S.D.Ind.: Wife could consent to search of safe in her bedroom although she did not know combination

Defendant’s wife had apparent authority to consent to a search of a safe found in her bedroom although she did not know the combination to the safe. Her passport and car title were inside. [Comes close to justifying a search by its product.] United States v. Santana-Cabrera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41895 (S.D. Ind. April 28, 2010)*:

Essentially, Flores-Lopez’s argument boils down to a claim that, because Juaquina did not have access to, or control of, the safe, she could not consent to its search. This argument is not persuasive. First, in addition to containing $53,000 in cash and several firearms, the safe also housed, among other things, Juaquina’s passport and the title to a vehicle owned solely by Juaquina. Second, the safe’s location — in Juaquina’s bedroom — further rebuts Flores-Lopez’s argument that Juaquina did not have access to, or control over, it. Although it is true that Juaquina did not know the safe’s combination, that alone does not convince the Court that the safe was solely her husband’s property. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers were justified in believing that Juaquina had authority to consent, and did indeed consent to the search of the safe. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990).

[And why doesn’t it?]

Assuming the confrontation clause applies in a suppression hearing [don’t assume that], a signed consent to search form is not hearsay; it is an admission of a party opponent. United States v. Molina-Alfonso, 377 Fed. Appx. 850 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*