KS: Reasonable mistake of fact found from speeding stop where defendant wasn’t actually speeding

Defendant was stopped for going 28 in what the officer fairly believed was a 20 zone, “‘more years than anyone knew.’” The officer was a life long resident of the city. In reality, the speed limit had been raised to 30, but the sign had been knocked down. The court concludes that it was all a reasonable mistake of fact and law and refused to suppress the fact defendant was found under the influence. City of Atwood v. Pianalto, 2015 Kan. LEXIS 352 (May 22, 2015):

In State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 982 P.2d 954 (Ct. App. 1999), the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed a situation similar to Pianalto’s case. In McCarthy, an officer observed defendant pass through an intersection at approximately 45 miles per hour. The officer mistakenly believed a 25 miles per hour speed limit sign was posted before the intersection, but it was actually posted after the intersection. The parties disputed whether the mistake was one of fact or law. The court reasoned:

“We think … that the mistake involved here was one of both fact and law. The officer was mistaken about the fact of the speed limit sign’s location and about the law regarding the speed limit applicable on [the roadway]. These two mistakes are inextricably connected, for the placement of the stop sign determined the applicable speed limit.” 133 Idaho at 124.

The court concluded it was unnecessary to determine whether it would permit reasonable suspicion to arise from a reasonable mistake of law because no evidence had been presented to demonstrate the officer’s mistake was a reasonable one. 133 Idaho at 125.

Having concluded this was a mistake of fact, we turn to whether that mistake was objectively reasonable. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539. In mistake of fact cases, courts consider the “reasonableness of an officer’s actions using an ‘objective standard’ that takes the ‘totality of the circumstances’ and the ‘information available’ to the officer into account[,]” disregarding the officer’s “‘actual motivations or subjective beliefs and intentions.'” United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir. 2009). “That an officer’s suspicions may prove unfounded does not vitiate the lawfulness of a stop ….” 557 F.3d at 1134. “[M]istakes of fact are rarely fatal to an officer’s reasonable, articulable belief that an individual was violating a traffic ordinance at the time of a stop ….” United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398 (3rd Cir. 2006).

Pianalto argues the mistake was not objectively reasonable because, for various reasons, he believes the officer knew or should have known about the sign having been knocked down: The officer would have driven past the downed sign prior to the stop; another officer had reported the downed sign to a dispatch operator prior to the stop; and that other officer was present at the traffic stop. And Pianalto further argues the other officer’s knowledge should be imputed to the arresting officer. But these claims are not borne out by the record.

First, the arresting officer testified he was driving in a direction away from the downed sign when he pulled Pianalto over and did not testify that he had passed or noticed the downed sign at any point prior to the stop, and the district court did not find that he had. Second, although Pianalto testified a second police officer (who knew the sign had been knocked down) arrived at the stop after he had been pulled over, the record is clear that the officer who initiated the stop did so before the other officer arrived on the scene. There was no evidence any person who knew the sign had been knocked down shared that information with the arresting officer. Finally, Pianalto’s assertion that he raised his imputed-knowledge argument in the district court is belied by the record. Nowhere in his oral arguments or brief to the district court did he make this claim. The panel correctly found this imputed-knowledge argument was never made to the district court. Pianalto, 2014 WL 642203, at *4-5.

In this case, the officer’s reliance on the false, but normally true, fact that a speed limit sign was in place was objectively reasonable. The district court found the speed limit had been 20 miles per hour on North Lake Road for “more years than anyone knew.” And the evidence established that signs displaying the 20 miles per hour limit are normally in place on both ends of the road. Nothing in the record indicates the officer had any reason to doubt the continuing existence of the normal condition.