D.Kan.: Email and computer SWs were necessarily broad, but not unreasonably broad

“These were not warrants to search for ‘any and all information’ or ‘all computer information’ in defendant’s house. See Christie, 717 F.3d at 1165. Rather, the attachments effectively limited the scope of the searches to material relevant to specific federal crimes. Id. The warrants and attachments put officers on notice they were authorized to seize and search the devices for specified types of materials pertaining to the identified offenses. … Given the nature of the offenses alleged, there was necessarily a broad scope of relevant material, but the warrant cannot be faulted for failing to specify the items to be searched, the nature of the materials sought, or the object of the searches. In fact, defendant fails to explain how the warrants could have been more particular in authorizing a search that encompassed all of the potentially relevant records within defendant’s computers, cell phones, and internet accounts.” United States v. Henson, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96351 (D.Kan. June 22, 2017).

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