CA6: The govt fails on its burden on independent source after an illegal search; deterrence rationale of exclusionary rule applies

The police conducted an illegal search then got a search warrant. The District Court suppressed, and the Sixth Circuit affirms finding the government did not satisfy the independent source rule. Moreover, it finds the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule applies to this situation. United States v. Williams, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12645 (6th Cir. July 8, 2016):

The meaning of this statement is clear: officers illegally searched McCormick Place in order to gather probable cause for the subsequent warrant. This reading of the situation undermines Mitchell’s assurances that police would have sought a warrant irrespective of the illegal search. Presumably, if the key did not fit the door, there would not have been a later search. Thus, [*10] Mitchell’s testimony (when combined with the information’s subsequent inclusion in the warrant affidavit) provides the district court with a sound basis for finding that the illegal search prompted police to seek a warrant.

The fact that police waited to seek a warrant for McCormick Place until after officers discovered incriminating evidence as part of the illegal search only lends additional support to the district court’s conclusion. While it is certainly possible that the police may have still sought a warrant for McCormick Place even if officers found no incriminating evidence during the illegal search, the district court’s finding comports with the more plausible interpretation that “officers would not have chosen to return immediately to [McCormick Place] with a warrant to search had they not discovered [incriminating] evidence during the initial search.” Murray, 487 U.S. at 549 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Finally, we are satisfied that the district court’s suppression of the evidence seized at McCormick Place advances the deterrence function of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule. Indeed, a contrary finding would “emasculate[] the Warrant Clause” because it would give police the affirmative incentive to conduct illegal searches to ascertain whether probable cause exists for a subsequent warranted search. Id. at 544. The Fourth Amendment simply does not countenance such “an intolerable incentive for conducting warrantless searches.” Id. at 551.

Because the district court did not commit clear error in finding that the illegal search of McCormick Place prompted officers to seek a warrant, we need not consider whether the warrant affidavit, when excised of the information obtained in the illegal search, nevertheless established probable cause to search McCormick Place.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.