HI: Stopping defendant of a dispersing group just because he was the easiest to stop was without RS

An officer came upon a group of 15+ men in an area known for drinking in public, and they dispersed quickly when the officer arrived, all except the defendant. He slowly walked to his car, and tried to drive away. The officer made him stop because he was the only one not to get away. He was found to be OUI. The stop was without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Tominiko, 126 Haw. 68, 266 P.3d 1122 (2011)* (concurring and dissenting opinions).

Defendant’s stop was based on two 911 calls about a shooting incident that were not played at the suppression hearing. The officers testified, however, to their ability to corroborate the information, including actually talking to one of the callers at her house about the incident. Basis of knowledge of both callers was shown. Commonwealth v. Perez, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 271, 952 N.E.2d 441 (2011)*:

The basis of knowledge test was satisfied with respect to both the first caller and the second caller. The officers testified that according to the dispatches they received, the first caller heard shots and the second caller observed the vehicle leaving the scene just after the gunshots. Firsthand observations would satisfy the basis of knowledge test. See ibid. While a 911 recording would likely have provided more information about the gunshots, a dispatch of a 911 call that gunshots had been heard at 17 Wilmington Avenue supports the inference that the report was based on personal knowledge or perception. See Commonwealth v. Ancrum, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 647, 652 (2006); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 212, 216 (2007). Indeed, as discussed below, when the police returned to 17 Wilmington Avenue and spoke with the initial caller, she stated that she had heard the gunshots. With respect to the second caller, her auditory perception was also buttressed by the specificity of information she relayed, reporting a license plate number that was later confirmed by the police. Thus, “it is reasonable to infer that the source of the information was a firsthand witness to the event and not a casual rumor.” Commonwealth v. Ancrum, 65 Mass. App. Ct. at 652.

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