The CI’s statement here was uncorroborated and 3-4 months old. Thus, the search warrant lacked probable cause and it was so lacking in probable cause, that the good faith exception cannot apply. Cartwright v. State, 2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 107 (February 25, 2015):
[29] The informant’s admission is not irrefutable evidence of criminal liability, particularly because he had not been charged with a crime and the admission was offered three to four months after the fact, without any independent evidence. Indeed, Detective Fortune declined to arrest the informant after the interview because he “didn’t have any evidence” of the informant’s alleged admitted crimes, thus indicating that the detective believed that the informant’s mere statements were insufficient to support a criminal charge. Tr. p. 33. Furthermore, in the portion of the affidavit where Detective Fortune explained why he believed the informant to be credible, Detective Fortune cited the informant’s description of the location of Cartwright’s home, not the informant’s admission of criminal activity, as proof of reliability.
[30] Under these circumstances, a reasonable person in the informant’s position could have concluded that, without any independent investigation or corroborating evidence from law enforcement, he or she was unlikely to be subjected to criminal liability for admitting to buying methamphetamine in the past. Argumentative and to the contrary, a person in the informant’s position could conclude that assisting in an Indiana methamphetamine investigation might result in favorable treatment in the pending Illinois criminal matter. We cannot conclude that the informant’s statements were sufficiently against his penal interests to establish his credibility.
[31] In the absence of proof of the informant’s credibility or corroboration under the totality of the circumstances, the informant’s hearsay statements were insufficient to establish probable cause, and the trial court should not have issued the search warrant. See Hayworth, 904 N.E.2d at 697 (affidavit did not establish probable cause for a search warrant where informant’s claims were uncorroborated).
[32] Nevertheless, lack of probable cause does not automatically require the suppression of evidence obtained during a search. Id. ….
. . .
[35] Detective Fortune testified at the suppression hearing that he withheld the fact of the informant’s incarceration not out of any intent to mislead, but rather out of concern that the information would reveal the informant’s identity and place him in danger. In any event, we conclude that the good faith exception is inapplicable here because Detective Fortune’s affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render an official belief in the existence of the warrant unreasonable. The informant gave Detective Fortune information that was at least three to four months old. The officers corroborated only facts that were readily available to the general public, i.e., observing an RV parked at the home. They did not attempt to confirm the informant’s claim of an ongoing methamphetamine dealing operation by placing surveillance on Cartwright’s property. In addition, Detective Fortune also relied on his stale four-year-old prior observation of Cartwright’s home, which had been rebuffed by the prosecutor for lack of probable cause. The officers’ reliance on a warrant issued on essentially uncorroborated hearsay from an anonymous informant was objectively unreasonable. See Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 186.
[36] In the absence of probable cause justifying a search warrant, the officers’ search of Cartwright’s home violated his federal and state constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence obtained as a result of the search. See id.; see also Dolliver v. State, 598 N.E.2d 525, 529 (Ind. 1992) (search warrant unsupported by probable cause where police did not independently corroborate informant’s statements, so the subsequent search violated defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights and the evidence was inadmissible). The erroneously admitted evidence includes Cartwright’s incriminating statements in the police car and the transcript of his post-arrest questioning at the jail, because the statements were the fruit of his arrest, and being informed of his Miranda rights prior to confessing in the police car and at the jail did not purge the taint of the unconstitutional search. See, e.g. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 271 (Ind. 2013) (defendant’s confession to possession of marijuana was not admissible where it was not an act of free will and did not purge the taint of unlawful detention).
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)