KS: Despite coerced consent for blood draw, no exclusionary rule for DL suspension proceeding

The threat to get a BAC warrant here lacked a legal basis under the statute, so defendant’s consent was coerced. The exclusionary rule does not apply in administrative driver’s license suspension proceedings. The court also disagreed with another panel of the same court over statutory construction of the implied consent statute. Hoeffner v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, 2014 Kan. App. LEXIS 69 (September 12, 2014):

Based on the implied consent statute itself, the well-established precedent from our Supreme Court, and the public policy underlying implied consent principles, we conclude an officer is prohibited from obtaining a search warrant to extract blood after a person has refused to consent to a request to submit to blood-alcohol testing. Given this conclusion, the officers in this case erroneously informed Hoeffner that they could obtain a search warrant to involuntarily extract blood from him for purposes of alcohol testing if he did not change his mind and voluntarily submit to testing. Because the officers did not have legal grounds upon which to obtain a warrant, we necessarily construe the officers’ threat to obtain a warrant as unlawful coercion that invalidated Hoeffner’s consent. See State v. Brown, 245 Kan. 604, 612, 783 P.2d 1278 (1989). Because Hoeffner did not voluntarily consent to the testing upon which the decision to suspend his driver’s license was based, we next turn to the issue of remedy.

Remedy

A Fourth Amendment violation does not automatically trigger the exclusionary rule; rather, the rule applies only where the benefit of deterrence outweighs the rule’s “‘substantial social costs.'” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 [1984]). Critical to the outcome of this case, our Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied in administrative driver’s license suspension proceedings arising out of an arrest for driving under the influence. Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 641, 646, 176 P.3d 938 (2008). This is because the deterrent purpose of the rule in fostering constitutionally correct conduct on the part of government agents may be sufficiently assured by excluding evidence from any related prosecution for the DUI offense itself. 285 Kan. 625, Syl. ¶ 8. Thus, even if the officer violated Hoeffner’s constitutional rights in obtaining the breath test after his refusal, the test results reflecting that Hoeffner had an alcohol concentration of .08 or greater in his blood were admissible in both administrative and court proceedings relating to the suspension of his driver’s license. As such, we find substantial competent evidence supports the district court’s decision to uphold the suspension of Hoeffner’s license.