Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense and the officer claimed that a gun was in plain view, justifying its seizure. The court finds that incredible. United States v. Zamichieli, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141610 (E.D. Pa. December 9, 2011)*:

Nonetheless, Zamichieli argues that the search and seizure of the gun during the traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Weighing the evidence presented, the Court finds the officers’ version of the story implausible. There was no reason for Zamichieli to turn on the dome light when he had already opened the driver-side window to speak with Officer Victor and was not asked to provide his paperwork—nor is it likely that Zamichieli would do so with a gun sitting in plain view on the front passenger seat. Without the dome light on, it would be nearly impossible for Officer Andrews to see a gun on the front seat through a closed, tinted window in the dark of night. The Court therefore credits Zamichieli’s testimony that the gun was under the front passenger seat. Because the gun was not in plain view, the only way for the officers to find it was to search the vehicle. Absent an applicable exception, the officers were not permitted to conduct a warrantless search of the Impala without probable cause to believe it contained evidence of criminal activity. See United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 100 (3d Cir. 2002). The Government has not met its burden of showing that the search was reasonable.

Cert granted today in Arizona v. United States, 11-182. It is not directly a Fourth Amendment case, but it probably will implicate probable cause and reasonable suspicion and suspected illegal aliens.

From ScotusBlog.com:

Arizona’s governor, Janice Brewer, in taking the fate of S.B. 1070 on to the Supreme Court, is portraying the case as a major test of the sovereignty of the states to make their own social policies under traditional “police power” principles. The federal government, which tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Court not to get involved in the case at this point, is treating the case as a test of whether states may adopt their own immigration policies that frustrate specific goals of federal policy.

With Justice Kagan not taking part, presumably because she had something to do with the issue in her former role in the Obama Administration Justice Department, there is the possibility that the eight participating Justices will wind up split 4-4 in the case. That would have the effect of simply upholding a Ninth Circuit Court decision, but without opinion and without setting a nationwide precedent. The practical effect of that would be that Arizona could not enforce four key provisions of S.B. 1070, blocked by both the Ninth Circuit and, earlier, by a federal District judge in Arizona.

The four provisions at issue are:

** A requirement that police in making any stop or arrest to try to determine the individual’s legal right to be in the U.S., if the officer has a “reasonable suspicion” of illegality. If arrested, the individual cannot be released until his legal status is verified by the federal government. That is the law’s Section 2(B).

** A provision making it a crime under state law for an individual to intentionally fail to obtain and carry legal immigrant papers with him while in Arizona (Section 3).

** A provision making it a misdemeanor for an undocumented immigrant to apply for a job, publicly solicit a job, or actually work in Arizona (Section 5[C]).

** And, a provision that allows police to arrest without a warrant any person for whom the officer has “probable cause to believe” that the individual has committed any crime, anywhere, that would make that individual subject to being deported (Section 6).

While the entry was valid on exigent circumstances for a mistaken but reasonable belief of a person in need of aid, searching between the mattress and box springs for that person was not reasonable on this record. State v. Hunter, 2011 Ohio 6321, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 5186 (2d Dist. December 9, 2011):

[*P3] We conclude that the police officers lawfully entered the residence without a warrant, based upon anonymous 9-1-1 reports that a person was being held captive in the residence, corroborated by the occupants of the residence ignoring the responding police officers’ repeated attempts to gain their attention and, after finally answering the door, immediately attempting to close the door.

. . .

[*P40] We conclude that the evidence in the record of the suppression hearing, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, is too sparse to support the trial court’s finding that the firearms were found under a bed. Detective Reed did testify that firearms were found in an area where a person could be hidden, but it appears that this was by report, not within his personal knowledge, and the conclusion that the firearms were found in an area where a person could be hidden does not affirmatively establish where the firearms were found. The only reasonable conclusion that we can draw from the sparse evidence at the suppression hearing was that the firearms were found between the mattress and the box springs.

[Note: If officers are looking for a hiding suspect, searches have often been permitted where the officer lifts the mattress off the box springs because it is a recognized hiding place. Here, however, it was for a person in need of aid, and it was argued that the facts of the search did not support this search. Seriously: Would a person in need of aid be hiding under the mattress? A fleeing felon, sure. I expect this one will go up to the Ohio Supreme Court. Here, weapons were found under the mattress.]

