search warrant or other court order was required to permit the officers to lawfully attach the electronic tracking devices to the exterior of [defendants’] automobiles.”); United States v. Burton, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (“There is no Fourth Amendment violation for using a tracking device … where the substitute is for an activity, namely following a car on a public street, that is unequivocally not a search within the meaning of the amendment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Same outcome: United States v. Fisher, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13749 (W.D. Mich. January 11, 2011).

Defendant’s admittedly illegal arrest was used to prosecute him for illegal entry, and the court finds that the police exploited the illegality for the purpose of running all fingerprints of arrestees in Albuquerque. Considering authority from the Tenth, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits, the court finds that the arrest was to exploit fingerprinting of everybody, and the identity evidence was suppressed. United States v. Perez-Partida, 773 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (D. N.M. 2011):

IV. Analysis

At the outset, it is important to acknowledge that the objective of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 608-09, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he driving legal purpose underlying the exclusionary rule [is] the deterrence of unlawful government behavior … [and to] compel respect for the constitutional guaranty … by removing the incentive to disregard it.”). At the evidentiary hearing, the Government argued that the deterrent function was satisfied in this case: Detective Tafoya conducted an unlawful search, and as a result, his illegal drug arrest will not lead to a criminal prosecution. According to the Government, Defendant “reaped some benefit [of the exclusionary rule], in the sense that he doesn’t face narcotics charges.” 2/3/11 Tr. at 69. However, the Government’s argument is incomplete. The purpose of the exclusionary rule would be equally served in cases where the evidence shows that the arresting officer was in fact motivated by a desire to transport a prisoner to the PTC in order to investigate possible immigration violations. Although the evidence presented here unequivocally establishes that all prisoners are subject to ICE screening at the PTC regardless of their perceived race or national origin, no such evidence was presented with respect to the arrest itself. In other words, given Albuquerque police officers’ knowledge of ICE’s presence at the PTC, the exclusionary rule should be applied to identity evidence where doing so would serve the purpose of deterring officers from pursuing unlawful arrests based on an arrestee’s perceived immigration status.

. . .

C. When “Routine Booking” Involves an “INS-Related Purpose”

This Court has carefully examined the rationales offered by both the Fourth and Eighth Circuits in support of their respective conclusions regarding the application of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine to identity evidence. It appears from Oscar-Torres that the Fourth Circuit arrived at its conclusion in part because the Supreme Court has established a general rule that the exclusionary rule simply does not apply in civil proceedings. See 507 F.3d at 229-30 (citing Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1042-47). The court further relied upon the Supreme Court cases of Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1985) and Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1969), where “police suspected [the defendants] of criminal activity, and [illegally] detained and fingerprinted them for the clear investigatory purpose of connecting them to specific crimes,” Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d at 231; from the Supreme Court’s central focus on the criminal nature of the investigations, the Eighth Circuit concluded that “[f]ingerprinting conducted as part of an arrest intended to lead only to an administrative deportation simply does not present the same concerns as the fingerprinting at issue in Hayes and Davis, which was meant to (and did in fact) lead to criminal prosecutions.” Id.

The circumstances surrounding the instant case caution against a hard-line rule allowing the remedy of suppression in a criminal proceeding only when the motivation for taking the fingerprints was for the purpose of pursuing said criminal proceeding, as opposed to civil deportation proceedings. The PTC screening policy embodies a recent trend of blurring the line between the “purely civil” nature of immigration proceedings and the distinctly punitive nature of criminal punishment. Compare I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1037, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984) (“A deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry”) with Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010) (“Changes to our immigration law … confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part–indeed, sometimes the most important part–of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants” (footnote omitted)). Mayor Berry himself titled his address “Ending Sanctuary for Criminals.” Doc. 17, Attach. D. This title, which stems from the label of “sanctuary city” that some placed on Albuquerque prior to Mayor Berry taking office, conveys the mayor’s position that a “sanctuary” for immigrants is in fact a sanctuary for criminals. In fact, the policy to which Mayor Berry referred when he described Albuquerque as a “sanctuary for criminals” is the Albuquerque Police Department’s Standard Operating Procedure (“APD SOP”) regarding the extent to which officers may question suspects or prisoners about their immigration status. See Sean Olson & Dan McKay, Mayor’s Race Turns Nasty, Albuquerque Journal, Sept. 24, 2009 (“What Berry calls a sanctuary city policy actually is a[n Albuquerque Police Department] policy …. Berry is the only [mayoral] candidate who says Albuquerque is a sanctuary city.”).

