CA3: “Computer hardware” and “any equipment” in a child porn SW includes cell phones

“The warrant, as written, defines ‘computer hardware’ broadly. Horton does not and cannot argue that his cell phone is not ‘computer hardware’ as it is defined in the warrant, which includes ‘any equipment’ (emphasis added) capable of transmitting computer data. Additionally, the particularity requirement is satisfied: the basis for probable cause in the government’s warrant application was the existence of an electronic file containing child pornography, and while this file may have been initially traced to Horton’s computer, the scope of a lawful search is ‘defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.’ The language of the warrant reflects an awareness that, because electronic data can reside on multiple devices, a comprehensive search would include not only Horton’s computer, but also any devices capable of storing or transmitting computer data. Horton’s concerns about invading the privacy of a separate ‘conceptual dwelling’ are inapposite when there is probable cause to search the second ‘dwelling’ and doing so is within the plain terms of the warrant.” United States v. Horton, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1106 (3d Cir. Jan. 22, 2016).