SCOTUS argument today: Qualified immunity for excessive force in ramming fleeing car in a traffic pursuit

Scott v. Harris, No. 05-1631.

Questions presented:

1. Whether a law enforcement officer’s conduct is “objectively reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment when the officer makes a split-second decision to terminate a high-speed pursuit by bumping the fleeing suspect’s vehicle with his push bumper, because the suspect had demonstrated that he would continue to drive in a reckless and dangerous manner that put the lives of innocent persons at serious risk of death.

2. Whether, at the time of the incident, the law was “clearly established” when neither this Court nor any circuit court, including the Eleventh Circuit, had ruled the Fourth Amendment is violated when a law enforcement officer uses deadly force to protect the lives of innocent persons from the risk of dangerous and reckless
vehicular flight.

Decision below: Harris v. Coweta County, Ga., 433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005).

The brief for Petitioner Scott is here, and the brief for Respondent Harris is here.

Summary from the Willamette University College of Law:

The issue in this case is whether a police officer reasonably used deadly force under the Fourth Amendment to stop a traffic offender driving and fleeing at excessive speeds, and whether that conduct entitled the officer to qualified immunity against a lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On March 29, 2001, petitioner Victor Harris was traveling approximately 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile-per-hour zone. A Coweta County Deputy clocked Harris’ speed and initiated pursuit, but Harris continued, increasing his speed and driving in a reckless and dangerous fashion. Eventually, Coweta County Deputy Timothy Scott took over the pursuit, and requested permission to make use of a “precision intervention technique” (PIT), a
maneuver in which the pursuer stops a fleeing vehicle by striking it in a specific manner, throwing the car into a spin and bringing it to a stop. Despite having received no training in the technique, Scott received approval, but later determined Harris’ speed precluded use of the PIT. Scott instead rammed his cruiser directly into Harris’ vehicle, ultimately rendering Harris quadriplegic. Harris filed suit against Scott in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under § 1983, claiming a seizure by excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

Scott moved for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, which the District Court denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial, stating that under Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), Scott’s deadly force was clearly excessive because a traffic pursuit is not a crime involving a threat of serious physical harm and therefore Scott was not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Scott will argue to the United States Supreme Court that reasonableness is the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard and that in using this standard he is entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably believed his actions would avoid a greater risk of serious injury or death. He further argues that even if his actions were not reasonable, he is still entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer in the same position would have believed his conduct lawful given the information possessed and clearly established law regarding excessive force and vehicle contacts. [Summarized by Ian Jeffrey
Slavin.]