IL follows Heien in a stop under an ambiguous traffic code section; it was a reasonable mistake of law

The court grapples at length with whether a trailer hitch blocking a LPN is an offense and concludes that the statute is ambiguous, and the defendant can’t be convicted for that traffic offense. On the larger question, however, the court finds that the ambiguous nature of the statute made the officer’s mistake of law reasonable under Heien, which the court follows, despite the defense argument that Illinois applies its exclusionary rule more expansively than SCOTUS. People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, 2015 Ill. LEXIS 502 (May 21, 2015):

[*P51] Defendant contends that this is such an instance. Defendant observes that Illinois’s exclusionary rule has traditionally been interpreted more broadly than its federal counterpart. See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 675 N.E.2d 604, 221 Ill. Dec. 409 (1996) (declining to follow Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987), which recognized a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule when a search was conducted pursuant to a statute later held unconstitutional). Defendant maintains that, because this court “has historically been disinclined to extend the good-faith exception [to the exclusionary rule] to the same degree as the Supreme Court,” we should decline to adopt “the extended good-faith exception created by Heien.” To do so, defendant argues, “would drastically change Illinois constitutional law.”

[*P52] There is a fundamental flaw in defendant’s reasoning. As the State points out, Heien did not address whether the exclusionary rule required suppression of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal seizure. That is a question that goes to the issue of the proper remedy for a fourth amendment violation. See, e.g., People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 227, 860 N.E.2d 178, 307 Ill. Dec. 524 (2006) (“The question of whether to exclude evidence, however, is a separate question from whether the search is legal.”). Rather, Heien held that the seizure, itself, was reasonable because the police officer initiated the vehicle stop based on an objectively reasonable, though mistaken, belief that the defendant’s conduct was illegal. Thus, there was no constitutional violation to begin with. Heien, 574 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 539 (where a seizure is supported by an objectively reasonable mistake of law, there is “no violation of the Fourth Amendment in the first place”). Heien did not extend the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Therefore, the fact that Illinois’s exclusionary rule is broader than its federal counterpart, or that this court has previously declined to recognize certain exceptions to the exclusionary rule, provides no basis for departing from Heien.

[*P53] Defendant has failed to demonstrate why the holding of Heien is contrary to any long-standing state traditions or values, and we are persuaded by the Heien court’s analysis. We conclude, therefore, that an objectively reasonable, though mistaken, belief as to the meaning of a law may form the basis for a constitutionally valid vehicle stop under our state constitution. For the reasons noted previously, it was objectively reasonable for the officers in this case to believe that the trailer hitch violated section 3-413(b). Consequently, we find that the traffic stop in this case was constitutionally valid under both the state and federal constitutions. For this reason, we must reverse the appellate court’s judgment and affirm the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress.