LA3: The person who owned a document obtained by SW clearly has standing for its return

Somebody was denied a job at a hospital, and complained to the Jefferson Davis Parish Sheriff’s Office who sought a search warrant for the letter received that apparently caused the job denial. A judge pro tem issued the search warrant but got the letter and sealed it for the regular judge who ordered the search warrant quashed and the letter returned. The hospital had standing because it owned the letter. In re Matter under Investigation, 15-0509 (La.App. 3 Cir. Nov. 4, 2015) (unpublished):

In addition, when ruling on standing, “it is both appropriate and necessary to look to the substantive issues … to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.” Chicago Tribune Co. v. Mauffray, 08-522, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08), 996 So.2d 1273, 1279 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 1021 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1953 (1968)).

It is clear that JALH [the hosptial] has standing in this matter. It is the owner of the seized documents. “[A]n owner may seek return of seized property in the criminal proceeding even where the owner is not a defendant.? Delta Retail 45, L.L.C. v. Cox, 44,873, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/28/09), 26 So.3d 200, 204, writ denied, 09-2580 (La. 2/5/10), 27 So.3d 304. Moreover, JALH has an interest at stake in litigation which can be legally protected. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3715.3(A)(2) states that records of peer review committees of any medical organization:

[S]hall be confidential wherever located and shall be used by such committee and the members thereof only in the exercise of the proper functions of the committee and shall not be available for discovery or court subpoena regardless of where located, except in any proceedings affecting the hospital staff privileges of a physician, dentist, psychologist, or podiatrist, the records forming the basis of any decision adverse to the physician, dentist, psychologist, or podiatrist may be obtained by the physician, dentist, psychologist, or podiatrist only. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3715.3 “was designed to protect the confidentiality of hospital peer review committee records.” Gauthreaux v. Frank, 95-1033, p. 1 (La. 6/16/95), 656 So.2d 634, 634. In that JALH is seeking to recover documents that are defined as confidential by statute, it is clear that it has standing to recover said property. This assignment of error is devoid of merit.

A search of the jurisprudence of this State finds that prosecutions for criminal defamation are few and far between, to say the least. It is clear from the record that the Jefferson Parish District Attorney is not going to prosecute this matter as directly stated to the trial court by the District Attorney. Further, it is clear from reading the warrant issued that the affidavit it was issued upon was full of Mr. Ellender‘s mere conclusions about an opinion allegedly contained in a reference letter, rather than fact. The United States Supreme Court held that “[s]ufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3416 (1984) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2333 (1983)).

Moreover, the pro tem judge who issued the warrant almost immediately sealed the documents seized, evidencing that even he had concerns about the legality of the warrant, which sought information that was clearly protected by law. Ultimately, the pro tem judge who issued the warrant basically placed the matter on hold for the regular trial judge to return. It is clear that the trial judge who quashed the warrant would never have granted the warrant in the first place.²

2. The trial court noted in his reasons for judgment that if a search warrant were issued under the circumstances of this case, then search warrants would be requested every time someone did not receive a job or loan based on an allegedly bad review.

Sending this matter back to him in any capacity would only result in the same disposition after further waste of time and money. Based on the scant record before us, we can find no abuse of the trial court‘s discretion in making that finding, in quashing the warrant, or in returning the documents. Therefore, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

Note: And, one could easily surmise that a criminal defamation case violates the First Amendment.