ID: Probation could seize work laptop but employer can object to its search; SW on PC required to search work computer

Defendant was on probation for forgery. His PO came to his house and found him in possession of a laptop computer, provided by defendant’s employer for his work. The PO seized the laptop and wanted to search it because he had reason to believe defendant traveled in violation of his conditions. The defendant consented, but the employer revoked consent under Randolph. The employer filed a motion for return of the computer in the probation case. The court still had jurisdiction over defendant’s probation to do something, and it was proper for the employer to file a state Rule 41 motion for return of the property. While the laptop is not ordered returned, the state needs a search warrant to search the laptop because it’s the employer’s. State v. Ruck, 2013 Ida. LEXIS 303 (November 26, 2013):

The issue with respect to Employer’s motion for the return of the laptop was whether the laptop was illegally seized, not whether the State could search the laptop. However, in its decision, the district court assumed that the State had the right to search the laptop. It wrote, “If the parties cannot reach an agreement regarding the method of searching the computer, the Court will entertain a motion for a protective order which would allow the information on the computer to be submitted to the Court under seal.”

As a result, Employer has raised on appeal the issue of whether the State has the right to search the laptop without a search warrant. The interest protected by the Fourth Amendment injunction against unreasonable seizures is quite different from the interest protected against unreasonable searches. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328. Thus, holding that the seizure was not illegal does not mean that the State can automatically search the laptop without a search warrant.

Employee’s condition of probation requiring that he consent to searches and the relevant provision in the Agreement of Supervision do not address consenting to the search of personal property owned by a third person. It is clear that Employee had authority to consent to the search of the laptop because Employer had given him possession of the laptop and authorized him to take it wherever he desired, including to his home. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728, 731, 40 P.3d 86, 89 (2002). It is not clear whether Employee did consent to a search of the laptop. There is no evidence that the probation officer expressly asked for his consent. The officer merely asked for the password, which Employee gave her.

The officers did not search the laptop while they were at Employee’s home, and apparently have yet to search it. Because Employer is the owner of the laptop, it can revoke any consent allegedly given by Employee. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006). Because Employer is not on probation, there is no basis for reducing the standard required for a search of the laptop. Therefore, the State cannot search the laptop without a warrant issued based upon a judicial determination that there is probable cause to believe that evidence of Employee’s probation violation is contained in the laptop.