NE deals with this issue for the first time: Handcuffs do not automatically convert a stop on reasonable suspicion into an arrest

In Nebraska’s first case on the issue: Handcuffs do not automatically convert a stop on reasonable suspicion into an arrest. State v. Wells, 290 Neb. 186, 2015 Neb. LEXIS 34 (February 20, 2015):

This court has not discussed under what circumstances the use of handcuffs would transform an investigatory detention into a custodial arrest. The use of handcuffs has been approved when it was reasonably necessary to protect officer safety during an investigative stop. For example, in United States v. Thompson, the defendant attempted to reach inside his coat pocket several times while an officer was performing a Terry frisk. The officer warned the defendant to stop or else he would place him in handcuffs. After the defendant again tried to reach in his pocket, the officer put the defendant in handcuffs. The Ninth Circuit held that the use of handcuffs was a reasonable precaution for officer safety and did not transform the stop into a custodial arrest. And in United States v. Purry, an officer detained a suspected bank robber. The officer placed the suspect in handcuffs after the suspect “‘turned and pulled away'” when the officer put his arm on the suspect. The District of Columbia Circuit determined that given the circumstances, the use of handcuffs constituted reasonable force and did not transform the stop into a custodial arrest.

But the use of handcuffs may not be justified when the facts do not justify a belief that the suspect may be dangerous. In State v. Williams, an officer was dispatched to investigate a burglar alarm sounding inside a nearby home. The officer noticed a car parked outside the front of the house, and as the officer approached, the car’s headlights turned on and the car began to move. The officer pulled his patrol car in front of the vehicle and instructed the defendant to get out of the car. The officer then handcuffed the suspect and put him in the back of his patrol car. The Washington Supreme Court determined that the use of handcuffs could be appropriate under certain circumstances, but was not a reasonable precaution in this situation, because “[h]e did not threaten the police nor did the facts of the alleged crime justify assuming that the suspect was armed or likely to harm the police.” The use of force in that situation exceeded the scope of the Terry stop.

Whether the detention was reasonable under the circumstances in this case depends on a multitude of factors. We find useful those factors listed in United States v. Jones, an Eighth Circuit case examining the reasonable use of force during a Terry stop, including

the number of officers and police cars involved, the nature of the crime and whether there is reason to believe the suspect might be armed, the strength of the officers’ articulable, objective suspicions, the erratic behavior of or suspicious movements by the persons under observation, and the need for immediate action by the officers and lack of opportunity for them to have made the stop in less threatening circumstances.

The officers blocked the defendant’s car from moving and unholstered their weapons while the defendant was out of their sight. The defendant argued that blocking the car and the use of weapons constituted a custodial arrest. The Eighth Circuit determined that the officers’ use of force was reasonable and did not transform the investigatory stop into a full-blown arrest. In this case, we find that the district court did not err in its determination that the detention constituted an investigatory stop. The record indicates that Cronin detained Wells in a reasonable manner under the circumstances, which stopped short of a full custodial arrest. Cronin had a strong suspicion Wells was in possession of a controlled substance. As Cronin approached the car, he witnessed Wells appear to be digging into his pocket, and when Cronin arrived at the car, Wells’ right arm was concealed underneath his jacket. The nature of Wells’ suspected crime, trafficking narcotics, further justified Cronin’s action. In Cronin’s past experience as a member of the Lincoln/Lancaster County drug task force, he knew that narcotics users and traffickers often carry weapons. Also, the suspects outnumbered the investigators at the scene and Parker was on the other side of the car at the time of detention. Based on Wells’ furtive movements and his apparent attempt to conceal something, Cronin had an immediate need for action. It does not appear that Cronin could have made the stop and, at the same time, ensured his safety in a less threatening manner. Finally, we note that Wells was detained only for a brief period of time before he allegedly assaulted Cronin and was placed under arrest. Considering these circumstances, we conclude that Cronin’s decision to gain control of Wells’ arm and handcuff him while Cronin conducted his investigation was a “reasonable precaution … to protect [officer] safety and maintain the status quo.” (footnotes omitted)

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