The D.C. Court of Appeals heard oral argument today in the case of the search of Rep. William Jefferson’s (D-LA) Congressional office, as shown on the Washington Post’s website this afternoon. The same article is on the NY Times website.

Previous posts are here on the search and the District Court’s upholding the search.

One judge seemed troubled by the execution of the search.

Judge Judith W. Rogers questioned whether the Justice Department carried out the raid appropriately.

“The question in my mind is the manner in which it was done,” she said.

That does not mean that that judge will stick with that view or that at least one other agrees.

Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben appeared for the government.

The 220th anniversary of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. Bill of Rights Day was designated in 1941, seven days after the declaration of war in WWII. They weren’t adopted overnight–they were referred to the thirteen states 27 months earlier. [Update: see Cato.org, too.]

Still, too few people even recognize the Bill of Rights (1991 here and 1998 here). This is remarkable, except when one considers the United States is interested in spreading democracy abroad while most of its own citizens do not understand its fundamental documents.

Look at the members of state legislatures and Congress so willing to give up Fourth Amendment rights of all in the name of some expediency, be it fighting terrorism or drug testing recipients of government funds. This is the misguided belief that others losing Fourth Amendment rights doesn’t mean anything as to the country as a whole. As to the recipients of government funds, there is no indication of a problem, but that doesn’t stop legislators (see posts here, here, here). I remember one state legislator saying that his constituents “really wanted” this. Why don’t we just get over it and drug test every recipient of government funds, starting with the Governor of Florida down to all state legislators, all government workers, welfare recipients, government contractors, CJA lawyers, judges, etc?

Because we can’t under Skinner and Von Raab, that’s why; and none of these clowns knows it because, while legislators are presumed to know what the courts have said on an issue, that only means that they are actively defying the Fourth Amendment, or just don’t care about the Constitution when it is the rights of somebody else, notwithstanding that destroying the rights of one can quickly lead to destroying the rights of all.

Happy Bill of Rights Day. Enjoy it while you still can.

[On a related note: On FoxNews’s “Fox and Friends” this morning, “Today in History” is the release of Michael Jackson’s “Black or White” video. Sigh.]

Defendant would lose on the merits of the search argument not appealed, so defense counsel could not be ineffective for not appealing. The issue was consent to search a vehicle for drugs, and that included any containers in which drugs might be found. Parker v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145970 (W.D. Mo. December 20, 2011).*

Officers in the NYC Anti-Crime Unit stopped the livery car defendant was a passenger in for speeding, yet the proof showed that they had maybe one second to judge the speed by eye without a radar gun. All things considered, without a showing of training in speed detection, the testimony was not credible, and the stop was suppressed. United States v. Moore, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145729 (S.D. N.Y. December 19, 2011).* [Note: The court never got into the question of the propriety of a search of the passenger area of a livery car for speeding.]

Defendant’s stop was with reasonable suspicion of an illegal U-turn. When the officer approached, he could smell marijuana from the vehicle. The defendant unambiguously consented [and did not even really defend against that]. When the officer got in the car, he could smell marijuana, and that was probable cause for an automobile exception search. United States v. James, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145234 (S.D. N.Y. December 16, 2011).*

Officer’s mere hunch of wrongdoing was not reasonable suspicion. The claim of reasonable suspicion fails, and the motion to suppress is granted. United States v. Preciado, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146366 (W.D. Tex. December 20, 2011):