Cutting the lock off a tractor trailer at a weigh station was a reasonable part of a cargo securement inspection under Kentucky law. United States v. Allen, 771 F. Supp. 2d 752 (W.D. Ky. 2011):

Random safety and cargo securement inspections conducted at a weigh station also set forth a very clear scope of inspection. First, “[t]he inspections can be made only of [commercial trucking vehicles.]” Burger, 482 U.S. 711. Second, “the permissible scope of these searches is narrowly defined:” the inspector may only enter into a vehicle to ensure compliance with Kentucky commercial trucking regulations. Id. Limiting the type of vehicle that can be inspected and the scope of the inspection narrowly defines the permissible scope of the inspections. Finally, while there is no limitation on time, “[t]rucks operate twenty-four hours a day and the officers must, necessarily, have the authority to conduct these administrative inspections at any time.” Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d at 470. With appropriate limits on time, place and scope, the third requirement of Burger is met when random inspections are performed at a weigh station.

Since the three Burger requirements are met under the facts of the current case, Officer Duvall was lawfully allowed to perform a warrantless inspection to verify compliance with Kentucky commercial trucking regulations while the truck was at a weigh station. Accord United States v. Ruiz, 569 F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Burch, 153 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1998).

Protective sweep here was applied to a report of defendant shooting at his dog. The police first swept the curtilage, saw where he freshly dug a hole and filled it. They were permitted to enter defendant’s house to see whether there was an injured animal or person. A gun found in plain view inside was properly seized. State v. Goulet, 21 A.3d 302 (R.I. 2011). [It was tenuous here that they would find a wounded person, as the court suggests. That was ridiculous. Finding the gun is a better view, but even then, they had no reason to believe at that point the gun wasn’t lawfully possessed.]

When the officer observed the defendant’s vehicle with one Florida license plate mounted on the rear, all he needed to know was whether Florida issued one or two plates. That was a legal question. If the officer did not know the answer, he was not authorized to make the stop anyway. People v. Reyes, 196 Cal. App. 4th 856, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167 (6th Dist. 2011).*

When the officer looked in the window of defendant’s car and saw an apparent bag of drugs, he did not have to know exactly what they were to have probable cause. State v. Brodia, 129 Conn. App. 391, 2011 Conn. App. LEXIS 327 (June 14, 2011).*

Warrantless arrest in the home on a 21 day old controlled buy violated the Indiana Constitution, and the Fourth Amendment is not even considered. State v. Foster, 950
N.E.2d 760 (Ind. App. 2011):

In this case, the police had a high degree of concern that a violation had occurred. Foster challenges the propriety of his arrest, but he does not dispute that the detectives had probable cause to arrest him based on the controlled buy. Nevertheless, the degree of intrusion in this case was also high. Foster had an expectation of privacy in his apartment. See id. (noting that the defendant had an expectation of privacy in his home). Gigli awakened Foster and his girlfriend, summoned them to the front door, and convinced them to open the door through subterfuge. Once Foster opened the door, the detectives entered, handcuffed Foster, and searched the apartment. Finally, law enforcement needs did not require Gigli and Reed to enter Foster’s apartment without a warrant. Twenty-one days had elapsed since the controlled buy, and there is no evidence that exigent circumstances called for an immediate arrest. There was ample time and opportunity for the officers to obtain an arrest warrant. In fact, the detectives obtained an arrest warrant after Foster was in custody. Balancing the three factors set forth in Litchfield, under the totality of the circumstances the officers’ warrantless entry and in-home arrest of Foster was unreasonable and violated Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. See Trotter v. State, 933 N.E.2d 572, 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (determining that the officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s barn violated the Indiana Constitution where the degree of the officers’ intrusion was high and there were no exigent circumstances to justify the intrusion).

The question then becomes whether the statements in Gigli’s car and at the police station should be suppressed. …

The search warrant for defendant’s clenched buttocks was issued with probable cause. The officer had encountered defendant doing that once before with cocaine hidden there, and he averred that defendant was clenching his buttocks and refused to relax when told to do so. Abbott v. State, 950
N.E.2d 357 (Ind. App. 2011).*

A garage is generally curtilage, and entry here violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer did not go in the front door; he went to the back, and then used a flashlight to navigate because he was using the cover of darkness. The officer’s own actions show open door was not an invitation to the world to enter. State v. Davis, 2011 WI App 74, 333 Wis. 2d 490, 798 N.W.2d 902 (2011):

P15 Therefore, Zahn’s warrantless entry into Davis’s attached garage violated the Fourth Amendment under Edgeberg, and as the State concedes, the intrusion is not saved by the potential Leutenegger exception. There is no dispute that the front entry door appeared to be a less intrusive means of attempting contact. Moreover, even if we assumed, arguendo, that entry through the open door of an attached garage was generally permissible under Edgeberg, it was unreasonable for Zahn to proceed to the rear of the garage to a door that was not visible from outside. In fact, it was even more unreasonable because Zahn had to utilize a flashlight to find his way through the dark garage. Given these facts, no person could reasonably conclude that the open overhead garage door was an open invitation for the public to enter and make contact with Davis inside the home.

