CT declines to require warrant for closed containers under automobile exception

CT declines to require separate warrant requirement for containers under the automobile exception under its state constitution. Virtually all states are in accord under their state constitutions. State v. Williams, 2014 Conn. LEXIS 104 (April 29, 2014):

With respect to sister states, we conclude that the weight of the decisions from those states does not support the defendant’s position. Twenty-two states have considered the constitutionality of a search of a closed container under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement pursuant to their state constitutions. Thirteen states have either explicitly or implicitly followed the Ross line of cases.8 The states that have expressly determined that a search of a container in a vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception is constitutional under their state constitutions have found federal precedent persuasive; see People v. Smith, 95 Ill. 2d 412, 422, 447 N.E.2d 809 (1983); State v. Bouchles, 457 A.2d 798, 802 (Me. 1983); or have historically interpreted their search and seizure provisions consistent with the fourth amendment to the United States constitution. See Berry v. State, 155 Md. App. 144, 175-78, 843 A.2d 93, cert. denied, 381 Md. 674, 851 A.2d 594 (2004); People v. Levine, 461 Mich. 172, 178-79, 600 N.W.2d 622 (1999); State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 137-38, 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988); Callaway v. State, 954 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Wyo. 1998). Even in Massachusetts, which recognizes that its state search and seizure provision affords greater protections than the fourth amendment, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 907, 556 N.E.2d 69 (1990), did not find any “compelling reason why closed containers found in an otherwise lawful warrantless search of a motor vehicle should come within this special category where [the state constitution] and [f]ourth [a]mendment law diverge.” These states have observed that interpreting the state search and seizure provision differently from the fourth amendment in this context would “force the police in every motor vehicle search that turned up a closed container to impound and secure the vehicle while a warrant is obtained . . . not an unobtrusive procedure from the point of view of the defendant’s privacy. Such a rule would unnecessarily burden the police and criminal justice system, while providing defendants with insignificant protections against privacy intrusions.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 908.

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