E.D.Cal.: Email seizure can be overbroad, but actual search has to be reasonably narrowed

In digital information searches, overseizure to start is permitted to facilitate the process, but the review of all that information has to be limited, and here it was. United States v. Flores, 802 F.3d 1028, 1044 (9th Cir. 2015). United States v. Evanovich, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3637 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2026):

In determining the breadth of a warrant the Court considers three factors: “(1) whether probable cause existed to seize all items of a category described in the warrant; (2) whether the warrant set forth objective standards by which executing officers could differentiate items subject to seizure from those which were not; and (3) whether the government could have described the items more particularly in light of the information available . . . .” United States v. Flores, 802 F.3d 1028, 1044 (9th Cir. 2015).

. . .

Defendant Evanovich argues that the warrant was overbroad as it permitted an overbroad seizure of digital information. Defendant argues that his complete search history, location history, photos, videos, contacts, calendar data, and voice queries are “manifestly irrelevant information” that the warrant permitted agents to seize. … Defendant argues the warrant lacks particularity as it “authorizes a general search” without including a “meaningful protocol for separating relevant from irrelevant information[,]” and because it leaves discretion in the determination of relevance to the executing officers.

The warrant here follows the approach that has been approved for usage in digital search cases. Flores, 802 F.3d at 1044-45. Under this warrant scheme, officers are first permitted to “over-seize” all data in an account and then required to perform a secondary search to determine what is relevant evidence that can lawfully be seized under the warrant. This approach reflects the reality of searches of digital accounts. The vastness of the data contained in most digital accounts, and the impossibility of determining what is relevant without examination of that data, makes it a necessity that warrants in such contexts permit an initial broad production. Id. at 1044. “‘Over-seizing’ is an accepted reality in electronic searching because there is no way to be sure exactly what an electronic file contains without somehow examining its contents.” Id. at 1044-45 (cleaned up). While there are recognized limits where over-seizing occurs, there is no indication that these are relevant here.

As structured, Section I of Attachment B to the warrant permitted officers to seek a production of data from the Google Account that was specifically limited in temporal scope based on the alleged crime at issue. … Officers were then only permitted to seize data that fell into specific categories of relevant evidence pre-designated in Section II of Attachment B. (Id.) Within this structure, the warrant was not overbroad. As discussed above, probable cause existed as to the Google Account, and the categories of information seized under Section II are well within the scope of that probable cause. Flores, 802 F.3d at 1044. The categories are also objectively described and could not have reasonably been described more particularly. Id.

While Defendant also argues that the time frame of data authorized for seizure by the warrant — May 20, 2022, to December 19, 2022 — was overbroad. … The Court disagrees. The period approved by the warrant was supported by the affidavit. …