CA2: Two anonymous calls proved no better than one; no RS

Two anonymous calls that were recorded provided no indicia of reliability. The police tried to call back and got no answer. United States v. Freeman, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22594 (2d Cir. November 7, 2013)*:

That the caller contacted 911 twice simply means that the content of both calls could not be assessed based on the caller’s reputation for honesty and that the caller could face the consequences for untruthful reporting for neither one of the calls. The fact that the anonymous caller made both of these calls, refused to identify herself, and could not be reached back via phone by the 911 operator merely indicates that there were two anonymous calls from the same individual, instead of just one. It does nothing to bolster her credibility. Furthermore, that the caller was an eyewitness makes the instant case no different than J.L.; there, in order to observe that J.L. was waiting at the bus stop clad in a plaid shirt, the caller would have been an eyewitness as well. Here, as the government stresses, the caller gave more information about Freeman’s appearance and location than did the caller in J.L., but that does not make the information provided anything but “[a]n accurate description of [Freeman’s] readily observable location and appearance.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 272. The fact that the anonymous call here was more detailed as to physical description and location does not alter the fact that such details merely serve to “correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse.” Id. Increased specificity on these dimensions does nothing to “show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity.” Id. Just as in J.L., “[t]he reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.” Id. Likewise, the district court’s reliance on the fact that Freeman was the only individual in the area matching the description, as compared to three individuals who matched the description in J.L., does nothing to alter the reliability of the tip or the overall analysis of whether there was reasonable suspicion. That Freeman was the only individual in the area matching the description simply means that it was that much easier to “correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse,” id. Identifying “a determinate person,” a task made easier by Freeman being the only individual matching the description, does not bolster the tip’s reliability “in its assertion of illegality,” and thus this case remains governed by the rule laid out in J.L. Id.