E.D.Pa.: Abandonment was equivocal, but search valid by third-party consent

The government could not prove that defendant unequivocally intended to abandon his place because he might be coming back to it. However, the other person living there had apparent and actual authority to consent to the search and seizure. United States v. McKnight, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94353 (E.D. Pa. September 10, 2010)*:

Paige testified he left the apartment with no specific intent to return. The Government, however, did not meet its burden to show by clear and unequivocal evidence that Paige abandoned the apartment and all his property therein. Although Paige did not return to the apartment while he was staying at friends’ houses, and although his rent payments were significantly overdue, there is no evidence formal eviction proceedings had been commenced. His co-tenant, Walker, stated Paige continued to live in the apartment after she left the residence on December 20, 2009. Moreover, when asked whether he planned to never return to the apartment, Paige responded it was possible he would not return. Such an answer is too equivocal to provide clear proof Paige intended to abandon his property.

Officer responding to a shooting call at an apartment complex right after the call stopped the first car coming out, and that was with reasonable suspicion. The fact that there was another exit that the assailant could have been going out did not mean this stop was without reasonable suspicion. United States v. Williams, 619 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2010)*:

When Officer Hunt saw a lone vehicle hurriedly pulling out of a high-crime housing project in the middle of the night within seconds of a gunshot, it was eminently reasonable of him to suspect that the car’s occupants might have committed a crime. Accord United States v. Bolden, 508 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen an officer sees a solitary vehicle … leaving the precise spot where that officer has good reason to believe that multiple persons were shooting less than a minute before, it is more than a ‘hunch’ that those in the vehicle may be involved in the shooting.”); United States v. Henning, 906 F.2d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir. 1990) (concluding that reasonable suspicion justified the stop of a lone car, moving quickly, that “emerged from the general area of an early morning gunshot heard by officers only seconds earlier” in a high-crime area).

This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.