WA: Parole revo warrant is not governed by the Fourth Amendment; it is an administrative warrant

A Fourth Amendment warrant to arrest an alleged parole violator is not required. The warrant can be issued by a designated official of the parole board as an administrative warrant, and the statute required reasonable suspicion. State v. Barker, 256 P.3d 463 (Wash. App. 2011):

Moreover, unlike the Vargas-Amaya court, the Sherman court was required to address the constitutionality of its holding that an administrative warrant need not comply with the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. Sherman, 502 F.3d at 883. The court concluded that because searches and seizures of parolees generally are not subject to the requirements of the warrant clause, the Fourth Amendment does not require an administrative parole violator warrant to be supported by oath or affirmation. Sherman, 502 F.3d at 884.

Former RCW 9.94A.740 (2009) justified the issuance of the warrant here and implicates an administrative rather than judicial warrant. The statute’s plain language authorizes the secretary to issue a warrant to any offender who violates a community custody placement condition. See Sherman, 502 F.3d at 876 (“[s]ection 4213 expressly authorizes only ‘the Commission’ to issue a parole violator ‘warrant’ and thereby provides for an administrative warrant”) (emphasis in original). In addition, the statute omits any reference to Fourth Amendment requirements, stating only that community custody officers must have reasonable cause to believe a violation has occurred. See Sherman, 502 F.3d at 876-77 (distinguishing several other statutes and rules that express a “probable cause” requirement). Given the obvious limitations of Vargas-Amaya, we conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that the Fourth Amendment requires an arrest warrant for probationers to be issued by a detached and neutral magistrate based on facts set out by oath or affirmation. Under Sherman, an administrative warrant issued by a designated administrator without an oath or affirmation is constitutionally permissible. Sherman, 502 F.3d at 884.