CA3: Jury’s § 1983 verdict for defendants not supported by evidence, and new trial granted

Where the facts of the case showed clear liability, maybe the plaintiff should have moved for a directed verdict for the plaintiff, but he didn’t. Nevertheless, the verdict is set aside as contrary to the evidence, and a new trial is granted Alvin v. Calabrese, Alvin v. Calabrese (3d Cir. 2011)*:

To be sure, the similarities between the undisputed facts of Brown [448 F.3d 239] and this case, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Calabrese and Karp, are striking. Other undisputed facts — for example, that other police officers, not just a victim, were coming to identify Alvin and that Calabrese held onto Alvin’s identification while waiting for other officers — further the suggestion that Alvin was seized prior to his arrest. Given these undisputed facts, Alvin could have moved for judgment as a matter of law, citing our decision in Brown, as to this particular issue at the close of evidence. See Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 128 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that whether a seizure has occurred may be determined by a district court, as a matter of law, without resort to the jury). But he did not.

Even if the jury’s verdict was contrary to the great weight of evidence, the “stringent standard” necessary to obtain a new trial in these circumstances requires a showing that “the jury’s verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice” or that the verdict “cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience.” Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1076; Williamson, 926 F.2d at 1353. In light of our decision in Brown and the undisputed facts suggestive of a seizure, we believe the verdict cries out to be overturned. We thus reverse the ruling on Alvin’s motion for a new trial on his Fourth Amendment claim.