The Fifth Circuit case law continues to develop in this area. Recently, the Court reversed a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress a firearm uncovered during a warrantless automobile search. See U.S. v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2011). In Macias, that defendant argued that before the officer ran the computer checks, the officer engaged in detailed questioning about matters unrelated to the defendant’s driver’s license, his proof of insurance, the vehicle registration, or the purpose and itinerary of his trip that unreasonably prolonged the detention without developing reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity. Id. at 518. The Macias Court determined that the unrelated questions impermissibly extended the duration of the stop. The Government argued that Trooper Barragan was permitted to ask these questions because, as soon as he stopped Macias, he had reasonable suspicion that Macias was involved in criminal activity. Distinguishing Brigham, the Macias Court stated that the Brigham officer’s “increasing suspicion was also fueled by Brigham’s extreme nervousness, his avoidance of eye contact, and his pattern of answering the officer’s questions with questions of his own.” Brigham, 382 F.3d at 508. Accordingly, the Macias Court found that the Brigham officer’s questioning represented “a graduated response to emerging facts” whereas Trooper Barragan “could only point to Macias’s extreme nervousness, which is not sufficient to support the extended detention.” Macias, 658 F. 3d. at 520. The Macias Court also stated that “potentially undercutting Trooper Barragan’s reasonable suspicion is the Government’s failure to present any evidence that sets out Trooper Barragan’s experience.” Id.

In this case, the Government established that Trooper Cipriani had four years of law enforcement experience, had conducted numerous vehicle stops and had attended “interdiction” schools, where he has received training in body language and vehicle indicators to detect contraband. The above notwithstanding, looking at the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Cipriani did not have a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” U.S. v. Vasquez, 253 Fed. Appx. 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2007). Reasonable suspicion may not be based on “inarticulate hunches of wrongdoing.” U.S. v. Thibodeaux, 276 Fed. Appx. 372, 377 (5th Cir. 2008). The Trooper had “mere uneasy feelings” about the believability of what he was being told. However, that does not constitute articulable facts that support a reasonable suspicion. U.S. v. Cavitt, 550 F. 3d 430, 437 (5th Cir. 2008).

Officers conducted a protective sweep which might or might not have been a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but the inevitable discovery rule justified the search warrant from what officers smelled at the door. “None of the evidence in this case was obtained in violation of the Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and, to the extent there was a violation, exclusion is not an appropriate remedy.” United States v. Sabo, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75327 (N.D. Ind. July 11, 2011).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant during a domestic dispute to look for a gun, and a drug dog was sent for. It was reasonable although it took 20 minutes to arrive. United States v. Smith, 645 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2011).*

Claim that a witness’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the trial court’s order to show the file he was testifying from [which is not error anyway] cannot be raised by a party because it is not his rights at issue. Gottschalk v. Gottschalk, 311 Ga. App. 304, 715 S.E.2d 715 (2011).*

Defendant was tried on the merits of a failure to identify himself case with the suppression motion included in the trial. The trial judge suppressed because the officer did not give a good basis for the stop, and then granted a directed verdict because there was no evidence. This acquittal was not collateral estoppel to a trial on subsequent charges for possession of methamphetamine because, inter alia, the first acquittal was not appealable by the state. This is an interesting and complex opinion on double jeopardy, Ashe v. Swanson, and collateral estoppel. York v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011):

In light of our discussion, we reaffirm the bottom-line result in Murphy as controlling where a defendant seeks to bar the relitigation of suppression issues on the basis of double jeopardy. That is, the State is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause from relitigating a suppression issue that was not an ultimate fact in the first prosecution and was not an ultimate fact in the second prosecution. We overrule appellant’s second ground for review.

To succeed in a post-conviction petition, the defendant must show that the motion would be granted, essentially by trying the motion to suppress in the post-conviction proceeding. In this case, only defense counsel was called on this issue, not the officer. Scott v. State, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 868 (November 22, 2011):

We need not address whether a motion to suppress should have been filed in this case because, after a careful review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to file such a motion. To meet his burden of showing prejudice, the Petitioner must establish that there is a reasonable probability that, had trial counsel filed a motion to suppress, the motion would have been granted. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Here, the Petitioner has failed to do so. Under the facts of this case, the Petitioner must have adduced sufficient facts to allow the post-conviction court to conclude that the second search was illegal, that is, not undertaken pursuant to one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. To the contrary, the facts in the instant case do not lead to such a conclusion.

