CA6: Alleged violation of discovery order by unauthorized possession of Jencks material justifies search of jail cell, not that there’s a REP in it anyway

Alleged violation of a protective order on discovery authorized a search of defendant’s jail cell and a search warrant for his mother’s home after he mailed it to her to copy and disseminate. The protective order itself justified the search of his cell. He also had no standing in his mother’s home to contest that search. United States v. Carson, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 35361 (6th Cir. Nov. 26, 2019):

Carson briefly asserts that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when authorities searched his jail cell and his mother’s house and seized Jencks material found there. A protective order issued by the district court demanded the return of Jencks material Butler had left with Carson in his jail cell in advance of trial. The government sought this protective order when it learned that Carson had unlawfully mailed the Jencks material to his mother and had asked her to copy it for dissemination to the media and various civil rights organizations. The Jencks material contained personal identifying information of third parties as well as a report of an unrelated incident about Deeb.

To the extent Carson complains about the legality of the searches, we note that the search of the jail cell was authorized by the protective order; moreover, Carson makes no claim contesting probable cause to conduct either search. Indeed, with respect to the search of his mother’s house, Carson admits that “[t]he government knew that Appellant’s mother had copies of the incriminating documents from a phone call he made to her from the jail.” More fundamentally, however, Carson has not established his standing to challenge the search of his mother’s home. He has not for example, attempted to show that he also lived there, see Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), and he can claim no reasonable expectation of privacy in the Jencks material he mailed to her, see United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[I]f a letter is sent to another, the sender’s expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery.”).

Similarly, Carson has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his jail cell. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (“[P]risoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and … the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells.”); see also United States v. Smith, 526 F.3d 306, 309 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[I]nmates … have no legitimate expectation of privacy from searches of their prison cells.”). To the extent that Carson argues he was deprived of materials taken from his cell that were not Jencks material, the record reflects otherwise. Discussing the seized material, the government informed the court, in Carson’s presence, that “[a]ll of the material that was reviewed, if it had nothing to do with Jencks, it was returned to Mr. Carson. Anything that was actual Jencks material turned over to him prior to the previous trial date was placed in an envelope and returned to Mr. Carson before [the court] started trial in this matter.” Carson did not object then and presents no evidence suggesting otherwise now. Carson’s Fourth Amendment claims fail.