MI: Inevitable discovery not applied where police not moving toward getting a search warrant

Michigan refuses to apply inevitable discovery where the police were doing nothing to get a search warrant because, to hold otherwise, “diminishes the Fourth Amendment and is an incentive for improper or careless police practice.” People v. Hyde, 285 Mich. App. 428 (September 1, 2009):

But even under this more expansive application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, we conclude that the evidence here should have been excluded. Although there was a high level of probable cause to obtain a warrant and the same evidence–Hyde’s blood–would have been obtained pursuant to the eventual warrant, it is obvious that the police were not in the process of obtaining a warrant when they secured Hyde’s invalid consent. Officer Williams did not understand the implied consent statute exception for diabetics and did not attempt to correct his mistake once Hyde’s blood sample was obtained.

Moreover, the line of reasoning that does not permit the doctrine to apply is particularly persuasive when placed in the context of Michigan’s three concerns with applying the inevitable discovery doctrine–independent legal means, inevitability of use of the legal means and discovery of the evidence, and incentive for police misconduct or significant weakening of Fourth Amendment protections. 34 Based on the facts here, there was an independent legal means to obtain the evidence by securing a search warrant. The discovery of the evidence was also inevitable because it is undisputed that Officer Williams would have done so had he realized his error. Also, there was easily enough evidence to establish probable cause based on Hyde’s erratic driving, admission that he had been drinking, and his failure of two sobriety tests. However, the damage that would be done to the Fourth Amendment and the incentive for police misconduct by adopting the inevitable discovery doctrine under these circumstances outweigh these considerations. To allow a warrantless search merely because probable cause exists would allow the inevitable discovery doctrine to act as a warrant exception that engulfs the warrant requirement. Even in the context of a good faith error, we reject the notion that a post-hoc probable cause analysis can preclude the constitutional requirement that a neutral and detached magistrate issue the warrant. Such an approach diminishes the Fourth Amendment and is an incentive for improper or careless police practice.