CA9: The exclusionary rule doesn’t apply in § 1983 cases

The exclusionary rule doesn’t apply in § 1983 cases, joining other circuits. Lingo v. City of Salem, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11708 (9th Cir. June 27, 2016) (amended Aug. 8, 2016):

Conversely, in a § 1983 suit, the need for deterrence is minimal. Here, application of the exclusionary rule would not prevent the State from using illegally obtained evidence against someone, but instead would prevent state actors merely from defending themselves against a claim for monetary damages. Exclusion of evidence in this context would not remove any preexisting incentive that the government might have to seize evidence unlawfully. It would simply increase state actors’ financial exposure in tort cases that happen to involve illegally seized evidence. In effect, § 1983 plaintiffs would receive a windfall allowing them to prevail on tort claims that might otherwise have been defeated if critical evidence had not been suppressed. Even if such application of the rule might in some way deter violative conduct, that deterrence would impose an extreme cost to law enforcement officers that is not generally countenanced by the doctrine. See Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The cost of applying the exclusionary rule in [the § 1983] context is significant … [a]nd the deterrence benefits are miniscule.”); Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1999) (observing that the availability of exclusionary rule in § 1983 cases “would vastly overdeter police officers and would result in a wealth transfer that is peculiar, if not perverse” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (“The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern.”).

For these reasons, federal courts of appeals have widely held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in § 1983 cases. See, e.g., Black, 811 F.3d at 1268; Townes, 176 F.3d at 145-46; Wren v. Towe, 130 F.3d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Machado v. Weare Police Dep’t, 494 F. App’x 102, 106 (1st Cir. 2012) (per curiam). We agree, and we join those courts now.

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