An officer firing an assault rifle into a fleeing stolen car operated at high speeds by a suicidal armed man did not commit a constitutional violation. There was no constitutional obligation on the part of the officer to use less than deadly force to stop him considering all the facts and circumstances. Thompson v. Mercer, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15241 (5th Cir. August 7, 2014):
Any suggestion that the threat to the officers had already passed is equally unpersuasive. The Thompsons contend that Mercer’s decision was unreasonable at the time it was made because Keith’s “truck didn’t pose a sufficient threat of harm, especially after Mercer had struck the radiator with three bullets ….” But the Thompsons’ argument counterfactually presumes that Keith was only a threat to the extent that the truck was operational. Yet the truck was not the only deadly weapon at Keith’s disposal. On the contrary, it is undisputed that he was in possession of a stolen firearm and that Mercer was aware of that fact. No one knows whether Keith had any intention of using the gun, but assume for the purposes of summary judgment that he did not. Even so, Mercer had no way of ascertaining Keith’s intent, and there was no visible sign of surrender. Given that this unidentified suspect was admittedly suicidal and had already acted with utter desperation in attempting to evade law enforcement, Mercer was justified in assuming that there was an ongoing “threat of serious harm to the officer or others,” even if Keith’s vehicle was already disabled. Carnaby, 636 F.3d at 188; see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2014) (rejecting argument that officer’s firing of 15 rounds constituted excessive force because “if police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the threat has ended”).
The Thompsons nevertheless contend that—to whatever extent law enforcement was in danger—the officers created that danger by trying to intercept Keith’s vehicle. The argument is wholly without merit. This court has consistently rejected similar reasoning. E.g., Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting argument that officers would not have been in danger if they had acted differently). The question is not whether “the force would have been avoided” if law enforcement had followed some other “police procedures.” Id. at 1275-76 (quoting Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1352 (5th Cir. 1985), reh’g denied, 778 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1985)). Instead, “regardless of what had transpired up until the shooting itself,” the question is whether “the officer [had] reason to believe, at that moment, that there was a threat of physical harm.” Id. at 1276. As already explained, the requisite threat was present here. Ultimately, it was Keith—not the officers—”who intentionally placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight that ultimately produced the choice” that Sheriff Mercer had to make. Scott, 550 U.S. at 384.
Finally, there is little merit in the Thompsons’ assertion that law enforcement was constitutionally required to continue lesser efforts to disable the vehicle. Officers from three agencies had already tried to intercept and disable the vehicle four times. They tried to deploy stop sticks on the interstate, and a deputy later fired a shotgun at Keith’s tires. These attempts were unsuccessful in part because officers had to remain mindful of the welfare of the pursuing officers and other motorists. The record suggests that Sheriff Mercer was the last one who could intercept Keith’s vehicle before he headed into the town of Lone Camp, which the Thompsons describe as “approximately a mile” away. It seems clear that law enforcement reasonably attempted alternate means of seizure before resorting to deadly force. Given the circumstances and the egregious nature of Keith Thompson’s flight, there was no Fourth Amendment violation in that decision.
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)