P16 Because Zahn had no right to enter the garage, the plain view doctrine cannot apply to allow evidence of the firearm he later observed inside the foyer. See Edgeberg, 188 Wis. 2d at 345-46 (“The officer’s right to be in the place where the view occurs is fundamental to the validity of what follows.”). The search warrant police eventually obtained was based on Zahn’s observation. Therefore, all evidence discovered during the subsequent search must also be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).

Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea was before Gant was denied, and she appealed. Her guilty plea waived all constitutional issues, and didn’t change anything. State v. Wilson, 162 Wn. App. 409, 253 P.3d 1143 (2011).*

Stop for patronizing a prostitute here was without reasonable suspicion. State v. Diluzio, 254 P.3d 218 (Wash. App. 2011)*:

¶20 The facts in Mr. Diluzio’s case are similar to those in Doughty and provide even less justification for a stop. Here, as in Doughty, the investigatory stop was based on the officer’s observation. The officer saw Mr. Diluzio having a conversation with a woman who got into the passenger side of his vehicle. There was no police informant and the police officer did not see any money change hands and did not overhear any conversations between the two individuals. Neither individual was known to have been involved in prostitution or solicitation activities. These incomplete observations do not provide the basis for a Terry stop.

A nonflagrant violation of the state constitution did not require suppression of a confession that was attenuated from the violation. “¶33 In sum, we hold that the Harris exception is incompatible with the exclusionary rule under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution but that Eserjose’s confession was not attributable to the illegal arrest. Thus, the trial court did not err in determining that Eserjose’s confession was admissible under article I, section 7 of our state constitution as well as the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Eserjose’s conviction is accordingly affirmed.” State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn. 2d 907 (2011).*

Failed state court IAC claim against lawyer for not moving to suppress a search that actually decided the merits of the claim precluded a § 1983 suit over the same search. Easterling v. Moeller, 418 Fed. Appx. 495 (7th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):

On appeal Easterling argues that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether the search of his bag violated the Fourth Amendment and thus issue preclusion should not bar his § 1983 claim. Federal courts give a state judgment the same preclusive effect that it would receive in state court. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S. Ct. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980); Burke v. Johnston, 452 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2006). In Wisconsin, a party may not relitigate a question of fact or law decided in prior litigation if the resolution of that issue was necessary to the judgment and giving it preclusive effect would not be fundamentally unfair. … Here, Easterling actually litigated his challenge to the bag search in the context of claiming that his lawyer was ineffective for not moving to suppress the fruits of that search. In rejecting that claim, the state courts concluded that Easterling would not have prevailed on his proposed Fourth Amendment claim because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag once he handed it over to Diener. Easterling, Nos. 2004 AP 934-CR & 2005 AP 1224-CR, slip op. at 3. Easterling has not argued that it is fundamentally unfair to preclude him from relitigating this conclusion, and thus issue preclusion prevents him from reasserting his objection to the search of his bag in his § 1983 claim.

Police got an anonymous call about shots fired from a “dark” SUV, and they went to the area. They stopped the first “dark” SUV they saw, ordering the occupants to the ground at gunpoint. Nothing on the 911 call audio supported its reliability. The stop was without reasonable suspicion, and, under United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 2006), everybody in the car had standing because the stop was invalid. People v. Isaac, 2011 V.I. LEXIS 13 (Super. Ct. March 8, 2011).*

The government had a search warrant for a business for visa fraud involving people from India. In executing the warrant, the officers found evidence of visa fraud of people from Mexico. The warrant was not overbroad because the records of multiple business shells were contemplated and found to launder the money. The evidence could thus be considered as 404(b) evidence. United States v. Pena, 418 Fed. Appx. 335 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

FL1 again rejects Ohio’s Smith for the second time in two weeks and holds that a cell phone is a mere container subject to a search incident. It certifies the case to the Florida Supreme Court for further review. Fawdry v. State, 70 So. 3d 626 (Fla. App. 1st DCA 2011).*

A lawful traffic stop led to the officer smelling marijuana, and that justified a search of the car. State v. Whatley, 2011 Ohio 2297, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 1956 (5th Dist. May 9, 2011).*

The CI’s information was detailed and corroborated and provided probable cause. Moreover, the CI testified at the trial. People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058 (2011).*

The cutting off a padlock with a bolt cutter was done by a private person for a private purpose of looking for abandoned animals. The police arrived shortly thereafter and entered to assist in the private search in case there was trouble. Stanley v. State, 2011 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 24 (April 29, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense, after a few strange moves of the vehicle compared to his explanation about looking for gas. He consented to the officer looking at his gas gauge, and, in the front seat, the officer saw a package which he believed would have contained drugs. He did not need to conclusively know, just have probable cause, and the officer’s having seen similar packages with drugs five times before was enough likelihood for probable cause. People v. Sinegal, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 400 (March 30, 2011), published April 28, 2011. Another copy at People v. Sinegal, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1130, 350 Ill. Dec. 628, 948 N.E.2d 1135 (2011).

Because the property that the police approached was being used for illegal purposes and not being used as a home, none of the people there had a reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. Rivas, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142827 (W.D. Tenn. November 15, 2010).*

Buying a vehicle but putting it in somebody else’s name to prevent or complicate its forfeiture shows a lack of standing in the vehicle. United States v. Duong, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62117 (D. Conn. June 10, 2011).

The record supports that defendant’s girlfriend had apparent authority to consent and did. She observed the search and never objected. United States v. Moylan, 418 Fed. Appx. 568 (8th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s traffic stop was valid, and his account of his travel plans made no sense, so that was reasonable suspicion that he was carrying drugs. United States v. Nunez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61726 (D. Utah June 9, 2011).*

After a dog alerted to defendant’s vehicle, Gant did not apply because it was no longer a search incident. United States v. Stafford, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61660 (E.D. N.C. June 7, 2011),* R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67536 (E.D. N.C. April 22, 2011).*

Gant was applied retroactively to a case still pending at the time Gant was decided, even though the search occurred pre-Gant. State v. Robinson, 171 Wn. 2d 292 (2011).

An officer approached a group of men on a report of an altercation. All the men stayed to talk but defendant. Defendant’s stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. The officer was aware of the following when calling out to the defendant to stop: (1) the area was a high-crime area to which the officer had been called on at least three prior occasions; (2) the police had received a call regarding an armed disturbance occurring at the area in question; (3) upon arriving at the scene, every individual remained where they were or approached the arrived officers, but defendant began to walk away towards a trailer; and (4) defendant, rather than stopping when the officer asked him to stop, looked back towards the officer and kept walking away from him. This evidence was sufficient to support the reasonableness of the stop under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Stittiams, 417 Fed. Appx. 530, 2011 FED App. 0226N (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

The record supported the trial court’s conclusion that defendant committed a traffic violation supporting the stop, and that supported the plain view of drugs on the front seat. State v. Hunter, 2011 La. App. LEXIS 430 (2d Cir. April 13, 2011).*

School resource officer from the police department was acting as a school official at the time of the school search, not a law enforcement officer. State v. J.M., 162 Wn. App. 27, 255 P.3d 828 (2011):

We hold that, like the officers in [People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill.2d 195, 661 N.E.2d 310 (1996)], and S.A., Officer Fry was acting as a school official when he searched J.M.’s backpack. He was on duty as an SRO and acting under his authority as an SRO when he personally observed the activity that formed the basis for his search of J.M. Furthermore, though the McKinnon court did not address the issue of who can be considered a school official, its decision did suggest that the difference between a school official and law enforcement is that the latter is chiefly concerned with discovering and preventing crime. Because it is undisputed that Fry’s primary duties as an SRO were to maintain a safe, secure, and orderly learning environment, it is reasonable to infer that his chief duty was not the discovery and prevention of crime. Under these facts, the reasonable grounds standard applies.

Defendant made no proffer to the court that he had standing to contest the search. Even if he had, he’d fail on the merits of staleness. Even though the information went back two years, there was an ongoing drug operation there. United States v. Rodney, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54940 (S.D. N.Y. May 18, 2011).*

There is no privacy interest in one’s driver’s license records, such that jailers could not run DL records when the defendant was visiting a jail. State v. Hathaway, 161 Wn. App. 634, 251 P.3d 253 (2011).*

Colorado’s implied consent law permits a blood draw without the need for asking for consent if the officer has probable cause. Here, the defendant was in a rollover accident and fled, and that permitted him to be restrained for purposes of the test. People v. Smith, 254 P.3d 1158 (Colo. 2011):

Section 42-4-1301.1(1) and (2)(a)(I) require anyone driving a motor vehicle in Colorado to consent to testing of the alcoholic content of his or her breath or blood if a police officer has probable cause to believe that the driver has committed an alcohol-related driving violation. See generally Null, 233 P.3d at 678-82 (describing in detail the operation of the express consent statute). Under section 42-4-1301.1(3), a driver may ordinarily refuse to cooperate with testing, but, by doing so, risks having his license revoked under section 42-2-126, C.R.S. (2010).

Section 42-4-1301.1(3), however, allows a police officer to physically restrain a driver who refuses to comply with testing and proceed with the testing if the officer has probable cause to believe that the driver has committed one of a limited subset of crimes, including vehicular assault under section 18-3-205(1)(b). …

The combined result of sections 42-4-1301.1(3) and 18-3-205 is that a police officer may perform blood tests on a driver without his or her consent if the officer has probable cause to believe the driver has committed vehicular assault under the influence of alcohol or drugs, subject to the constitutional limitations of Schmerber.