Seven years before Carpenter, Salinas CA police violated statute in getting real-time CSLI and a trap and trace order to find defendant after a robbery. The statutory violation was negligence, but it was isolated and not systemic, and the other officers involved didn’t know about it. A search warrant obtained on that information was saved by the good faith exception. United States v. Chavez, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33210 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2019). This case has an excellent discussion of application of the good faith exception despite officer negligence in not knowing the law:
Finally, although Agent Franco’s belief that she could rely on the § 2703(d) electronic communication court order casts doubt on Agent Franco’s competence, it did appear to be a sincere belief. The Court found Agent Franco’s testimony credible. The Court does not doubt that Agent Franco’s mistaken views were held in good faith. Moreover, the Court recognizes that Agent Franco acted in a short period of time in a fast-paced situation that she considered to be urgent. Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has clarified that subjective good faith alone is not the test. See Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964). Were it, “the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.” Id.; see also United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We have no doubt that Officer Hill held his mistaken view of the law in good faith, but there is no good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for police who do not act in accordance with governing law.”).
In light of the above, the Court concludes that Agent Franco did not act in good faith when she relied on real-time cell-site location information from Skates’s cell phone to search for Skates and his residence on June 9, 2011.
2. The Salinas Police Department’s Warrant Was Obtained and Executed in Good Faith and the Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply
For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Agent Franco’s negligence was isolated and that Salinas Police Department officers did not have knowledge and may not be charged with knowledge of Agent Franco’s negligence. Thus, pursuant to Davis, any deterrence benefits from suppression do not outweigh the costs of suppression. See Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (“[W]hen the police act with objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Henderson, 906 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The exclusionary rule applies only when ‘police conduct [is] sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.'” (citing Herring, 555 U.S. at 144)); see also id. (“The exclusionary rule does not apply ‘when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor,’ because ‘the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.'” (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 908)). Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 170 (1978) (explaining that the exclusionary rule does not extend “beyond instances of deliberate misstatements, and those of reckless disregard” to instances where an officer was “merely negligent in checking or recording the facts relevant to a probable-cause determination.”); Krull, 480 U.S. at 348-49 (“[E]vidence should be suppressed ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.'” (citation omitted)).
In the sections that follow, the Court first discusses the significance of the Salinas Police Department having obtained a warrant. Second, the Court reviews the facts demonstrating that Salinas Police Department officers had no knowledge and may not be charged with knowledge of Agent Franco’s negligence. Third, the Court discusses why the isolated nature of Agent Franco’s negligence makes suppression inappropriate in this case. Finally, the Court discusses the good faith of the executing officers.
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c. Agent Franco’s Negligence Was Isolated from the Warrant, Rendering Suppression Inappropriate
Finally, having found that the facts demonstrate no knowledge or culpability on the part of the Salinas Police Department officers, the Court turns to the important question of whether the facts warrant application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Put differently, the Court addresses whether, in light of Agent Franco’s negligence, the Court should suppress. The Court concludes that suppression is not warranted under the facts of this case because Agent Franco’s negligence was isolated and that Salinas Police Department Officers did not have knowledge and may not be charged with knowledge of Agent Franco’s negligence.
Most recently, in Davis, the United States Supreme Court discussed its good faith cases to date, and explained that “when the police act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although the isolated negligence question was not at issue in Davis, the United States Supreme Court referenced its prior decision in Herring.
