E.D.Pa.: Stop without RS still leads to PC and no exclusion

The stop was without reasonable suspicion, but the court finds the subsequent search incident based on probable cause from the stop reasonable and refuses to apply the exclusionary rule. United States v. Harris, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97002 (E.D.Pa. May 31, 2022):

Under the good faith exception, the arrest of Mr. Harris and search incident to that arrest are not subject to the exclusionary rule. An officer may constitutionally arrest (seize) a person without a warrant, so long as that arrest is supported by probable cause. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976). Upon discovery of the “rack” of heroin in Mr. Harris’s sweatshirt, Officer D’Alesio rightly believed that he had probable cause. Thus, once he had the drugs, Officer D’Alesio had an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that his arrest of Mr. Harris was constitutional. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964) (“Whether [an] arrest was constitutionally valid depends. . . upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it.”); United States v. Laville, 480 F.3d 187, 194, 48 V.I. 1012 (3d Cir. 2007). The search of Mr. Harris incident to that arrest is not subject to the exclusionary rule for the same reason. Once Officer D’Alesio had arrested Mr. Harris, he could constitutionally search him incident to that arrest. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 449, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 186 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013).

Because Officer D’Alesio’s conduct after the Terry stop and frisk was constitutional, there would be no deterrent value to excluding the fruits of the arrest and search incident to that arrest. On the facts presented, there is no reason to think that Officer D’Alesio deliberately violated Mr. Harris’s constitutional rights and nothing to suggest Officer D’Alesio’s conduct was culpable. Thus, the suppression of the cash and cell phones would have no deterrent effect because suppression of the money and cell phones here would only be in reaction to a constitutional arrest and constitutional search incident to that arrest, not the unconstitutional Terry stop. In other words, there is no need to deter purely constitutional conduct. Therefore, the Court denies Mr. Harris’s motion to suppress insofar as it seeks to suppress the money and cell phones seized during Officer D’Alesio’s search of Mr. Harris incident to Mr. Harris’s arrest.

Similarly, application of the good faith exception to the subsequent search of Mr. Harris’s cell phones and residence is uncomplicated. Officer D’Alesio correctly believed that he could seize and retain Mr. Harris’s cell phones after recovering them incident to Mr. Harris’s arrest. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386, 388, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014). The police, operating on the DEA task force, later obtained search warrants based on probable cause for those phones before searching them. Gov. Exs. 8 & 9. The police also correctly adjudged this to be constitutional. Riley, 573 U.S. at 401. Likewise, the Philadelphia police officers’ search of Mr. Harris’s residence and seizure of certain items within based on a search warrant supported by probable cause was constitutional. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). Mr. Harris has not argued that the officers were “dishonest or reckless” in preparing their probable cause affidavits, id., nor has he argued that the warrant itself was so lacking in particularity that the officers should have declined to execute the warrant, Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068 (2004). Hence, once again, there is no unconstitutional conduct to deter and, therefore, the Court denies Mr. Harris’s motion to suppress insofar as it seeks to suppress the fruits of the searches of his cell phones and his residence.