Summers rationale of detaining bystanders when executing a search warrant can apply to arrest warrants. Here, the target of the arrest warrant fled, and that justified the officers in detaining the others just in case of a risk of a violent reaction. State v. Williams, 2016 Ida. App. LEXIS 71 (June 16, 2016):
Although the concerns that arise when the police are serving an arrest warrant are somewhat different from the concerns that arise when the police are searching for evidence of a crime, see Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981), courts have applied the rationale in Summers to cases involving arrest warrants. United States v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 2003) (reasoning a limited seizure of a third party during a consent search for a fugitive is constitutionally reasonable); Way v. State, 101 P.3d 203, 209 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (holding officers have the authority to restrain third parties at a residence when executing an arrest warrant to prevent interference with the arrest, but officers have no basis for continuing the detention of the third parties after the arrest has been made); State v. Valdez, 68 P.3d 1052, 1056 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (holding the limited seizure of a third party during the execution of an arrest warrant is permissible). We see no reason not to apply the reasoning of these cases here.
In this case, the officers’ sole reason for approaching Williams and the other individuals outside the apartment was to execute an arrest warrant. Upon approaching the group, the subject of the arrest warrant fled and an officer pursued him. Because of this, the remaining officers were justified in taking precautions by detaining Williams to ensure the safety of the officers and the orderly conduct of the execution of the arrest warrant. Officers had been observing the apartment for thirty minutes and during that time, although only one person entered, the officers saw four people exit the apartment and stand by the door. Thus, it was reasonable for the officers to believe more people or weapons could be inside the apartment. Further, it was reasonable for the officers to initially detain Williams to ensure the safety of the officers. Additionally, it was reasonable for the officers to conclude that because they observed Williams with the subject of the arrest warrant, Williams was related to or friends with the suspect and as such, may attempt to assist him in escaping. During his detention, before the subject of the warrant was arrested, Williams was not handcuffed, patted down, or searched, and the initial detention lasted only three to four minutes. Because the detention was minimal and effectuated in order to obtain information, potentially prevent a suspect from evading the police, and ensure the safety of the officers involved, Williams’ initial detention was reasonable.
Williams’ initial detention ended once the subject of the arrest warrant was secured. As the officer returned to the front of the apartment to let the other officers know the subject had been arrested, he detected a strong smell of marijuana emanating from the apartment. The apartment owner then admitted to marijuana being in the residence. Accordingly, the officers had a new basis to detain Williams based on their reasonable suspicion that he was guilty of frequenting. Because of these new facts, the officers’ continued detention of Williams [*9] after securing the subject of the arrest warrant was reasonable based on specific, articulable facts justifying the suspicion of frequenting. Thus, Williams’ initial detention was properly extended based upon a new reasonable suspicion of frequenting.
Alternatively, Williams’ detention was a lawful investigatory detention based on the officers’ reasonable articulable suspicion that Williams committed, or was about to commit, a crime. The district court did not address whether it was lawful to detain Williams to investigate whether he harbored a fugitive. However, where a ruling in a criminal case is correct, though not based upon a correct reason, it still may be sustained upon the proper legal theory. See State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997). Williams conceded both below and now on appeal that the officers could lawfully detain him to investigate whether he was guilty of harboring a fugitive, but he argues his detention was nonetheless unreasonably prolonged.
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)