Failure to leave an inventory is not a suppression issue under Hudson

Assuming, without deciding, that defendant did not receive a copy of the inventory of the seizure (and the evidence tended to indicate that he did not), the court would not suppress the search under Hudson because this is not a constitutional defect that the exclusionary rule was designed for. United States v. Makki, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27034 (E.D. Mich. April 12, 2007):

Here, as in Hudson, given that a valid search warrant entitled the agents to look for the items listed on Attachment A at the Medical Office and the Residence, “[r]esort[ing] to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt is unjustified.” Hector, 474 F.3d at 1155 (quoting Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168). Regardless of whether the agents had shown Defendant the search warrant, they would have executed it and found the items seized inside the Medical Office and the Residence. Therefore, “while the acquisition of the [evidence seized by the agents] was the product of a search pursuant to a warrant, it was not the ‘fruit of the fact’ that the [agents failed to provide Defendant with a list of items to be seized].” Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2169.

In addition, the causal connection between any failure to provide Defendant with a list of the items to be seized and the evidence actually seized is

“highly attenuated, indeed non-existent, in this case. … [as] the only legitimate interest served by the presentation of [the list of items to be seized] … is to head off breaches of the peace by dispelling any suspicion that the search is illegitimate. … This interest does not implicate the seizure of evidence described [in the list of items to be seized] in the search warrant nor would it be vindicated by suppression of the evidence seized.”

Hector, 474 F.3d at 1155.

Accordingly, in light of the rationale of the exclusionary rule and the considerations set out by the Supreme Court in Hudson, the Court concludes that suppression of the evidence in this case would not be an appropriate remedy.

Detention at gunpoint and with handcuffs does not per se turn a stop on reasonable suspicion into an arrest. United States v. Valenzuela, 231 Fed. Appx. 785 (10th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished):

The officer’s conduct in this case did not exceed the scope of a Terry stop under the circumstances and was reasonable at all times. We have previously held a Terry stop does not necessarily become unreasonable because officers draw their weapons and point them at a subject. See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1506 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Neff, 300 F.3d at 1220. “[T]he use of guns in connection with a stop is permissible where the police reasonably believes the weapons are necessary for their protection.” Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1462. In holding the use of firearms reasonable under certain circumstances, we noted that “[w]henever the police confront an individual reasonably believed to present a serious and imminent danger to the safety of the police and public, they are justified in taking reasonable steps to reduce the risk that anyone will get hurt.” United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1274 (10th Cir. 1982).

Defendant consented to entry of the officers, and he was arrested. A protective sweep was then justified. “Consequently, officers were constitutionally entitled to seize the incriminating evidence found in plain view during the protective sweep.” United States v. James, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27278 (D. Kan. April 11, 2007).*