“Second look” at wallet in property room was valid

“Second look” at property lawfully seized while in the property room was valid. The defendant did not contest the initial seizure because it was valid. The second look came days later when it was discovered that there might be something there that was unimportant at the time of the initial seizure, and it was valid, too. United States v. Aldaco, 477 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2007).

Valid traffic stop led to reasonable suspicion. United States v. Jimenez, 478 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 2007):

The conflicting stories regarding the travel plans; the fact that Ms. Jimenez was planning to leave the vehicle in Minneapolis; the lack of tickets, money, and plans to return home after leaving the car; her nervousness when speaking with Officer Oetter; and the fact that the vehicle’s kick panel and molding had been removed and were visible in the back seat of the car all support the officer’s decision to further investigate. … While these and the other factors noted in the record standing alone individually may not be enough to raise a reasonable suspicion, when considered together, they are sufficient to warrant Officer Oetter’s further investigation.

In a § 1983 action where the defendant was convicted, the action is limited to the unreasonable detention and search only, and not to the conviction. Davenport v. County of Suffolk, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12696 (E.D. N.Y. February 23, 2007):

There is no question that Townes prevents Davenport from recovering damages for his subsequent arrest and prosecution based upon his unreasonable search and seizure claim. However, unlike the plaintiff in Townes, Davenport does not limit the damages sought to his arrest and conviction, but also seeks damages from the alleged unreasonable stop and seizure prior to his arrest. The Second Circuit recognized that, if the plaintiff in Townes had sought damages from the stop and initial search of his person, such damages would have been available. Id. (“[Plaintiff’s] only possible damage claim would be limited to the brief invasion of privacy related to the seizure and initial search of his person.”). More specifically, “[v]ictims of unreasonable searches or seizures may recover damages directly related to the invasion of their privacy– including (where appropriate) damages for physical injury, property damage, injury to reputation,” and related damages. Id. at 148. Therefore, such damages are clearly available to Davenport if he can prove that a Fourth Amendment violation of his rights occurred during the initial stop and search of his person prior to arrest. Under Second Circuit law, Davenport is entitled to a trial even if he is only able to recover slight or nominal damages. Id. at 146; see also Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, No. 00-CV-0824, 2001 WL 1217224, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2001) (where plaintiff sought damages for alleged invasion of privacy before marijuana discovered, “[w]hether a jury would award compensatory damages for the brief detention suffered by the Plaintiff is . . . a question of fact”). Accordingly, the Court denies summary judgment as to plaintiff’s unreasonable search and seizure claim.