The trial court found the search was by consent; therefore, no Strickland prejudice. State v. Mohler, 2011 Ohio 6121, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 5006 (5th Dist. November 28, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped with reasonable suspicion of being involved in a robbery. He consented first to looking through maps on the front seat visible to the officer. Then he consented to a search of his van. United States v. Farnell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136890 (E.D. Mo. November 8, 2011).*

Search of envelope finding cash by TSA, “[a]lthough it is a close question,” is lawful because TSA was looking for potential for “sheet explosives,” and there was no sign this was an investigatory search, distinguishing other cases. United States v. Rosales, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137405 (D. Minn. November 30, 2011):

Although it is a close question — particularly given the lack of detail about the discovery of the envelope and why the TSA agent looked inside of it — the Court concludes that the search of the envelope was lawful. “[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’ ….” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006). The government did not offer direct evidence of the condition of the envelope, but it is reasonable to infer that a standard, business-size envelope containing thousands of dollars of cash — as well as vehicle titles and photographs — would be quite bulky. It was thus reasonable for the TSA to take at least a cursory look in the envelope to confirm that it did not contain sheet explosives. In addition, unlike several recent cases in which courts have held that a TSA agent’s search went beyond the permissible scope of an airport-screening search, see McCarty, 648 F.3d at 836; United States v. Fofana, 620 F. Supp. 2d 857, 863-65 (S.D. Ohio 2009), here there is absolutely no evidence that the TSA agent’s search was motivated by anything other than legitimate security concerns. The agent did not know that Rosales was under surveillance or even that Rosales was suspected of criminal activity; in fact, the agent permitted Rosales to leave with his cash after the screening procedure was complete. The Court therefore finds that, in light of changes in technology since Kroll [481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973)] was decided in 1973, the search of the envelope was within the proper scope of an airport-screening search.

During an eviction where a locksmith picked a lock to let movers in, fraudulent identification documents were found, and the finder called the police who said to bring them in. It was still a private search. United States v. Jones, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137602 (W.D. Tenn. November 29, 2011).*

The stop of defendant’s car was with reasonable suspicion that it was involved in a bank robbery. After the stop, defendant’s three year old daugther was found in the car, and she was asked where they were coming from, and she pointed toward the bank. Asked if they were at the bank, she said yes. The registration of the car was expired, and its impoundment was valid. United States v. Brumfield, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137834 (N.D. Ga. February 17, 2011).*

Defendant consented because he wanted to show the police there was nothing amiss. The fact the consent form was not timely executed is irrelevant. United States v. Garcia, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137252 (E.D. N.Y. November 30, 2011).*

Defendant did not allege foundational facts for standing to contest a seizure of his mother’s van. He had the keys, but he needed to show permission. Still, the court denies the motion without prejudice to renew it and attempt to make a proper showing. United States v. Sinclair, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138154 (N.D. Cal. December 1, 2011):

In the instant case, Defendant has failed to establish that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the van. Though it is clear that Defendant possessed the keys to van, Defendant does not state how he obtained the keys or that he, in fact, had his mother’s permission to use the van. Nor does Defendant make any showing that he had the authority to exclude all others, except his mother, from using or accessing the van. Based on Defendant’s failure to make this foundational showing, the Court finds that Defendant lacks standing to challenge the search of the van belonging to his mother and denies his motion to suppress. E.g., [United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2006)] (affirming denial of motion to suppress where defendant failed to establish that he had “permission” to use the rental car). However, since it conceivable that Defendant could cure the foregoing deficiencies and make the requisite showing to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the van, the denial of his motion is without prejudice to renewal.

Whether property was lawfully or unlawfully seized is not the question in a Rule 41(g) proceeding for return. Defendant was entitled to return of property where he was acquitted of some counts and it wasn’t contraband. United States v. Crooker, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138234 (D. Mass. November 30, 2011).*

Officers went to defendant’s house to do a knock-and-talk about inappropriate text messages to a young girl. His daughter answered the door and said he was in the backyard. Officers saw him and he invited them into the yard. He consented to a search of his computer and house but contended he only agreed to one doing it, not three. He didn’t object, so his claim fails. United States v. Coulter, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138271 (E.D. Ark. November 30, 2011).*

Defendant failed to show he had standing to contest placement of a GPS on a stolen vehicle that was allegedly used in a bank robbery. United States v. Davis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145444 (D. Md. December 19, 2011):

Defendant asserted in his motion papers that “[a]t a hearing on this motion, the evidence will show that the defendant was not involved with the alleged theft of the automobile, and in fact he purchased the automobile from a third party months after the vehicle is alleged to have been reported stolen.” (ECF No. 57, at 10). No such evidence was presented at the hearing, however. The court raised the possibility that although Defendant had no standing to contest the placement of the GPS device, he might nevertheless have standing with respect to the monitoring of the movement of the Charger. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made this distinction in United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2011). In that case, the court held that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the placement of a GPS device on the undercarriage of his brother’s truck, but did have standing to challenge “the use of the GPS device to follow the truck’s path.” Hernandez, 647 F.3d at 220. That distinction was based, however, on the fact that the defendant was driving the truck with his brother’s permission. See id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 898 F.2d 1034, 1038 (5th Cir. 1990) (“where a person has borrowed an automobile from another, with the other’s consent, the borrower becomes a lawful possessor of the vehicle and thus has standing to challenge its search.”)). Here, Defendant has not established that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Dodge Charger or the monitoring of its movement on the highways. Thus, he lacks standing to bring his Fourth Amendment challenge, and the court does not reach the question of whether the Government’s search was reasonable.

While the officer had reasonable suspicion to pursue and stop defendant’s car, once they saw he was not the person identified in the radio report, he had to be let go. His subsequent crime, however, revived the reasonable suspicion, and a gun found in plain view was admissible. United States v. Galaviz, 645 F.3d 347, 2011 FED App. 0115P (6th Cir. 2011):

Although we agree that Webber had reasonable suspicion to pursue Galaviz’s car and to stop it to investigate whether it was the car involved in the robbery, once Webber observed Galaviz’s physical features and saw that he was a Hispanic male, and thus did not match the description of the robbery suspect as a black male or black female, the reasonableness of the suspicion was undermined. Indeed, Webber testified at the suppression hearing that Galaviz “looked like a Hispanic male,” and that he was able to clearly identify him as such in the available light. Webber further conceded that, because the robbery suspect identified in the radio transmissions was a black male or black female, identifying Galaviz as a Hispanic male constituted conclusive information that he was not a suspect in the robbery. See United States v. Jackson, 188 F. App’x 403, 410 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (holding that, even if police had probable cause to stop defendant’s car based on purported similarity to the suspect’s vehicle, they should have immediately released him once they saw that his “physical appearance differed significantly from that of the suspect”).

Officers had reasonable suspicion that a particular Nissan would be carrying drugs. While the car was described as black and this one was dark green, the court does not find that material enough a mistake to undermine the reasonable suspicion. United States v. Benavides-Garcia, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48644 (N.D. Ga. March 28, 2011).*

“‘[I]n the wiretap context, [the Fourth Amendment’s particularity] requirements are satisfied by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular conversations to be seized.’ United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 427 n.15, 97 S. Ct. 658, 50 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1977). [¶] Title III’s particularity requirements must be distinguished from the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirements. Id. Dubose’s case brings this distinction into sharp relief. Dubose does not allege that law enforcement’s wiretap application violated Title III’s particularity mandates, but, rather, the Fourth Amendment’s.” Identification of one telephone and drug trafficking conversations satisfied the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Gaines, 639 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 2011).*

Once defendant conceded that a third party with authority to consent permitted entry into the hotel room, the smell of narcotics was apparent to the officers, and, thus, a plain view. That supported a later search warrant. United States v. Bullard, 645 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011).*

The government’s application for a search warrant to search all electronic devices in the target’s possession without a filter team and permitting a plain view is denied as constituting a general warrant. In re United States’s Application for a Search Warrant to Seize and Search Electronic Devices from Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (apparently just unsealed):

