CA7: Administrative inspection stop without RS was pretext for drug search

Defendant showed that the administrative stop and inspection of this semi-truck was pretextual, without reasonable suspicion for the stop, and not in furtherance of the administrative program for truck inspections. Under Burger, pretext can be an issue. United States v. Martinez, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19808 (7th Cir. July 7, 2026):

An allegation that an officer abused such a scheme in this manner is, by another name, attacking that administrative inspection as pretextual. And given the risk of allowing administrative inspections to become a pretext for crime control, it makes sense why Martinez has asked us to focus on that question here. Burger, 482 U.S. at 716-17 n.27 (assessing whether “the instant inspection was actually a ‘pretext’ for obtaining evidence of respondent’s violation of the penal laws”); see also United States v. Knight, 306 F.3d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 2002) (recognizing the danger of allowing administrative inspections to become “pretexts for ‘crime control'” (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40)); Bruce, 498 F.3d at 1241 (“We share our sister circuits’ concern that the administrative search exception not be allowed to swallow whole the Fourth Amendment.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Johnson, 408 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting Burger “did not endorse a scheme that would allow a warrantless search based on recently discovered evidence that criminal activity had occurred” (citation omitted)).

We do not mean to say that pretext is irrelevant when an administrative scheme serves multiple goals. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 713-16 & n.27 (noting that inspection conducted pursuant to scheme serving administrative and penal ends was not pretextual). Instead, we merely observe that where an administrative scheme serves only non-criminal ends, an inspection under that scheme motivated only by the desire to find evidence of criminal activity is more obviously pre-textual.

Applying these principles here, for the government to show Muzzillo’s traffic stop was justified in its inception under the administrative inspection exception to the warrant requirement, the government must demonstrate two things. See United States v. Dixon, 137 F.4th 592, 605 (7th Cir. 2025) (noting the government bears the burden of proving warrantless searches’ reasonableness). First, it must show that the State’s regulatory scheme is reasonable under Burger. And second, it must show that Muzzillo’s purpose for undertaking the administrative inspection was not “pretext.” If the government can prove both elements, then Muzzillo’s stop was justified in its inception. But if Muzzillo’s sole purpose for the traffic stop was to obtain evidence of Martinez’s involvement in criminal activity, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant exception for an administrative inspection would not apply. Burger, 482 U.S. at 716-17 n.27 (maintaining a pretextual administrative inspection isn’t “truly” an administrative inspection). And because Muzzillo initiated the traffic stop without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, it would follow that the stop was unreasonable and thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment.