S.D.N.Y.: Collective knowledge doctrine in CA2 only applies to warrantless searches, not a Franks challenge

Defendant’s Franks claim fails. The omitted allegedly exculpatory evidence either wasn’t material to the probable cause finding or wasn’t known by law enforcement at the time the warrant issued. In this circuit, the collective knowledge doctrine applies to warrantless searches, not warrants. Also, the Franks offer of proof is just conclusory. United States v. Combs, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89165 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2025)*:

… Combs says that “Fourth Amendment doctrine is generally governed by” the collective-knowledge doctrine, Dkt. 187 at 11, but in the Second Circuit, the doctrine has solely been applied to warrantless searches and seizures, not to a judge’s probable-cause determination when issuing a warrant. See Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 103 F. Supp. 3d 465, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (extending the collective-knowledge doctrine to exigent circumstance analysis while recognizing that “settled law in this Circuit” applies the doctrine only to “warrantless searches and seizures”). This makes sense, because the doctrine was developed to address fluid, evolving situations in the field where “mobile defendants” are pursued by “large police departments” equipped with “swift modern communication” technology. Colon, 250 F.3d at 135 (quoting Williams v. United States, 308 F.2d 326, 327, 113 U.S. App. D.C. 371 (D.C. Cir. 1962)). These are not the conditions under which judges decide whether to authorize search warrants, and Combs cites no case applying the doctrine in these circumstances.

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