This matter comes before the Court on the government’s application for a warrant to search the residence of Edward Cunnius, to seize any computers or digital devices (collectively “digital devices”) that may be located at the premises, and to search all electronically stored information (“ESI”) contained in any digital devices seized from Mr. Cunnius’ residence for evidence relating to the crimes of copyright infringement or trafficking in counterfeit goods. Specifically, in addition to the search of the residence and the seizure of digital devices, the application requests the authority for investigative officers to: (1) search all ESI contained in Mr. Cunnius’ digital devices and related to the use of the devices; (2) conduct the search without segregation by a filter team; (3) conduct the search without foreswearing the plain view doctrine; and (4) permit investigative agents to obtain a second warrant if, during the search of the ESI, the investigating and searching agents find evidence of crime outside the scope of the instant warrant. On February 7, 2011, the Court advised the Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) that the warrant, as presented, would not be granted. The United States has refused to accede to the Court’s view that a filter team and forswearing reliance on the plain view doctrine are appropriate, and indeed, required in this specific case. Accordingly, the AUSA requested the Court to file a memorandum opinion, so that the government can appeal. A copy of the requested warrant and affidavit in support is attached as Exhibit 1. That request has led to this opinion.

Because the government, in this application, refuses to conduct its search of the digital devices utilizing a filter team and foreswearing reliance on the plain view doctrine, the Court DENIES the application as seeking an overbroad or general warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the law of this Circuit.

Defendant entered a military base with a sign that said that any entering vehicles were subject to search. By continuing past the sign to the guard shack and not turning around, the defendant implicitly consented to a search of his car. In state cases, the state constitution controls. State v. Torres, 125 Haw. 52, 252 P.3d 1229 (2011).

Defendant was a registered sex offender, and his roommate was one too. The roommate told his PO that he saw child pornography on defendant’s computer, and that supported a search warrant for defendant’s computer. State v. Ollivier, 161 Wn. App. 307 (2011).*

A protective sweep was justified in this case, and marijuana and scales were found in plain view. United States v. Kemp, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142674 (S.D. Fla. November 20, 2010).*

The government’s three year delay in searching all 103 computers seized in a Medicaid fraud investigation was not unreasonable. Also, a pre-search protocol was not required. United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213 n. 95 (11th Cir. 2011):

The Bradleys and Bio-Med claim that resulting searches of Bio-Med servers for data were unconstitutional because they occurred almost three years after the servers were originally seized. We find nothing in the record that would lead us to believe that the search procedure was unreasonably delayed, for any reason. See, e.g., United States v. Gerber, 994 F.2d 1556, 1558-59 (11th Cir. 1993) (approving a delayed search, even after expiration of the search warrant, because officers acted reasonably). We find no error in the district court’s rejection of this claim.

Furthermore, we reject outright the Bradleys’ and Bio-Med’s claim that the searches were unconstitutional because the agents failed to obtain pre-approval from the district court of a search protocol before conducting the searches. Cf. United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding a wide-sweeping, keyword-based computer search reasonable where the defendants failed to “cite any binding case law that would lead us to conclude the procedures used in this case infringed defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights”).

The movement in the backseat was not necessarily a furtive movement, and the trial court granted the motion to suppress. “Without a firm statement from the testifying officer that a hand-to-hand exchange occurred, the legal standard found in Pettegrew is not met. As this court found in Pettegrew, ‘because the action of the men is consistent with innocent behavior, we resolve this case in favor of [defendant’s] Fourth Amendment rights.’” Affirmed. State v. Toles, 2011 Ohio 217, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 164 (8th Dist. January 20, 2011).*

An officer passed on information to a school principal that the defendant juvenile was dealing heroin. The principal’s search of the student was based on the school’s “zero tolerance policy” and not at the request of law enforcement and it was valid under T.L.O. In re K. K., 2011 Ohio 192, 192 Ohio App. 3d 650, 950 N.E.2d 198 (5th Dist. 2011), Discretionary appeal not allowed by In re K.K., 128 Ohio St. 3d 1501, 2011 Ohio 2420, 947 N.E.2d 683, 2011 Ohio LEXIS 1306 (Ohio, May 25, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense, and he had tattoos that suggested membership in a violent gang involved with drugs. He consented to a search of his car, and nothing was found. Officers then went to his house and did a knock and talk with his live-in girlfriend consenting to a search for drugs and some were found. The search was valid. State v. Arnold, 2011 Ohio 238, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 204 (2d Dist. January 21, 2011).*

Defendant’s traffic stop led to the officer smelling marijuana, and then defendant waived her Miranda rights. State v. Hardy, 2011 Ohio 241, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 197 (2d Dist. January 21, 2011).*