Entry into plaintiff’s alleged crack house by city building inspectors was not an unconstitutional entry as an administrative search. Anderson v. Morrow, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13028 (W.D. Pa. February 26, 2007):
It is undisputed that the warrantless search of Plaintiff’s alleged home did in fact take place. While municipal searches of residential structures for code violations typically requires that a search warrant be obtained, Camara, 387 U.S. at 533, defendants “may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has noted that, “as a practical matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry.” Camara, 387 U.S. at 539-40 (1967) (emphasis added). Here, entry to 7428 Monticello Street was never refused (in fact, the record evidence shows that the door was open), and there were numerous “satisfactory reason[s] for securing immediate entry” – namely the numerous housing code violations and complaints from neighbors that the residence was operating as a “crack house.” Under these circumstances, there were exigencies which excused the entry without a warrant.
As the decision not to obtain a warrant for the search at issue was based upon a “special government need beyond that of normal law enforcement,” e.g., the need to protect public safety, it was appropriate for the inspectors to proceed to inspect the premises without obtaining a warrant, and this decision comported with the requirement of reasonableness mandated by the Fourth Amendment. Neumeyer, 421 F.3d at 214.
To reiterate, the authority pursuant to which employees of BBI conducted the warrantless search of 7428 Monticello Street is found in Section 104.6 of the BOCA Building Code, which permits inspections when necessary to enforce other provisions of the Code, or where there is reasonable cause to believe that a code violation or safety risk exists. The BBI had reasonable cause to believe that an unsafe and dangerous condition existed in violation of the code that made 7428 Monticello Street unsafe, dangerous or hazardous (see Sworn Affidavit of Kathleen Kraus, Exhibit D, Doc. No. 41 at 9); and as the residence was unoccupied, the Defendants made reasonable efforts to locate the owner of the property (id. at 11-12).
Here, entry to 7428 Monticello Street was never refused (in fact, the door was open), and there were numerous “satisfactory reason[s] for securing immediate entry” – namely the litany of housing code violations and complaints from neighbors that the residence was operating as a “crack house.” See Sworn Affidavit of Paul Loy, Exhibit B, Doc. No. 41-6 at 1-2. Under these circumstances, there were exigencies which excused the entry without a warrant.
Informants provided credible information that defendant was selling drugs from his home. Also, “[t]here is no question that there was a substantial basis for the state judge to conclude that probable cause existed for the search of defendant’s laptop” for child porn. United States v. Kain, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12735 (E.D. Mo. February 23, 2007).*
Plaintiff held for four days on a mistakenly issued arrest warrant had no cause of action. At worst, the people causing the mistake were negligent, and that is an insufficient basis to state a constitutional claim. Aing v. City of Philadelphia, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12910 (E.D. Pa. February 23, 2007).*
Plaintiff who prevailed in his habeas case that defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging his search who was discharged and not retried loses his civil rights case against the arresting and searching officers on qualified immunity grounds. Howie v. Hawk, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12845 (W.D. N.C. February 22, 2007):
With regard to defendants Pierce and McAllister, as has been noted, the plaintiff clearly is entitled to be free of unlawful searches and seizures. However, because the undersigned finds that the Officers reasonably believed–albeit erroneously–that they were entitled to search the plaintiff’s room, they are entitled to qualified immunity from this action for damages.
To be sure, the doctrine of qualified immunity should be applied where, like here, a reasonable person in the Officers’ position would have known that his or her actions violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Smith v. Reddy, 101 F.3d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1995). Here, it stands to reason that if numerous State courts reviewed the conduct of the Officers and did not find it to be unconstitutional, the Officers clearly could have reasonably believed that their conduct was lawful. Consequently, the plaintiff also cannot prevail on either his Fourth or Eighth Amendment claims against the defendant Officers.
