A probation search of “property, personal effects” reasonably includes a cell phone and its data. There are no limits on what “personal effects” means in the search condition paperwork. And, this was misdemeanor probation, and the search of the phone included text messages. People v. Sandee, 2017 Cal. App. LEXIS 791 (4th Dist. Sept. 13, 2017):
B. The Search of Sandee’s Cell Phone Was Within the Scope of the Search Conditions in Her Probation Orders
As we have explained, as a condition of probation in several misdemeanor cases Sandee agreed to “[s]ubmit person, vehicle, place of residence, property, personal effects to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause,” and the detective in this case relied on that probation search condition to conduct the warrantless search of Sandee’s cell phone. Accordingly, the question presented here is whether the warrantless search of Sandee’s cell phone was permitted under the probation search exception to the warrant requirement in that the search fell within the scope of the Fourth Amendment waivers in Sandee’s probation orders.
As our Supreme Court explained in Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d 600, when interpreting the scope of a Fourth Amendment waiver agreed to by the defendant as a condition of probation, the “waiver of [the defendant’s] Fourth Amendment rights must be interpreted on the basis of an objective test.” (Bravo, at p. 606.) Under this approach, “[t]he search condition must … be interpreted on the basis of what a reasonable person would understand from the language of the condition itself, not on the basis of appellant’s subjective understanding, or under a strict test in which a presumption against waiver is applied.” (Id. at p. 607.) The reason for this rule is that “[l]aw enforcement officers who rely on search conditions in probation orders, the probationer himself [or herself], and other judges who may be called upon to determine the lawfulness of a search, must be able to determine the scope of the condition by reference to the probation order. We cannot expect police officers and probation agents who undertake searches pursuant to a search condition of a probation agreement to do more than give the condition the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader. They can neither inquire into the subjective understanding of the probationer, nor analyze the condition in light of legal precedent drawing fine points based on minor differences in the wording of search conditions in other probation orders.” (Id. at pp. 606–607.)
For the purpose of our analysis, it is important to determine the appropriate timeframe for determining the reasonable meaning of the search condition in Sandee’s probation orders. We conclude that the proper inquiry focuses on what a reasonable, objective person would understand the search condition to mean at the time of the search. We reach this conclusion based on our Supreme Court’s focus in Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d 600, on the limitations of law enforcement officers who conduct the search. Bravo explained that an objective test is appropriate because officers “can neither inquire into the subjective understanding of the probationer, nor analyze the condition in light of legal precedent drawing fine points based on minor differences in the wording of search conditions in other probation orders.” (Id. at pp. 606–607.) If law enforcement officers cannot be expected to draw fine points based on legal precedent when interpreting the search condition’s reasonable meaning, those officers certainly cannot be expected to possess an understanding based on future legal developments.
Turning to the language of the probation search condition, we conclude that at the time the search was conducted a reasonable, objective person would understand it to encompass a search of Sandee’s cell phone. In the probation search condition, Sandee agreed to submit her “property” and “personal effects” to search at any time. The probation search condition is worded very broadly and contains no language whatsoever that would limit the terms “property” and “personal effects” to exclude Sandee’s cell phone or other electronic devices and the data stored on them. As a cell phone is indisputably the property of the person who possesses it and constitutes part of his or her personal effects, a reasonable person would understand the terms “property” and “personal effects” to include Sandee’s cell phone and the data on it.
I’ve been waiting to see one of these. My state adopted a broad suspicionless probation and parole search statute in the 2015 legislative session, and the police are really having fun with it. I’ve seen this question on list servs, and I always expected this outcome. More to the point: How can you avoid that outcome? A house is private as is a cell phone, and a house is subject to a parole or probation search without reasonable suspicion here. The only limit is “reasonableness”; i.e., they can’t trash the place. But what is “reasonable”? It’s whatever the court thinks it is that day.
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)