MO: RS of driving on a suspended DL requires real facts, not hearsay

When a police officer stops you and asks for your DL, any reasonable person would not think he’s free to leave. The officer’s claim that he knew two weeks earlier that defendant’s DL had been suspended had to be supported by real facts and not just hearsay he’d received back then, and the state failed on that burden. State v. Perry, 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 1027 (Oct. 18, 2016):

Officer Huber based her suspicion that Perry was driving with a suspended license on two articulable facts: the report she received two weeks prior from a fellow officer that Perry’s driver’s license was suspended, and her personal observation of Perry driving. Obviously, however, Officer Huber’s bare observation of Perry driving offered nothing to support her suspicion that Perry’s license was suspended. The sole and only source of Officer Huber’s belief that Perry’s license was suspended was Officer Maples’ report to that effect two weeks prior. The State was thus obligated to produce evidence persuasively establishing that Officer Maples’ suspicion was reasonable because it was supported by specific and articulable facts. Stated another way, we assess the reasonableness of Officer Huber’s reliance on the information she received from Officer Maples as if Officer Maples himself had made the investigatory stop of Perry.

The State did not sustain its burden of either production or persuasion on this essential point. The State presented no evidence beyond naming Officer Maples as the source of the information which motivated Officer Huber to stop Perry. No explanation was offered to explain how or why Officer Maples came to believe that Perry’s driver’s license was suspended. In short, there was no evidence that could have permitted the trial court to conclude that Officer Huber’s belief that Perry was driving with a suspended license was supported by reasonable suspicion. Compare Franklin, 841 S.W.2d at 644-45 (finding a Terry stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion where the record was silent about the source of information relayed to the arresting officer) with State v. Monath, 42 S.W.3d 644, 649-51 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (finding reasonable suspicion where the dispatcher, an intermediary officer, and the seizing officer all testified at the suppression hearing).

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