The knock-and-announce rule in Pennsylvania exists by court rule, and it serves important interests. The remedy for violation is suppression of evidence. Pennsylvania does not follow Hudson v. Michigan. Commonwealth v. Frederick, 2015 PA Super 206, 2015 Pa. Super. LEXIS 553 (September 25, 2015):
“The purpose of the ‘knock and announce’ rule is to prevent violence and physical injury to the police and occupants, to protect an occupant’s privacy expectation against the unauthorized entry of unknown persons, and to prevent property damage resulting from forced entry.” Chambers, 598 A.2d at 541. The purpose of the rule may be achieved only through police officers’ full compliance. See id. Indeed, our Supreme Court has held that “in the absence of exigent circumstances, forcible entry without announcement of [identity, authority and] purpose violates Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures.” Carlton, 701 A.2d at 148 (“In a free society, the mere presence of police does not require an individual to throw open the doors to his house and cower submissively before the uniformed authority of the state.”). Our Supreme Court has determined that “the remedy for noncompliance with the knock and announce rule is always suppression.” Crompton, 682 A.2d at 290 (emphasis added).
During a suppression hearing, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that the police seized evidence without violating defendant’s constitutional rights. Id. at 288. “The Commonwealth can satisfy its burden by establishing either that the police complied with the knock and announce rule or that the circumstances satisfied an exception.” Id. (emphasis added).
With the foregoing principles in mind, we now address Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in denying the remedy of suppression sub judice upon its determination that a knock and announce violation took place in the Second Case. As noted earlier, here the trial court correctly concluded that the police officers violated the knock and announce rule. The facts of this case indicate that the police failed to announce their identity, authority and purpose until after they opened the back door to Appellant’s residence.
As we noted above, “the remedy for noncompliance with the knock and announce rule is always suppression.” Crompton, 682 A.2d at 290 (emphasis added) (concluding that this Court “was in error when it found the police violated the knock and announce rule but did not suppress the seized evidence”). Here, the trial court denied the remedy of suppression based on its conclusion that no constitutional rights were implicated and that the police officers did not act in bad faith. We disagree. In Crompton, our Supreme Court explained that a knock and announce violation always infringes upon a defendant’s fundamental rights guaranteed under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. Also, the trial court’s determination that it can deny the remedy of suppression for a knock and announce rule violation based on its finding that the police officers did not act in bad faith is bereft of any legal support. The trial court does not cite any cases in support of this bad faith proposition and our review of the law yields none. To the contrary, it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution, a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not exist. See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887, 888 (Pa. 1991) (rejecting the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), and concluding that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would frustrate the guarantees embodied in Article I, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution); see also Commonwealth v. Arnold, 2007 PA Super 248, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing Edmunds for the proposition that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not exist under the Pennsylvania Constitution). Accordingly, consistent with Chambers, Means, Crompton, and Carlton, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the sawed-off shotgun in connection with the Second Case after it determined that a knock and announce violation occurred.