W.D.N.Y.: Violation of state law on informant hearsay [erroneously] imported into federal prosecution

The court finds the search warrant issued without probable cause as to the informant hearsay under New York law, and a hearing will be scheduled to determine whether to exclude. [Considering that state law violations generally have no affect on Fourth Amendment considerations, this case appears to wrongly apply state law.] United States v. Chatmon, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152007 (W.D. N.Y. Aug. 29, 2018):

Therefore, a hearing is necessary to determine whether suppression is warranted. See Julius, 610 F.3d at 67 (“we remand for consideration of whether the deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary rule outweighs the cost of the rule’s application, for example, whether the degree of police culpability in this case rose beyond mere … negligence such that application of the rule is necessary to compel respect for the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees”). Since the government argues that “the detectives’ good faith reliance stemmed in part from their knowledge of the in camera testimony and the resulting probable cause” (government’s Response [29], p. 11, n. 2), I will be particularly interested in hearing from Detective Kent. “It is necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not only of the officers who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or who provided information material to the probable-cause determination. Nothing in our opinion suggests, for example, that an officer could obtain a warrant on the basis of a ‘bare bones’ affidavit and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances under which the warrant was obtained to conduct the search.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, n. 24.

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